2026 SL viewer release summaries week #12

Logos representative only and should not be seen as an endorsement / preference / recommendation

Updates from the week through to Sunday, March 22nd, 2026

This summary is generally published every Monday, and is a list of SL viewer / client releases (official and TPV) made during the previous week. When reading it, please note:

  • It is based on my Current Viewer Releases Page, a list of all Second Life viewers and clients that are in popular use (and of which I am aware), and which are recognised as adhering to the TPV Policy.
  • This page includes comprehensive links to download pages, blog notes, release notes, etc., as well as links to any / all reviews of specific viewers / clients made within this blog.
  • By its nature, this summary presented here will always be in arrears, please refer to the Current Viewer Release Page for more up-to-date information.
  • Outside of the Official viewer, and as a rule, alpha / beta / nightly or release candidate viewer builds are not included; although on occasions, exceptions might be made.

Official LL Viewers

  • Default viewer  – Legacy search; WebRTC improvements; QoL improvements – 26.1.0.22641522367 – March 12.
  • Second Life Project Viewers:
    • Second Life Project Flat UI – 26.2.0.22829286351, March 20 -“flat” UI and font updates.
    • Second Life Lua Editor Alpha viewer 26.1.0.21525310258, February 12.
    • Second Life One Click Install viewer 26.1.0.21295806042, January 26 – one-click viewer installation.
    • Second Life Voice Moderation viewer 26.1.0.20139269477, December 12, 2025 – Introduces the ability to moderate spatial voice chat in regions configured to use webRTC voice.

LL Viewer Resources

Third-party Viewers

V7-style

  • Kirstens Viewer S24(5) VETR Beta 4 (Build 2955) – March 13 – release notes.

V1-style

Mobile / Other Clients

  • Second Life Mobile version 1081/2, March 20 – new user chatbot; support for Portuguese in app UI.

Additional TPV Resources

Related Links

Space Sunday: more Moon bits

The Artemis 2 SLS and Orion MPCV depart the Vehicle Assembly Bulding at Kennedy Space Centre on March 20th (UTC), heading back out to the pad for a potential launch on April 1st, 2026. Credit: Terry Renna / Associated Press

The Space Launch System (SLS) which will launch a crew of four on a trip around the Moon aboard their Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) during the Artemis 2 mission, has returned to the launch pad at Kennedy Space Centre’s Launch complex 39B (LC-39B).

The rocket had to be returned to the Vehicle Assembly Building on February 25th, 2026 after a helium pressurisation issue was found in the rocket’s upper Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), resulting in a helium leak.  While the leak could be resolved with the vehicle on the pad, the need to ensure the ICPS has a stable helium pressure flow when in operation called for a rollback to the VAB to allow engineers unfettered access to the upper stage in order to resolve the problem.

The second roll-out to the pad mirrored the preparations for the Artemis 1 uncrewed mission in late 2022, which also saw the SLS rocket used on that flight rolled out to the pad, encounter issues (with the main propellant feed mechanism intended to fill the rocket’s tanks with liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen) then rolled back to the VAB, before a second roll-out to the launch vehicle back to the pad. Given the overall success of Artemis 1 (despite leading to concerns over the Orion capsule’s heat shield), the roll-out, rollback, roll-back of Artemis 2 might be seen as a good (if delaying) omen.

A close-up of the Orion MPCV encased within its Launch Abort System (LAS) shroud, the LAS motor visible on the tower above it, and the European service Module (ESM) directly below the capsule’s “dome” protected by its pair of white payload fairings. Credit: Terry Renna / Associated Press

The second roll-out took place overnight on March 20th, 2026 UTC (March 19th – 20th, US EDT) with the rocket and its Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) inching away from the confines of the VAB atop one of NASA’s mighty Crawler-Transporters. The 6.4 kilometre journey to the pad took almost 12 hours to complete, with the SLS and MLP positioned on the pad at around 15:20 UTC on March 20th.

The next launch window for the mission opens on April 1st, 2026 and runs through the first few days of April. NASA is currently targeting the very opening of the launch window on April 1st for a launch attempt, giving them maximum leeway should any minor issues occur or the weather decides to play a hand in matters.

An infographic produced by L3Harris, an Artemis contractor, highlighting features of the Artemis 2 mission, including the on-orbit rendezvous and docking simulations the crew will perform using the SLS ICPS as a dummy target, and the fact the flight will be a last hurrah for NASA’s most reliable Space Shuttle Main Engine, having flown 15 previous times. Credit: L3Harris

Once launched, Artemis 2 will initially enter a 24-hour orbit around Earth. During this time several critical systems not carried aboard Artemis 1 will be tested and checked. Additionally the ICPS will be used to lift Orion into an elliptical orbit with a high apogee whilst imparting the craft with much of the velocity it will need to head for the Moon.

