Space Sunday: Artemis 4 – to the south pole or not?

Either Blue Origin (left) and SpaceX (right) is due to provide the lunar lander for Artemis 4 – but should the landing take place in the Lunar South Polar Region?

Artemis 4 is currently scheduled to mark America’s return to the surface of the Moon in 2028. However, as I’ve noted in covering the programme in this column, there are several technical matters which need to be addressed – particularly if SpaceX remains the supplier of choice for the mission’s lunar lander – which could see the mission slip back to 2029. But now questions on exactly where Artemis 4 should be going.

Taken as The Artemis Project aims to send humans to the Lunar South Polar Region with the aim of establishing a base there, on the basis that base parts of the Moon’s polar regions remain in complete shadow all the time – notably the bottoms of craters – then it is possible there is accessible water ice to be found which could make lunar operations somewhat easier (providing water for drinking / cooling systems, air, ingredients for rocket motor propellants).

The overall goal of the mission is to primarily check-out what will be largely untested hardware, equipment and systems – both in terms of the lander vehicles and the space suits developed for Artemis. But do these necessarily need to be tested using a mission to the Lunar South Polar region? Could they not equally be carried out using a more equatorial landing zone, one which involves less complexity in its execution – and potentially less risk?

Map of candidate landing regions in the Artemis exploration zone (90°S to 84°S), as identified by NASA, 2022 and 2024. Credit: Lunar and Planetary Institute

Landing at the lunar equator offers predictable solar illumination, simplified orbital dynamics, and reduced communication blackout risks compared to the high-latitude Lunar South Polar Region. While much of the latter does experience near-continuous daylight, its chaotic topography with dramatic elevation changes coupled with a low-angle solar elevation (thus resulting in areas remaining in deep shadow, even outside of craters) present severe hazards for landing craft and extravehicular operations.

Thus, by targeting the more “known” regions of the Moon, such as Mare Imbrium (in which Apollo 17 landed) and Mare Tranquillitatis (Apollo 11), Artemis 4 could operate in a somewhat more predictable operational envelope than would be the case with a South Polar Region landing. This would potentially allow for better initial testing of guidance, control, automated landing systems and communications systems.

The latest voice to be heard advocating for this approach is that of Artemis 2 pilot, Victor Glover, who likened the switch to a more stepwise approach to lunar operations. For example, in the 1960s, NASA initially tested the Apollo Command and Service Module in Earth orbit (Apollo 7), then in a flight around the Moon (Apollo 8), then the lunar lander was tested in Earth orbit (Apollo 9) and then on a non-landing voyage to the Moon where its decent / ascent capabilities could be tested in lunar conditions (Apollo 10). Further, the Apollo missions grew in complexity, making targeting more difficult landing sites more acceptable as experience was gained from earlier missions and the capabilities of the vehicles and their systems became more clearly understood.

Credit: Lunar and Planetary Institute

By contrast, Artemis effective jumps: from an uncrewed cislunar test of the Orion Earth-Moon-Earth vehicle (Artemis 1) to a crewed cislunar test of Orion (Artemis 2) to a semi-orbital test of the landing vehicles in Earth orbit (Artemis 3 – which will not even be a test of either vehicle’s flight and propulsion systems) to attempting a landing in a very challenging environment; so there is much to be said for revising efforts.

As well as lowering the technical complexity of the initial mission, Glover raises a health reason. What if a crew member suffers and injury or medical situation requiring evacuation to Earth? With Apollo, the Command and Service Module orbited between 100 and 300 km above the lunar surface. This made getting back to it aboard the lunar lander in an emergency, and it would be in a position to rendezvous with the ascend lander every few orbits, and likewise be able to more readily to break orbit and return to Earth.

Missions to the Lunar South Polar Regions require a more complex, propellant-intensive flight, culminating in an Elliptical Polar Orbit with Coplanar Line of Apsides (EPO/coLA). Because more propellant is required, this orbit must vary between 100 and 6,500 km above the Earth, as the high altitude is required for Orion to be able to break orbit and return to Earth; lower than this, and it could have insufficient fuel remaining to escape the Moon.

NASA Astronaut and mission pilot for Artemis 2, victor Glover. Credit: NASA

Because of its range, this EPO/coLA orbit means that a rendezvous between Orion and an ascending lander can only happen once every couple of days or so. By switching to a more equatorial landing zone, propellant usage is reduced, making Orion more capable of entering a more circular, lower orbit of the Moon, thus presenting more opportunities for an emergency rendezvous with the lander should this be required. Of course, this doesn’t solve the issue of emergency evacuations on missions are Artemis 4; what it does mean is that the risks associated with the “first time” nature of Artemis 4 might be further reduced.