The ICPS will then separate from Orion and its European Service Module (ESM) and become a passive dummy target for the crew on Orion to carryout mock rendezvous and docking manoeuvres of the kind Orion will have to perform when operating around the Moon in future missions in order to dock with the lunar landing vehicles and (later) Gateway station.

Once these tests have been completed, Orion will use the ESM’s min motor to push it into a free return trajectory around the Moon on a trip lasting 9-10 days, affording the crew time to thoroughly check-out Orion’s systems and amenities.

EUS Replacement  – I Called It

On February 27th, 2026, NASA provided an update on the entire Project Artemis, noting some significant changes to mission and vehicles (see Space Sunday: major Artemis updates and a rollback).

One of these changes was the cancellation of the planned Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) the more powerful upper stage for the SLS that has been under development at Boeing for several years, and would replace the ICPS on mission from around Artemis 5 (now Artemis 6).

ULA”s Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) for the SLS rocket, now set to be replaced in the future by ULA’s Centaur V. Credit: ULA

At the time of the announcement no indication was given as to what would be used to replace the EUS and ICPS, or whether NASA was looking at something to match the ICPS or EUS in capabilities. However, in my article linked to above, I noted that as far as I could see, there were only two possible contenders: Blue Origin, with their New Glenn upper stage, or United Launch Alliance (ULA) with their Vulcan-Centaur V upper stage, part of a family of Centaur upper stages that has gained a long and venerable operational history.

On March 10th, 2026 NASA confirmed my thinking by making a procurement filing to replace the ICPS and EUS with ULA’s Vulcan-Centaur V. Whilst some modifications to the stage will be required, the V-C 5 was selected by NASA in part because of its pedigree stretching back over 60 years (which was seen as overcoming the fact the Centaur V has itself only flown twice), and in part because it is almost a simple drop-in replacement for EUS and (particularly) ICPS.

The first Centaur V (officially designated the Vulcan-Centaur V) to roll off of ULA’s production line, and used in ULA’s first Vulcan-Centaur rocket launch. Credit: Tony Burno (former CEO of ULA)

Once upgraded, the V-C 5 will offer more-or-less the same capabilities as ICPS, but not as great as the EUS. However, the lineage of Centaur means NASA has an assured route to have the system upgraded to meet future needs, if required.

The NASA announcement also indicated that, per my theorising, they had also considered the Blue Origin New Glenn upper stage. This was only ruled out on the basis it has only flown twice thus far – albeit completely successfully on both occasions – and NASA wanted an upper stage replacement will a decent launch / success / failure history and a track record of development they could properly evaluate.

ULA’s established infrastructure, resources, flight history, existing cross-program integration, and human-rating familiarity with the Centaur upper stage represents the only currently viable opportunity for the Government to accomplish Artemis mission objectives and requirements while also maintaining the agency’s programmatic goals.

– From the NASA procurement filing

So, yay me for calling it.

Artemis Accord Signatories Mull How to Deal with Emergencies and More

When a single nation goes to the Moon, there’s a pretty narrow field of operational requirements that need to be dealt with to keep people safe, avoid misunderstandings, demote working areas, and in handling thing like emergency situations.

When multiple nations decide to not only head for the Moon, but head for the same part of the Moon – in this case the South Polar Region – such requirements get a lot more complicated.

Currently, there are two confirmed groups of nations participating in projects aimed towards a long-term human presence within the Moon’s SPR – those of the US-led Artemis Accords (numbering, at the time of writing, 61 nations – not all of whom will be seeking to send their own astronauts to the Moon) and the China and (nominally) Russian-led International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), comprising (at the time of writing) 13 nations.

As such, serious considerations need to be given to managing diverse (or even competitive) lunar operations, denoting separate research and work environments, establishing buffer zone between different interests and working areas, and – critically – how to handle emergencies and provide emergency support.

The latter is something very much up in the air – although one would hope any emergency call for assistance would be responded to without regard to the nationality or allegiance of those making the call. For the former – the establishment of buffer zones is seen by members of the Artemis Accords as the way to go, although they prefer the term “safety zones”.

These would, in theory, allow signatory states pursue their own specific research interests on the Moon without the risk unintentional (or even intentional) interference from other member states. The problem is, how should a “safety zone” be defined? Should limits be placed on the size of such zones? How should they be recognised? How lawful would they be? How can they be enforced when it comes to non-Artemis nations?

A major concern here is that of territorialism: member states (or even the Artemis project as a whole) laying claim to a large area of the Moon, or even an entire region. Such claims are explicitly outlawed under the 1967 Space Treaty, but if sufficient resources of a valuable nature are found in a particular area of the Moon, is that treaty enough to stop a nation establishing a presence there and declaring an exclusionary “safe zone” around it before hoisting their flag and treating it as a national enclave? And what sort of response should that garner if it did happen?

We’re a long way away from where these issues might start to become problems, but they do need to be addressed in some form – and not just by members of the Artemis Accords – but by all nations, whether or not they are signatories to the Accords or the ILRS.

Lunar Ice Might be Rarer than Thought

One of the reasons for the interest in sending humans to the lunar South Polar Region has been the fact that the region is heavily cratered, and due to their position, many of the bottoms of these craters never see daylight or feel the Sun’s heat. Referred to as permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) it has been theorised that these craters could be home to large, accessible (or at least semi-accessible) deposits of the Moon’s water ice – which would be enormously beneficial to human operations on the Moon if they could be exploited.

This idea is backed-up by PSRs elsewhere in the solar system being home o water ice, including the planet mercury and the asteroid Ceres, to name two examples. However, despite all our orbital observations of the Moon, confirming the presence of water ice in lunar PSRs has been difficult; not least because of the orbital complexities involved in get a satellite to overfly them and the fact they are very deeply shadowed when seen form orbit.

To try to understand just how much ice might be present in the bottoms of permanently shadowed craters on the Moon, a team of US researchers operating out of the University of Hawaii at Manoa developed ShadowCam, an imaging system 200 times more light-sensitive than most other cameras used to study and map the Moon from orbit.

ShadowCam forms a part of the payload flown aboard the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter Danuri, South Korea’s first lunar mission, which entered orbit around the Moon in December 2022. Classified as a NASA experiment, ShadowCam first flexed its muscles in mid-2023, demonstrating it raw ability to see in to PSRs and reveal never-before-seen details.

A computer rendering of the 678 kg Danuri (Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter), which hosts the ShadowCam imaging system. Credit: South Korea Ministry of Science and ICT

More recently, ShadowCam has been engaged in a campaign to image multiple PSRs in the Moon’s Polar Regions (north and south) to reveal more of their secrets. And while the campaign has been very successful in providing new data and information on the observed craters, the one thing it hasn’t found is any sign of water ice deposits.

To be clear, any water ice contained within lunar craters is not going to be pure. It’s going to be mixed with and even covered by a layer of lunar regolith (the loose dust and rock fragments making up the surface material of the Moon). As such, these mixtures would produce different levels of reflectance and light scattering depending on the regolith-to-ice ratios encountered, although astronomers work on the basis that a mixture that is around 20-30% water ice would be enough to be detected by a sensitive-enough imaging system – and as noted, ShadowCam is very sensitive.

A selection of ShadowCam images of lunar North Pole and south Pole PSRs, with features and details the system has revealed for the first time – although none of them show any indication of water ice within the craters. Credit: Nasa / University of Hawaii

However, none of the dozens of PSRs on the Moon imaged by the instrument showed any signature that might indicate water ice was present in some degree. This doesn’t necessarily mean the water ice is not there; it could exist in percentages as low as 10%, or even in single digits – as these are levels too small for ShadowCam to currently detect, although the University of Hawaii team hope to be able to use software updates in their processing software that would reveal water ice in concentrations as low as 1%.

But that said, the real rub here is that even if such low percentages of water ice are revealed, and assuming ShadowCam’s results hold as more lunar PSRs are examined, then it is obvious that the hoped-for abundance of water ice to assist in lunar operations simply don’t exist or might be so small as to not be worth the expense and effort in trying to exploit them. As such, the water needed to help sustain human operations on the Moon and to enable various construction and technology options is going to become a further payload mass that will have to be routinely shipped from Earth.

2026 week #12: SL Open Source (TPVD) meeting summary

Hippotropolis Theatre: home of the OSD/TPVD meeting
The following notes were taken from:

  • Pantera’s video (embedded at the end of this article) and my chat log of the Open-Source Developer (OSD) meeting held on Friday, March 20th, 2026, together with my chat log of that meeting.
  • Please note that this is not a full transcript of the meeting but a summary of key topics.
Table of Contents

Meeting Purpose

  • The OSD meeting is a combining of the former Third Party Viewer Developer meeting and the Open Source Development meeting. It is open discussion of Second Life development, including but not limited to open source contributions, third-party viewer development and policy, and current open source programs.
    • This meeting is generally held twice a month on a Friday, at 13:00 SLT at the Hippotropolis Theatre and is generally text chat only.
  • Dates and times of meetings are recorded in the SL Public Calendar.

Official Viewer Status

  • Default viewer  – Legacy search; WebRTC improvements; QoL improvements – 26.1.0.22641522367 – March 12.
  • Second Life Project Viewers:
    • Second Life Project Flat UI – 26.2.0.22829286351, March 20 -“flat” UI and font updates.
    • Second Life Lua Editor Alpha viewer 26.1.0.21525310258, February 12.
    • Second Life One Click Install viewer 26.1.0.21295806042, January 26 – one-click viewer installation.
    • Second Life Voice Moderation viewer 26.1.0.20139269477, December 12, 2025 – Introduces the ability to moderate spatial voice chat in regions configured to use webRTC voice.