In terms of missions beyond Artemis 4, SpaceX have already suggested that their massive Starship-derived land could actually take Orion to the Moon if the two were to dock in Earth orbit. This would conserve Orion’s propellant, potentially allowing the elliptical nature of the EPO/coLA orbit to be reduced, again offering more opportunities for emergency rendezvous in lunar orbit. Similarly, the switch to using a modified Vulcan-Centaur booster and the upper stage of the SLS rocket, replacing the current Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) could also allow the EPO/coLA orbit range to be reduced, again allowing windows for Orion / lander rendezvous to be increased.

Finally, Glover (and others) note that the political onus on Artemis 4 is increasingly about “beating the Chinese” rather than achieving science / engineering goals. If this is the case, then a mission to land within the Moon’s more familiar equatorial regions, building on all of the knowledge gained on such mission during Apollo, would help make that goal easier by removing several levels of complexity to Artemis 4.

Thus far, NASA management has given no indication any such shift will be made, but in many respects it does fit with a more step-by-step approach to lunar operations they have adopted since the start of 2026 .

Starship IFT-13: More of the Same, but with Twists

On July 24th, SpaceX completed the 13th integrated flight test (IFT) of its Starship / Super Heavy booster combination, flying the “version 3” of each vehicle for the second time, the fist having been in May 2026.

A camera mounted on one of the two forward flaps of Starship S40 looks back down the length of the vehicle and its Super Heavy booster towards the Boca Chica launch site as IFT-13 approaches max-Q following launch on July 24, 2026. Credit: SpaceX

In broad terms, the flight was something of re-run of the past few missions: launch, get Starship to sub-orbital velocity / altitude, return the Super Heavy booster for a controlled splashdown in the Gulf of Mexico, with the Starship deploying a payload before initiating a test-restart of one of its engines and then making a re-entry and splashdown in the Indian Ocean not all of which had been achieved through IFT-10 through 12.

An initial attempt to launch the flight had been made on July 16th, but was halted by on-board systems when four of the booster’s 33 Raptor engines failed to ignite. Subsequent analysis revealed that due to the way the engines are chilled, ice had formed within those four engines, choking them at start-up. This resulted in two of the engines having to be swapped-out on the pad. A second Attempt on July 23rd was scrubbed as cloud would have obscured observations of the vehicle’s ascent.

On July 24th, things went remarkably smoothly, with the raw power of the Raptor 3 engines clearly seen – it took just sixty seconds for the booster and ship to go from the launch platform to supersonic speed and then pass through max-Q (the point of highest dynamic stress on the vehicles during ascent).

As the Super Heavy booster performs its boost-back flip, a camera on its hull captures Starship S40 with all six engines lit. Credit: SpaceX

Hot staging took place with the booster shutting down all but five of its engines as the ship fired-up its six engines. On separation, the booster immediately vectored away from the ascending Starship, avoiding the issue which led to a failure with the boost-back engine burn seen with IFT-12 in May. However, the booster did suffer a engine re-start failure just before a planned splashdown in the Gulf of Mexico, when only 9 of the anticipated 13 engines restarted – and four of those immediately shut down again and the booster hit the water at an estimated 160 km/h. This and the ice issues of July 16th suggest the Raptor 3 still needs refinement.

Starship S40, however, went on to achieve sub-orbital flight, deployed its payload, finally carried out a restart of an engine (something the last several flights have tried and failed to achieve, and which forms a vital part of vehicle operations) and then made a perfect re-entry into, and passage through, the denser atmosphere. Finally, it successfully re-lit three engines, flipped itself vertically to make a gentle landing in the Indian Ocean. So gentle, in fact, it didn’t explode; it gently tipped over on its back to float on the ocean, small fires licking around the hull caused by vented gases. This obliging allowed the aerial drone patrolling the landing zone to capture video of the vehicle’s re-entry heat shield for analysis.

The key difference between this mission and the earlier payload carrying sub-orbital flights lay in the fact that this time, and actual working payload was carried aloft in the form of 20 Starlink v3 satellites.

A flap-mounted camera on StarshipS40 captures some of the deployed Starlink satellites reflecting sunlight (white) and seemingly firing their icon thrusters (blue dots). Credit: SpaceX

At up to 2 tonnes each, and with a span of 15 metres with their solar arrays open, the Starlink v3 is a veritable monster compared to the v1 (300 kg) and v2 (600 kg) variants and offers gigabit levels of data transfer rates.

These satellites are seen as vital to Starlink’s future, and are wholly dependent on the Starship / Super Heavy combination to launch them, as they are too big and bulky to be launched en-masse by Falcon 9 (hence why SpaceX is almost solely focused on getting Starship working with a Starlink deployment system rather than building it capable of delivering a range of payloads to orbit – in fact, there is an argument to make that Starlink is Starship’s only viable payload, but that’s for another article).

Starship S20 “bellyflops” through the atmosphere after re-entry, the four and aft flaps maintaining its aerodynamic control. Credit: SpaceX

None of the deployed Starlink units survived long – just 20 minutes given they were sub-orbital as well. However, this was long enough for SpaceX to test their ion engines and communications capabilities, hooking them into the main Starlink network and testing their laser communications systems among themselves.

Six of the satellites were fitted with cameras and spotlights, and were tasked with following the starship vehicle down through re-entry, filming its manoeuvres and interactions with the upper atmosphere. At the time of writing, none of that footage, if successfully relayed to Earth, has been released.

Almost 2 minutes after splashing down vertical and then toppling into the sea, S20 floats as fires from vents gases burn around parts of it. Credit: SpaceX

Overall, IFT-13 was a step forward from the rinse-wash-repeat status of the last few Starship / Super Heavy flights. The system still has a long way to go before it can be said to have met even its baseline requirements (launch, deploy, return and capture for re-use), and even longer to go in terms of actually proving it is viable for anything other than Starlink launches. However, subject to the on-going issues with the Raptor 3 motors, SpaceX have indicated the 14th flight might actually be an attempt to reach orbit – possibly with an attempt to catch the orbital vehicle on its return.

Psyche’s Time-Lapse of Mars

On May 15th, 2026 NASA’s Psyche spacecraft swung by Mars, using the planet in a gravity-assist manoeuvre to help propel it on its way to its intended target, the M-type (indicating it has a high metallic content) asteroid 16 Psyche, which it will reach in 2029.

The fly-by marked the mid-point in the spacecraft’s journey, and I covered it and the overall Psyche mission just after it happened. However, earlier in July NASA issued a time-lapse video of the encounter, stitched together from individual images captured by the spacecraft’s imagining system between May 2nd and May 31st.

Approaching from a “high phase” angle relative to the Sun, Psyche initially reveals Mars as a thin crescent, only around 4% of its surface visible. This rapidly grows as the spacecraft sweeps down towards the planet’s northern hemisphere, features somewhat blurred, but with craters and clouds visible before Psyche arcs over the very heavily cratered southern hemisphere, closing to within 4,609 km of the planet’s surface before heading back into space, speeding towards the asteroid belt and 16 Psyche with 1,600 km/h more velocity than when it approached at Mars.

While the fly-by didn’t add much to the masses of data already gathered on Mars, it did serve a second important function for the Psyche mission: by aiming Psyche’s suite of instruments at a well-studied world, mission engineers were able to properly calibrate and validate the spacecraft’s major science instruments ahead of its encounter with 16 Psyche.

Space Sunday: Starliner, a rover and a rebuild

Starliner Calypso closes on the ISS for docking during the Crew Flight Test, June 6th, 2024. Credit: NASA

Following on from my previous piece on recent NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports about NASA’s launch infrastructure and the costs associated with Artemis / SLS, Thursday June 30th, 2026 saw the release of the OIG’s latest audit of the NASA Commercial Crew Programme (CCP) which gave rise to the SpaceX Crew Dragon and Boeing Starliner vehicles.

As those with an interest in space exploration are aware, one of these vehicles – SpaceX Crew Dragon – has been providing a successful service in ferrying astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS), whilst the other – Starliner -, despite two uncrewed and one crewed flight test has, yet to enter service. Unsurprisingly, the OIG audit report does not pull any punches where the Boeing system is concerned. However, its target is not so much Boeing as it is NASA itself.

The report starts by noting that whilst both Crew Dragon and Starliner where technically challenging developments, NASA opted to focus primarily on the SpaceX project in terms of management oversight and intervention, despite the fact Crew Dragon was proceeding from a vehicle already in operation: the Cargo Dragon. Meanwhile, Boeing, despite designing a brand new vehicle from the ground up, was subject to far less NASA oversight and management.

A further complication with Starliner was identified as the use of the United Launch Alliance Atlas V; this effectively split vehicle development between two companies, where SpaceX were responsible for both Crew Dragon and the modifications required to its Falcon 9 launch vehicle. Credit: NASA OIG

Instead, NASA management opted to put their faith in Boeing’s “heritage” procedures and workflows, allowing the company to develop Starliner with minimal intervention. This resulted in programmatic and development issues escaping NASA’s attention where a more hand-on approach would likely have seen them spotted and measures put in place to rectify them long before they became issues deeply embedded in the vehicle’s design.

Nor is the report limited to the development path with Starliner; it is deeply critical of NASA management following the 2024 Crew Flight Test (CFT). This should have been an 8-day test of Starliner liner under crewed control, including time docked at the International Space Station (ISS). However, the vehicle suffered issues remarkably similar to those experienced during the second automated test flight, so it returned to Earth without its crew of Barry “Butch” Wilmore and Sunita “Suni” Williams, who remained on the ISS for a further 278 days before returning to Earth on a Crew Dragon vehicle.

Cutaway of Starliner showing major elements, including the “doghouse” thruster blocks which have been the cause of the vehicle’s major ills. Credit: Boeing via BBC

Under NASA’s own requirements, the CFT should have been classified a Type A mishap, prompting an immediate, NASA-led multi-disciplinary investigation into the flight and Starliner, with full root cause analysis, culminating in the development of a complete plan to remediate issues identified and bring Starliner back to operational readiness. Instead, NASA management labelled the flight a “partial success” and maintained their hands-off attitude to addressing Starliner’s issues.