Upcoming Viewers

Viewer 2026.01.01 – One-Click Installer / Velopack

  • Remains the current viewer development focus, with a beta (RC) update targeting a potential availability in week #13 (week commencing Monday, March 23rd). Actual promotion to release status depends on how long the viewer may ned to remain at RC status.
    • There is one major blocker to promotion, which is being worked on, but otherwise, it is “very close” to being a candidate for release, user feedback allowing.
  • Geenz Linden noted that the repo for the viewer is getting updates to more easily ship updates for those TPVs opting to adopt Velopack as their updater.
  • Velopack benefits:
    • The move to Velopack allows LL and TPVs  to move off from VVM with the exception of cohort management, and allows LL to discontinue the old SLVersionChecker all of which should streamline the viewer install and update processes as experienced by users.
    • Velopack also opens the door to partial viewer updates  – although LL are still in internal discussions on when to actually start doing this.
  • A side effect of this viewer, when generally available, is that it will not automatically uninstall versions of the viewer using the old install / update processes, and there will be no requirement to manually uninstall such versions (although users can if they wish). The reason for this latter point is a concern that inexperienced users will simply click YES when asked if they wish to remove all their settings, etc., and thus lose them.
  • Testing of this viewer against incoming new users to SL saw a “not insignificant” increase in day 1 user retention..

Viewer 2026.02 – “Flat” UI and Splash Screen Refresh

  • An alpha version (see viewer status, above) was released on Friday, March 20th, but without the log-in splash screen updates. These will be in an upcoming update.
  • This viewer includes the “flat” UI design, font updates and WebRTC voice moderation capabilities to help align viewer-side WebRTC updates more with the server-side.
Example of the upcoming flat UI. Via: Geenz Linden / Github #4681/2

Viewer 2026.03 – Maintenance Release

  • 2026.03 will now see the return of official viewer maintenance releases, with the initial focus on viewer performance improvements, together with a focus on top crashers and regressions, up to a certain limit, so they can be kept as relatively small releases rolled out on a reasonably fast basis.
  • 2026.03 should see (partial list):
    • A backporting of the texture streaming changes at the very least, with Geenz particularly focused on getting lower RAM usage in general.
    • Kitty Barnett’s long-waiting avatar appearance fixes.
  • Geenz also hopes to get some work done on lightening the main thread burden in the viewer – which is potentially more difficult, and may take longer.
  • A hope with this cycle of maintenance releases is to put a reasonable dent in some of the debt we’ve accumulated with PBR’s release.

Viewer 2024.04 – SLVP or LUA (TBD)

  • The 2026.04 viewer release is liable to be either the Second Life Visual Polish (SLVP) release (containing all of the SSR, PBR Specular, and HDR EEP parameters work), or a SLua release.
  • Work on improving mirrors for SLVP is currently on hold whilst 2026.01.01 and 2026.02 is on the table.
  • SLVP is liable to spend a long time at alpha status (which may be why SLua moves ahead of it in the order of things).

WebRTC Deployment

  • This commenced on Wednesday, March 18th, with a deployment to the BlueSteel RC channel covering approximately 3.4% of the grid.
  • This early release allows us to verify performance, stability, and compatibility in real-world conditions before expanding further.
  • Users in the release candidate channel may experience:
    • Failure of peer-to-peer (P2) Voice calls between regions on WebRTC and the rest of the grid. These will not be fully resolved until WebRTC is grid-wide.
    • Differences in audio quality depending on being in or out of the release candidate channel.
    • Ongoing tuning and iteration as we gather feedback.
    • For more details, see: WebRTC Voice in Second Life — Limited Release Begins March 18, 2026.
  • The next, larger deployment is currently scheduled for week #14 (commencing Monday, March 30th). However, a smaller deployment might be made in week #13.
  • There are thoughts being given to next steps for WebRTC: transcription, the ability in-preferences to hear how you sound, etc. (a replacement for echo canyon), but these are subject to other priorities.
  • The existing Vivox Voice service is liable to be shut down “a few months” after the WebRTC deployment has been completed. However, no target date has as yet been decided.
    • During the deployment phase, Vivox, users on the latter will not have spatial Voice when in WebRTC regions, although they should have p2p/conference/group voice with others on Vivox regions.

General Discussion

  • Mesh Convex Hulls:
    • The new physics choice for mesh uploads is currently available on ARM Macs, and on the “to do” list for other viewers.
    • Geenz’s first choice for the role choked on a lot of content for SL, so VHACD is the choice of libraries.
    • As has been previously mentioned, the aim is to remove the Havok sub-libraries from the viewer entirely – but this a process several steps down the line.
  • There was a general discussion on performance, lightening the load on the viewer’s main processing thread (some noted above).