It was not until Jared Isaacman took over at NASA that the CFT was reclassified a Type A mishap, meaning that for 21 months following the flight, Boeing management left to their own devices at a time when the company was known to be experiencing considerable managerial and programmatic issues across a range of its projects and programmes.

The irony here, as the report also notes, is that while this necessary reclassification has now occurred, more recent staff restructurings at both NASA and Boeing mean that neither organisation is in a position to properly drive the Starliner programme, with the result that the OIG casts doubt as to whether the craft will transition to an operational status ahead of the ISS being shut down in the latter half of 2030. As it stands, Starliner is supposed to complete four crew transfers to the ISS between 2026 and 2029, with perhaps only the 2028 and 2029 flights actually happening as planned.

Worse, the report notes that manage has under planned CCP requirements: even if the four Starliner mission do go ahead, they and the three SpaceX missions planned for the same period are insufficient to maintain a US presence on the ISS through until August 2028.  Therefore, NASA is likely to have no choice but to order further transfer flights, with SpaceX liable to be the recipient of the contracts.

In closing, the report notes that CCP was supposed to provide NASA with two crew-carrying vehicles capable of being operated cooperatively but somewhat competitively with one another, rolling contracts for missions being awarded on the basis of reliability and cost-effectiveness. This has not been the case; Starliner’s issues have meant that SpaceX has been the only game in town for crewed launches from US soil – as as such, they’ve had some degree of unilateral freedom to set the costs of flights sans competition. Meanwhile, and despite Boeing effectively having its original contrast reduce by US $500 million and covering much of the extra costs involved in trying to fix Starliner in the wake of the second uncrewed flight, the entire programme has become a shambolic mess.

NASA to Send Mars OPTIMISM to the Moon as a PROMISE?

On June 30th NASA hosted its second monthly Moon Base Update to provide information on Artemis and plans to establish a human presence at the Lunar South Pole. During the event it was confirmed that three private companies – Astrobotic, Firefly Aerospace and Intuitive Machines – have received further contracts under NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) programme to deliver payload to the Moon in support of Artemis. However, the surprising aspect of the update was the announcement of plans to send a Mars rover to the Moon.

Formally called OPTIMISM (Operational Perseverance Twin for Integration of Mechanisms and Instruments Sent to Mars), the vehicle in question is a full-sized, almost fully-equipped version of the Curiosity and Perseverance rovers (just minus the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) which power the latter), the vehicle has been an essential tool for both rover missions, allowing engineers to trouble-shoot software, electrical and mechanical issues the two rovers have experienced in their travels on Mars.

NASA’s OPTIMISM test vehicle (now PROMISE) show with its rear to the right. The two angled brackets are designed to hold a nuclear RTG “battery” and its protective casing / shielding on its operational siblings, Curiosity and Perseverance. Credit: NASA

Under the lunar plans, the vehicle is to be renamed PROMISE (Polar Rover for Observation, Mapping, and In-Situ Exploration –  someone at NASA gets to stay up very late dreaming up acronyms!), and would be delivered to the Moon where it could operate largely autonomously. If the vehicle could be readied and flown in time, it could act as a valuable survey scout and mobile lab, gathering data and carrying out experiments that could greatly help in characterising the Lunar South Polar Region ahead of human landings. However, there are some issues around the idea:

  • Loss of an engineering and software test-bed for the on-going Curiosity and Perseverance missions on Mars, potentially impacting their longevity should a significant issue with either develop in the future.
  • The rover will likely require the development of a suitable lander system for delivering to the Moon, assuming the “skycrane” approach cannot be modified for use in lunar deployments. This will take time – potentially years.
  • As a nuclear powered vehicle, it will require an RTG. These are no longer manufactured and in short supply. Use of one with PROMISE means denying its use on a deep-space mission.
  • The rover will face a far wider range of surface temperatures on the Moon than its systems were designed for when operating on Mars. This means it will require substantially more in the way of heating in order for delicate systems to withstand the cold lunar nights and, conversely, a cooling system so those same systems don’t overheat during the heat of the lunar daytime.

As such, there are considerable pros and cons to the idea, so exactly where this idea goes will be worth following.

Updates

Blue Origin Updates and Unveils

Blue Origin has provided an update on efforts to get Launch Complex 36 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station back to an operational status following the catastrophic explosion of the NG-4 vehicle in May 2026 which wiped out the main launch pad and caused considerable surrounding damage, including to the vehicle and payload integration building, shown below.

The vehicle and payload integration building at lunch complex 36, Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, home of the New Glenn rocket. Note the blast damage to the large pad-facing roller doors. Credit: Blue Origin

As a part of this update, the company provided a video animation revealing how they plan to both equip the rebuilt launch facilities and prepare their New Glenn rockets – both the existing 7×2 vehicle and the in-development 9×4 (the numbers refer to the count of first and second stage engines on each version) – for launch.

Prior to the NG-4 static fire test explosion, Blue Origin utilised a 1,800 tonne Transporter Erector (TE) and a series of hydraulic actuators on the pad in order to get New Glenn to the pad and ready for launch. These were all completely destroyed in the May explosion. The TE would deliver the rocket to the pad horizontally, the actuators connected and then both rocket and TE would be raised to the vertical, the base of the TE becoming the rocket’s launch platform and the TE’s strongback its “launch tower”.

Under the new plans, a New Glenn will be moved to the launch pad by a simplified transporter and without the payload attached. A mobile crane will then raise it the the vertical and lift it onto a new permanent launch platform on the pad, with a new tower supporting the rocket through until launch.

The latter will actually be the lightning conducting tower which survived the NG-4 explosion, completely repurposed and expanded to fulfil the role of launch tower. It will include two halves of a rotating service platform designed to fit around the upper part of the rocket, allowing the payload within its fairings to be lifted into position by crane, with the necessary connections between it and the rocket then being made.

The overall plan is daring in scope and still ambitious, given that Blue Origin is sticking to their bullish view New Glenn will return to flight before the end of 2026.

This week also saw Blue Origin unveil their planned lunar Power Tower system for use on the Moon.

Whilst the preferred means of powering a lunar base is nuclear, there are some significant challenges to overcome to make this a reality. In the interim, solar power remains an option – at least to a limited degree, given nights on the Moon last 14 terrestrial days making any sole reliance on solar impossible. However, even when the Sun is above the horizon, it remains at a relative low angle in the sky, and this can limit the ability of ground-based solar arrays in gathering sunlight, as they can easily end up stuck in shadows for long periods of the lunar day.

The Blue Origin Power Tower, which can be delivered to the Moon on specialised Blue Moon MK1 landers – offers a possible means of continuous solar power during the lunar day by suspending “sails” of solar arrays from a 20+ metre tall deployable boom system, thus lifting them clear of areas of shadows, etc.

Exactly how effective such a system might be is open to debate, but the system could potentially help power smaller outposts and stations during lunar daylight hours and which are both beyond the reach of having power routed to them from nuclear reactors and do not need to be in constant use.

Swift Rescue Mission Launches

Following my previous Space Sunday report, the mission to rescue NASA’s Neil Gehrels Swift Observatory finally launched on Friday, July 3rd after weather and a software issue conspired to delay the mission for three days.

The launch was flown out of the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range located on the Marshall Islands in the South Pacific, the Pegasus XL rocket – the last one scheduled to be used – carried to an altitude of 12,000 metres by As I noted last time, the mission was air launched utilising a Pegasus XL rocket (the last mission the rocket will actually fly) carried aloft by Northrop Grumman’s modified Lockheed L-1011 aircraft Stargazer. At 08:36 UTC on July 3rd, the aircraft passed through the designated drop zone for the mission and the Pegasus XL was released, allowing it to fall safely clear of Stargazer before its rocket engine ignited sending it into low Earth orbit in just under 10 minutes.

A set of an artist’s renderings of LINK in space and rendezvousing with Neil Gehrels Swift Observatory, ready to gently push it up to a safe operating altitude before atmospheric drag causes it to re-enter the atmosphere and burn up. Credit: Katalyst Space

Following deployment from Pegasus, the 4.9 metre long LINK deployed its solar arrays for power and is currently going through an initial systems check-out. Once this has been completed, the craft will fire its ion thrusters to gradually close on the Swift observatory. Once within range, LINK enter a 2-3 week observation of Swift, flying around it so that engineers can confirm the best point for LINK to attach itself itself to the observatory to commence the operation to raise Swift’s orbit and save it from burning-up in the upper atmosphere.

The lifting manoeuvre will last several months, boosting Swift from its present 300 km altitude to around 600 km, adding at least another 5 years to Swift’s mission in the process. Not bad for a mission that cost US $250 million and was supposed to last just 2 years when it commenced 22 years ago, and a rescue mission which has cost just US $30 million and was put together in just nine months.  

Space Sunday: NASA – a rescue attempt, costs & infrastructure

Northrop Grumman’s Lockheed L-1011 Tristar Stargazer lifting a Pegasus XL air-launched vehicle to altitude ready for deployment. Credit: USSF

A daring rescue attempt in space is due to commence at 10:23 UTC on June 30th. It will cost NASA some US $30 million, but if successful it will be priceless.

The mission is to rescue the Swift Observatory, a three telescope observatory operating in low Earth orbit for primarily studying gamma ray bursts (GRBs). Smaller than the famous Hubble Space Telescope, Swift – and that’s a name, not an acronym – has been in operational since 2004. It’s a partnership programme between NASA Goddard, the UK and Italy, and was in part intended to take over the work of the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, which ceased operations in 2000, only with far greater sensitivity.