Next Meeting

2026 week #12: SUG meeting summary

The Great Mother, January 2026 – blog post

The following notes were taken from the Tuesday, March 3ed, 2026 Simulator User Group (SUG) meeting. These notes form a summary of the items discussed, and are not intended to be a full transcript. They were taken from the video recording by Pantera, embedded at the end of this summary – my thanks to Pantera for providing it.

Meeting Overview

  • The Simulator User Group (also referred to by its older name of Server User Group) exists to provide an opportunity for discussion about simulator technology, bugs, and feature ideas is held every other Tuesday at 12:00 noon, SLT (holidays, etc., allowing), per the Second Life Public Calendar.
  • The “SUG Leviathan Hour” meetings are held on the Tuesdays which do not have a formal SUG meeting, and are chaired by Leviathan Linden. They are more brainstorming / general discussion sessions.
  • Meetings are held in text in-world, at this location.

Simulator Deployments

  • No deployments are planned for the week, channels will be restarted.
  • WebRTC deployment is now planned to commence on Wednesday, March 18th with a deployment to the BlueSteel RC channel. Progression from there will likely be subject to how it settles, issues arising, etc.

In Brief

  • Rider Linden:
    • Has some Lua work waiting on him to add support for script information to inventory and the viewer. Basically, scripts will have an inventory subtype that can be either LSL or Lua and it will also have some meta data which is the VM that the script was compiled for (LSO, Mono, Luau).
    • This week he is taking care of a long standing issue with mesh uploading costs, and the fix should hopefully surface in the 2026.02 viewer release.
  • Leviathan Linden:
    • Has been working on is to try to improve login/teleport/region-cross success rate. The idea is to improve the reliability of the UDP packets that are used for viewer<–>simulator connections.
    • He has a Pull Request for this up against the viewer, although he’s not sure the core of the issue lies within the viewer. Rather he believes similar changes server-side will probably make a bigger difference.
    • Currently this work is largely complete and going through validation.
    • Once released, it will not “fix all region crossings” – as there are multiple issues with them that need to be tackled – it his work should hopefully be a further step towards improving things.
    • In addition, Leviathan has been attempting to better understand a fix proposed by Cool VL Viewer’s Henri Beauchamp to reduce the time avatars with attachments spend being a cloud. He believes the fix is the right way to go – asking the server to re-send attachment details (which currently doesn’t happen) along with texture data (which is resent when an avatar has issues “de-clouding”). He hopes to have the simulator updates for this ready for deployment after WebRTC has gone out.
  • Harold Linden (SLua):
    • Has been working to refactor some of the common Lua standard library functions that currently lead to “failed to perform mandatory yield” errors in user scripts. As a result, he hopes such errors will be fixed with the next SLua deployment.
    • He is also working on a refactor of lljson to make it easier to convert things back to proper Lua types when serialize / deserialize your data with the JSON serializer
      Working on meta problems, such as identifying Voice issues.
    • The next viewer-side update could be in “the next two weeks”.
    • Further work on SLua is dependent on the continued feedback of those using it.
    • It was noted generally that the is further work to be forthcoming (e.g. sim caps for slua_default.d.luau).
    • Harold also confirmed the Lua scripting system runs on a single thread.

General Discussion

Please refer to the video below as well.

  • SLua warning: as per my previous CCUG summary, the next Lua deployment will have breaking changes. At a minimum scripts will need to recompiling, as they otherwise will not run.
  • A general discussion on Voice roll-off for WebRTC and general voice tethering to prevent eavesdropping. When moving your avatar / camera away from others who are speak, Voice so decrease down to nothing at 60 metres. However, it has been reported that simply zooming the camera out from the current position does not result in Voice roll-off.
    • This discussion also wrapped around the limitations of Bluetooth headsets / microphones which can affect Voice quality.
  • User Tapple Gao has put forward a feature request for improved animations without resorting to a “heavy” project like puppetry. This is currently being tracked by the Lab.
  • The are issues around logging in and capability granting which can result in non-graceful disconnects and log-in failures due to capabilities failing to create.
    • Some of these issues had been fixed, but the lab acknowledged there are potential more issues that can cause the same outcome.
    • Monty noted that L and firestorm have recently been jointly poking at the problems.
    • A suggested recommendation for those experiencing disconnects / log-outs of this nature is to either wait 2 minutes before a re-try, or to try logging-in to a non-neighbouring region to the one being used at the time of the crash.
  • A general discussion on scripts and scripting and future Lua development work took-up most of the second half of the meeting.

Date of Next Meetings

  • Leviathan Linden: Tuesday, March 24th, 2026.
  • Formal SUG meeting: Tuesday, March 31st, 2026.