Originally intended to have a primary nominal mission of just 2 years, Swift has continued to operate almost flawlessly and its science mission has expanded so it ow functions as a general-purpose multi-wavelength observatory, particularly for the rapid follow-up and characterization of astrophysical transients of all types. It was given its name because of the speed with which it can move between targets of interest. Where Hubble can take up to 2 days to re-orient itself to observe different targets, Swift can do so in minutes, allowing it to carry out up to 70 individual observations a day.

The Neil Gehrels Swift Observatory Observatory. Credit: NASA

This speed is important and the phenomena it is observing can be relative transient – particularly GRBs. What’s more it can re-orient itself complete autonomously; when its Burst Alert Telescope (BAT) picks up on a target, it can rapidly slew itself to observe the event without ground-based intervention. Afterwards, it will also automatically re-orient itself to resume whatever other observations it was carrying out beforehand.

Now officially called the Neil Gehrels Swift Observatory in honour of the mission’s first Principal investigator, who passed away in 2017, Swift has been in trouble over the course of the last 18 months as increased solar activity during the current Solar Maximum cycle has caused an expansion in Earth’s atmosphere (as commonly happens) which has exacerbated the observatory’s rate of orbital decay. If not corrected, Swift’s altitude will fall below 300 km, and shortly thereafter it will start to tumble and re-enter the atmosphere.

To the rescue: Katalyst Space’s LINK. Credit; Katalyst Space

Given its science value and relative low cost (US $250 million), the decision was taken to try to boost Swift’s altitude using a custom-build satellite designed and built by Katalyst Space in just nine months. Called LINK, the relative small, solar-powered vehicle is due to be air launched aboard a Northrop Grumman Pegasus XL vehicle carried aloft by a modified Lockheed L-1011 aircraft called Stargazer.

Taking off from the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range located on the Marshall Islands in the South Pacific, Stargazer will carry the Pegasus XL to altitude before releasing it to allow its rocket motor to ignite and carry it to orbit were the nose-mounted payload can be deployed.

The plan calls for LINK to spend a number of weeks undergoing its own commissioning tests prior to it rendezvous with Swift and use three small robot arms to connect to the observatory and then use its ion thrusters to gently push Swift into a higher orbit – up to its original 600km orbit – before detaching to allow the observatory to continue operations for at least another five years.

LINK mounted on a Pegasus XL air launch rocket with the payload farings about to be fitted around it. Credit: Northrop Grumman

If LINK is successful, it will be a remarkable success – and a major gain for Katalyst, which plans to start offering satellite reboosting services to customers and already has a contract with the United States Space Force. This involves the company’s larger Nexus vehicle, with the first flight due in 2027 with LINK being very much a proof of concept flight for Nexus.

NASA’s OIG Reveals Out-of-Control Nature of Artemis Expenditure

The US Space Launch System (SLS) rocket has frequently been criticised on the basis of its huge launch cost – around US $2.5 billion, which the US government’s own Office of Management Budget (OMB) indicated would likely rise to US $4 billion per launch. However, given it is the only vehicle currently able to launch America’s only deep space capable crew vehicle in the form of Orion, it is not easily replaced.

Hence why in February 2026, rather than cancelling SLS outright as some pundits had been demanding, NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman announced significant changes to the Artemis programme to return humans to the moon (see: Space Sunday: major Artemis updates and a rollback), which included cancelling just the Block 1B and Block 2 enhancements of SLS whilst extending the capabilities of the current Block 1 version to meet launch requirements until such time as alternative vehicle capable of launching Orion – most likely a modified version of the Vulcan-Centaur from United Launch Alliance – become available.

The original planned evolution of SLS, from the current Block 1 version for crewed launches through a cargo variant of the same vehicle to the Block 1B version utilising the EUS in both crewed and cargo versions, through the evolved Block 2 design with more powerful solid rocket boosters. Under the new plan, NASA will replace the Block 1B version with a “near Block 1” enhanced variant. Credit: NASA

Now, a memo made public on June 24th, 2026, NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reveals just how badly costs were getting out of control for the SLS enhancements and part of Gateway Station.

Core to the Block 1B and Block 2 versions of SLS were the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) and the Universal Stage Adapter (USA). Ordered in 2017 from Boeing as a prime SLS contractor, EUS was supposed to be a more powerful upper stage for SLS Block 1B and Block 2, allowing SLS (together with more powerful versions of the vehicle’s solid rocket boosters (SRBs)) SLS to lift up to 130 tonnes to orbit and deliver up to 46 tonnes to lunar orbit.

A rendering of the EUS in action (engine unit, orange segment). The Tapered cone is the USA, shown connected to the Orion’s European Service Module after the fairings protecting the latter have been jettisoned post-launch and ascent. Credit: NASA

Because Boeing stated EUS development could be folded-in to their current SLS workflow, the cost for its development was put at US $962 million with initial delivery to be in 2021. By 2026 and its cancellation, some US $2 billion had been spent on EUS, with a further US $1.7 billion likely required to get it to a position where the first units could be delivered to NASA – in 2028.

The USA contract was awarded to Dynetics Inc., in 2017. It called for the development of a conical unit massing some 2.7 tonnes designed to mate the Orion space vehicle to the EUS on Block 1B and Block 2 SLS vehicles, with Orion. At 10 metres in length, 8.5 metres across where it connected to the EUS and 5.4 metres across where it connected to the Orion, USA was to carry electrical and communication paths between the two and provide environmental control to payloads during ground operations and launch and ascent.

A test article of the USA within the Vehicle Assembly Building at NASA’s Kennedy Space Centres. Credit: NASA

The original contract was put at US $131 million with initial delivery to be in 2022. By the end of February 2026 and USA’s cancellation, the cost had risen to US $497 million, with initial delivery pushed back to 2030.

Finally, for SLS at least, was the Mobile Launcher 2 (ML-2), a new version of the platforms and towers used to support SLS vehicles on their journey to the launch pad and then support them throughout launch operations. In particular, ML-2 was supposed to support Block1B and Block 2 SLS launches.

The woefully behind schedule ML-2 under construction at Kennedy Space Centre earlier in 2026. The building to the left is the Launch Control Complex for NASA launches from LC-39B (launches from LC-39A now being exclusively SpaceX). Credit: Jeff Faust

The contract went to Bechtel National, Inc., in 2019 at a cost of US $383 million and an expected delivery in 2023. By its cancellation in April 2026, the cost had risen to some US $1.6 billion with delivery pushed back to the end of 2026, earliest and it would then require some two years of validation and testing at a further cost of US $2 billion.

It addition to this, the memo highlights the Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO) module, indicating a reason why the planned lunar Gateway Station was cancelled beyond its sheer pointlessness.

HALO, as built by Thales Alenia Space in Europe (responsible for the International Space Station modules Harmony, Tranquillity and Columbus and the observation Cupola) under contract to Northrop Grumman, is  essentially a modified version of the pressurised module used in Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus resupply vehicle, also manufactured by Thales. HALO was contracted at 1.3 billion, with that cost rising to US $1.9 billion by the time the basic module had been delivered to Northrop Grumman ready for completion, with OIG estimating this would further increase the overall cost by the time it was ready for delivery to NASA in 2031, several years late.

The HALO pressurised module revealed as the upper section of its shipping unit is lifted clear following its delivery to Northrop Grumman in the USA from Thales Alenia in Europe. Credit: Northrop Grumman
The HALO pressurised module intended for Gateway revealed as the upper section of its shipping unit is lifted clear following its delivery to Northrop Grumman in the USA from Thales Alenia in Europe. Credit: Northrop Grumman

OIG highlighted that some of the rising costs could be laid at the feet of the contractors, with all three responsible for delays and failures, and Bechtel National being particularly highlighted for refusal to work with NASA in the planning for ML-2 construction and then ignoring NASA’s expertise in developing the original Mobile launchers. However, it also notes there have been many failures at NASA in properly managing and controlling projects and in putting contracts in place which failed to allow for full fiscal control.

Responding to the memo, Isaacman’s office indicated they were a core part of why the Artemis programme was redirected in February and also why the agency was undertaking a broader overhaul of its methods and processes related to costing and contractual management in order to reduce the risks of such major over-runs in future projects.

NASA Needs US $1 Billion in Launch Facilities Infrastructure Investment

Ahead of the OIG’s memo, the Inspector General published a report into the state of NASA’s launch infrastructure at both Kennedy Space Centre (KSC) and Wallops Island, Virginia, and the ability of both meeting the needs of Artemis and commercial launch operations. It does not make for happy reading, with KSC alone requiring around US $1 billion for essential support infrastructure updates.

In short, whilst several of the actual launch complexes at both receive lease payments from the companies using them – SpaceX, Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, United Launch Alliance, etc., – NASA is responsible for all of the underpinning infrastructure required to support such launch operations at both Wallops and KSC (with the responsibilities at the latter extending into the commercial launch facilities in the neighbouring Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS) in what is called the “common infrastructure agreement”).

The launch facilities at Kennedy Space Centre (KSC) and Cape Canaveral Space Force Station for which NASA is responsible for all supporting infrastructure – road, power, on-site consumable supplies, communications lines, etc. Credit: NASA OIG

This infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, the roadways linking various parts of the space centres; the critical electrical power grids serving all launches facilities; the neutral gas supply systems serving them; fuelling capabilities; communications and data capabilities; flight hardware transportation – even elements such as security support and occupational and environmental health services.

The problem here is that many of these physical infrastructure elements – the roads, electric and gas systems, etc., have not been updated in a long time – in KSC’s case, not since the centre was being built in the 1960s. The result is that many are now in danger of breakage or complete collapse.