† The header images included in these summaries are not intended to represent anything discussed at the meetings; they are simply here to avoid a repeated image of a rooftop of people every week. They are taken from my list of region visits, with a link to the post for those interested.

2026 SL viewer release summaries week #11

Logos representative only and should not be seen as an endorsement / preference / recommendation

Updates from the week through to Sunday, March 15th, 2026

This summary is generally published every Monday, and is a list of SL viewer / client releases (official and TPV) made during the previous week. When reading it, please note:

  • It is based on my Current Viewer Releases Page, a list of all Second Life viewers and clients that are in popular use (and of which I am aware), and which are recognised as adhering to the TPV Policy.
  • This page includes comprehensive links to download pages, blog notes, release notes, etc., as well as links to any / all reviews of specific viewers / clients made within this blog.
  • By its nature, this summary presented here will always be in arrears, please refer to the Current Viewer Release Page for more up-to-date information.
  • Outside of the Official viewer, and as a rule, alpha / beta / nightly or release candidate viewer builds are not included; although on occasions, exceptions might be made.

Official LL Viewers

  • This list reflects those viewers available via the first four links in the LL Viewer Resources section, below.
    • Default viewer  – Legacy search; WebRTC improvements; QoL improvements – 26.1.0.22641522367 – March 12NEW
    • Second Life Project Viewers:
      • Second Life Lua Editor Alpha viewer 26.1.0.21525310258, February 12.
      • Second Life Voice Moderation viewer 26.1.0.20139269477, December 12.
        • Introduces the ability to moderate spatial voice chat in regions configured to use webRTC voice.
      • Second Life One Click Install viewer 26.1.0.21295806042, January 26, 2026 – one-click viewer installation.

LL Viewer Resources

Third-party Viewers

V7-style

  • Kirstens Viewer S24(5) VETR Beta 4 (Build 2955) – March 13 – release notes.

V1-style

Mobile / Other Clients

  • Second Life Mobile version 1081/2, March 6 – object chat fixes.
  • Radegast client version 2.52, March 3 – release notes.

Additional TPV Resources

Related Links

Space Sunday: of China’s goals and radiation belts

A artist’s impression of the first Chinese crewed mission to the surface of the Moon, taking some liberties with the appearance of the Lanyue lunar lander and the position of the Earth relative to the horizon. Credit: Getty Images

I’ve covered China’s space programme in some detail in these pages, not so much because I’m a fan of the Chinese government, but because – and US readers may not like it – China has proven it can put together a highly competent and integrated national space programme. One that is, and despite all of its magnificent achievements to date over the decades, is far more integrated in terms of projects and goals than the US national space programme, which has, where manned space exploration is concerned, largely plodded along somewhat aimlessly for some 40 years.

Obviously, a lot of this comes down to politics and governance. The US government is answerable to the people, and this includes NASA which is – completely and utterly wrongly – seen by many as a high-cost waste of taxpayer money. I say “wrongly” deliberately, as NASA’s budget accounts for just 0.35% of the US federal budget. Compare that to the 62% gobbled up annually by the Pentagon.

Of course, there are considerable differences in scale and need between the Pentagon and NASA, but considering all the latter does achieve annually in the fields of space science, astronomy, space exploration health and safety, avionics and aeronautics even without firmer integration of its major goals and ambitions, adds up to NASA doing a huge amount for very little in the overall scheme of things.

China’s government does not answer to its people, ergo, its spending is entirely at its own whim. This means China can be more indulgent in its spending around space goals (something also helped by the fact that a good portion of the Chinese space programme is linked to the People’s Liberation Army, which can swallow costs and overruns in what might otherwise be seen as civilian operations in the name of “national security”).

Even so, since the 1970s, China has sought to pace its activities in space in a manner that is both pragmatic and which has enabled them to build expertise in planetary science, rocketry, launch capabilities and to develop a coordinated approach to space exploration. The latter, as I recently covered in these pages, is particularly notable within China’s lunar ambitions, which have throughout seen both robot missions (their family of Chang’e landers, orbiters and rovers) and upcoming human missions tied together in one over-arching programme – the Chinese Lunar Exploration Programme, or CLEP. True, NASA did something similar with Project Apollo and is doing so again with Project Artemis, but the degree of shared goals and progression from robotic to human exploration is not on the same scale as China’s.

China’s Tiangong space station not only operates as a Earth-orbiting research station, it has a number of roles to play in China’s lunar ambitions. Credit: CMSA

The same is true when it comes to China’s Tiangong space station and CLEP. This operates both as an independent orbital research facility and as an Earth-bound extension to CLEP, providing an on-orbit medical research facility, a training environment to help lunar crews carry out tasks in microgravity as they might whilst going to or returning from the Moon, and providing the means to develop food cultivation methods which could be employed on the Moon to help supplement diets.

As a part of this work, 2026 will see the launch of Shenzhou 23 in April. The 17th Chinese crewed spaceflight and the 23rd for the Shenzhou programme overall, the mission carry three tiakonauts to Tiangong, as is usual for such missions. However, unlike all crewed missions to date, which have seen personnel spend no longer than 6 months on the station, Shenzhou 23 will see one of the crew (as yet unnamed) spend a full year in orbit.

Such long duration missions are the stuff of legend for NASA and Roscosmos, with astronauts and cosmonauts alike spending in excess of a year in space, largely for medical research purposes (such as studying the impact of microgravity on the human physiology) and kind-of tangentially focused on some ideas of human deep space missions, such as the now defunct near-Earth asteroid rendezvous mission or looking towards some far-off mission to Mars.

For China, the goals are both similar and more immediate: the Chinese want to know more about the physical and psychological impact of a long-duration stay in near zero gravity and how the more debilitating effects might be countered and they want to start gathering data on the effects of something like a voyage to Mars undertaken in microgravity – a human mission to Mars also being one of their stated medium-term goals once they have established a presence on the Moon.

Also coming up this year is the first – and uncrewed – orbital flight test of China’s Mengzhou multi-purpose crewed space vehicle. Set to initially operate alongside Shenzhou (itself a derivative of Russia’s Soyuz vehicle), Mengzhou is set to be – as I’ve also mentioned previously – an integrated and highly-capable vehicle, designed to both provide three crew (as standard, although it can carry up to 6 or 7) with access to Tiangong, and also in an extended operations mode providing 3-4 taikonauts with a ride to lunar orbit.

China’s workhorse Shenzhou (left), comprising a forward cargo module with integrated airlock, a central crew module capable of supporting up to three tiakonauts and large service module, is due to be joined by the more up-to-date Mengzhou vehicle, capable of carrying crews of up to 6 or 7 in the forward (top) capsule unit, which can also include cargo racks, and a service module for power and propulsion. Credit: various

No target date for this orbital flight test has yet been given, but all major milestones required for it to take place have been successfully cleared, and its dedicated launch vehicle, the Long March 10 (CZ-10) is also very close to being ready for an orbital launch attempt, having passed the majority of its development and testing milestones.

Nor does it end there in terms of ambitions and integration. Like NASA and Roscosmos, China is working to encourage international cooperation and participation in its space aspirations.  CLEP is set to evolve into the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) project which will see participation in China’s lunar project from Russia, South Africa, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Pakistan and Egypt, to name the headline nations.

Whilst not as all encompassing as the Artemis Accords (which involve 61 countries at the time of writing), ILRS nevertheless points to the fact that China is determined to be a major leader in space-based human activities. To this end, Shenzhou 24, scheduled for later in 2026, will see a Pakistani astronaut fly to Tiangong, and there are plans to fly astronauts from both Macau and Hong Kong to the station as well (although these are more from Chinese-managed Special Administrative Regions rather than representatives from genuine foreign nations).

China’s First lunar Mission May Target Rimae Bode

Whilst the Chinese Lunar Exploration Programme is, like Project Artemis, focused on the South Polar Region of the Moon for the establishment of a lunar research station, the first crewed lunar landing on the Moon by Chinese nationals will not be in that region; instead, it will likely be to the lunar nearside, not too far from the equator.

Currently, the possible prime candidate for China’s first crewed mission to the Moon is Rimae Bode  (crater Bode) located to the left of Mare Vaporum (seen towards the right of the image above), within semi-chaotic and volcanic terrain. Credit:  Selenochromatics

There are several good reasons for this. Most notably, such a location would enjoy direct line-of-sight communications with Earth throughout the majority of the mission. Secondly, it can be timed to take place under more favourable lighting conditions than might be the case with a mission to the South Polar Region. Thirdly, it doesn’t require a lot of complex orbital manoeuvring in order to get the lander into the desired obit, again simplifying the overall mission profile. There’s also the fact that China has never been to the Moon before with a human crew, thus a nearside mission with full communications, etc., allows mission managers to gain vital experience in managing such a mission without the complications a polar landing might bring.

The potential landing zone for this – as yet unnamed mission, which is targeting 2030 – is Rimae Bode. Located at the boundary between Mare Vaporum and the highlands on the central lunar nearside, the area has been selected as the likely landing site because of its scientific value. Diversely volcanic, the region provides easy access to assorted  lunar material and differing terrain types within a relatively small area – ancient lava flows, rilles (long, narrow, channel-like features formed by ancient lava flows) and local impact craters which have left subsurface materials exposed on the surface for easy collection and study.

The Rimae Bode region (Bode also being the name of a local crater) is rich in “young” impact craters which may reveal secrets as to the Moon’s interior. Credit: NASA

Rimae Bode is actually one of 106 potential landing candidates under consideration for the first Chinese crewed landing on the Moon, but it has grown in popularity with scientists and mission planners because of its sheer diversity and opportunities for exploration. further, it has long been considered a site worthy of human and / or robotic exploration and because it is relatively accessible.

Of particular interest to scientists is the potential for Rimae Bode to reveal insights into the Moon’s deep interior.

The most ground-breaking discovery from the Rimae Bode region would likely come from the dark mantle deposits, which consist of volcanic ash and glass beads that were violently erupted from the moon’s deep interior billions of years ago. These samples act as ‘messengers’ from the lunar mantle, offering a rare opportunity to directly analyse the chemical composition of the moon’s deep heart — information that is usually hidden beneath miles of crust.

– Professor Jun Huang, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan

Examining this material together with studying the region’s complex network of lava channels, could help in the reconstruction of the Moon’s early volcanic history, with samples perhaps indicating how the Moon cooled and what triggered its most massive eruptions. Studies of the region and its rocks and minerals might even inform scientists on how all rocky planets, including Earth, cooled and evolved after their birth.

The final decision on a landing zone for the first Chinese crewed mission to the Moon has yet to be made, so Rimae Bode may yet lose out. However, given the nature of the region, its location and the fact it has long been the focus of scientific curiosity possibly makes this unlikely.

Van Allen Probe Makes Belated Return to Earth

Wednesday, March 11th, 2026 saw the return to Earth of one of two probes launched in 2012 to increase our understanding of the Van Allen radiation belts around our planet.

Named for James Van Allen, who discovered them in 1958 using data gathered by America’s first successful satellite, Explorer 1, the Van Allen belts are missive, if invisible doughnut like structures surrounding Earth in two layers – the inner and outer radiation belts. Combined, they range in altitude from a few hundred kilometres to some 96,000 km, and comprise protons and electrons trapped within the Earth’s magnetic field.

A simplified cross-section of the Van Allen radiation belts. Credit: Booyabazooka

The Van Allen belts are what might be called frienemies of life. On the one side, they act as a shield, deflecting harmful cosmic radiation and the relentless stream of charged particles blasted out by the Sun, making our planet far more supportive of life than would otherwise be the case. On the other, they’d happily kill you if you loiter in them for too long. They are also a constant hazard to satellites orbiting through them, as they will also merrily fry unprotected electronics and, during periods of high solar activity, they “puff up” with even greater concentrations of radiation which can easily kill satellites completely and disrupt Earth-based communications, GPS systems, and so on.

Spaceflight and Moon landing deniers point to the Van Allen Belts as “proof” that all space missions are “fake” as “no-one can survive them” – although their reasoning is far more a demonstration of their inability to grasp concepts such as velocity together with an overly simplistic view of what the belts are and what is required form them to have a lasting impact. However, they are correct in their stance that loitering within the influence of the belts is definitely not a good idea.

The two Van Allen Belt probes double stacked in one half of the payload fairing of their Atlas V 401 launch vehicle, ahead of their 2012 launch. Credit: Kim Shiflett

The twin Van Allen Probes were specifically built and launched to increase our understanding of the Van Allen Belts in terms of their ability to severely harm the inner electronics and workings of satellites that have no other choice but to loiter within the radiation environment as they orbit the Earth. Armed with hyper-sensitive sensors and recorders, the two probes of an identical design were given an initial 2-year primary mission. However, both continued to operate through until 2019, when their stocks of manoeuvring propellants were exhausted, leaving them unable to main a proper communications / power generation orientation, and both were retired. In that time, the craft – called simply “Probe A” and “Probe B” gathered a huge amount of data concerning the belts and the dynamics at work within them; data which has both altered our understanding of the belts and which is still being researched and studied.

Given their extreme orbital regime (617 km to over 30,000 km), both Probe A and Probe B were expected to remain in orbit until the mid-2030s. However, such has been the level of solar activity from 2019 onwards (with Solar Maximum being reached in 2024), the upper reaches of our atmosphere have been greatly inflated as a result of solar radiation influx. This has increased drag on multiple satellites, including the 600 kg Van Allen probes, with Probe A in particular being impacted.

By 2025 it was clear that Probe A was coming down sooner rather than later, the atmospheric drag having significantly lowered its altitude overall, with its perigee in the low hundreds of kilometres. By early 2026, it became obvious the probe only had weeks or months at the most left before it reached interface with the denser atmosphere and started to break / burn up. This started on March 11th (UTC) as it entered the denser atmosphere over the Galapagos Islands. The majority of the probe was destroyed in the upper atmosphere as it passed over South America, although some debris is believed to have fallen into the Atlantic Ocean.

Whilst also affected by the Sun’s activity, Probe B currently remains in orbit, although it is expected to now re-enter the atmosphere in 2030, rather than the mid-2030s as originally anticipated.