The report highlights this with just a single example: the electrical supply feeder system at KSC’s Launch Complex 39. Laid in the 1960s, this runs from the C5 substation near the Vehicle Assembly Building along underground conduits to a switch station and from there to LC-39A and LC-39B. However:

  • The loads placed on these cables are reaching the limits of their capability.
  • The conduits through which they run are a decade beyond their lifespan and literally disintegrating.
  • There is therefore a real risk of overload or short circuit which could completely remove electrical power from one or both launch pads, and there is no back-up.
  • Further, the transformers at the C5 substation are at the end of their plan lifespan and are suffering degraded performance and severe corrosion.
All electrical power supplied to LC-39A and LC-39B run through a single set of underground electrical feeders now a decade past their end of life. There are no independent back-up feeds, and even the main power transformers at the C4 substation are at the intended end of their operational lifespan. Credit NASA OIG

Elsewhere, the infrastructure is simply being over-stretched and is in need of comprehensive surveys to assess their condition and ability to meet the continued growth in demand. This is a problem exacerbated by the rapid growth of launches in the last 5.5 years. The combined launch facilities at KSC and the neighbouring Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS) have, for example, seen their overall annual launch cadence increase by 352%.

This means that the volume of heavy refrigerated transporter carrying liquid propellants into the tank farm at KSC / CCSFS has risen from fewer than 2,000 annually in 2017 to over 8,700 in 2025 – on roads never designed to take such mass or see such volume of use.

Nor does it end there. The report indicates that with the state of the current support infrastructure at KSC / CCSFS, NASA will be over capacity in terms of the launches it can handle by 2029 unless serious work commences now – and will be unable to meet the demand for launches required to support Artemis (such as the high-cadence, 16 short-period launches required by SpaceX to send each of its HLS vehicle to the Moon (depending on how many of these are actually used)).

The 64 km of underground pipelines supplying gaseous nitrogen and helium, both vital to launch operations at KSC and commercial facilities at CCSFS are also NASA’s responsibility and rapidly approaching the point where they cannot adequately support launch operations across multiple sites. Credit: NASA OIG

The irony here is that NASA did actually make an attempt to deal with the crisis well ahead of time: in 2016, it sought Congressional approval to implement the Infrastructure Investment Fund. This would have allowed the agency to accept contributions from non-federal sources for long-term, large-scale shared infrastructure projects. Congress refused, and continued to refuse each time NASA raised the idea in various forms through until 2022.

Whilst the situation is not exactly rosy at Wallops, the approach to leasing agreements and responsibilities for infrastructure maintenance are a little different, which has the potential to help alleviate some of the concerns – which is not to say action is not required. The report duly notes that Wallops has seen launch cadence increase from 3 to 17 a year in the past 5 years, and this will increase to 43 in the next couple of years, and so elements of infrastructure there do need improving.

The report outlines a step-by-step plan for addressing the most significant infrastructure issues NASA faces at both Wallops and KSC/CCSFS. It also notes that unless Congress significantly re-evaluate infrastructure funding for NASA, under the current annual funding levels for support infrastructure, it will take NASA 260 years to complete all the required updates and modernisation.

Space Sunday: listening to the Sun and Zvezda worries

The Sun launched this coronal mass ejection at some 1,500 km/s on August 31st 2012. The Earth is included to give an impression of the scale of the CME. Credit: NASA

Most of us are probably aware of the Sun’s magnetic cycle, rising and falling through a period of some 11 years. When this cycle is at its peak – or solar maximum – the surface of the Sun literally broils with sunspots which can sit on their own or as clusters. These sunspots range in size, with the largest thus far recorded measuring over 299,000 kilometres across – large enough to swallow two Jupiter-sized planets side-by-side! The sunspots are accompanied by an increase in solar flares and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) bursting away from the Sun and its corona.

At their most violent, flares and CMEs are fully capable of knocking out satellite systems, completely overwhelming critical GPS and direct communications systems and even bring down power grids if we happen to be in the path of one. Such periods of solar maximum can also see the Sun’s magnetic field flip entirely, before returning to “normal” after two further cycles (referred to as the Hale Cycle). By contrast, periods of solar minimum saw the Sun far quieter and less prone to fits of stormy anger.

Because of the Sun’s ability to be so disruptive, understanding how it behaves and learning to understand what we are seeing as a solar cycle progresses is becoming increasingly critical to maintaining our civilisation’s ability to function. Take GPS systems for instance. Whilst the help guide us when travelling, the signals they output play a critical role in things like the operation of power grids and oil rigs – and even financial systems and services. So a CME overwhelming a system like Galileo or GPS could do far more than just inconveniencing a trip to granny’s new house…

Thus, observations of the Sun from the surface of the Earth, of local orbit and from deep space – including fairly up close and personal to the Sun with missions such as the Parker Solar Probe – has become an essential element in maintaining much of the technology on which we depend. However, we’re not just observing the Sun visually: for the last 40 years we’ve been listening to it as well; in doing so scientists have found that something quite unexpected is going on inside the Sun.

The Parker Solar Probe orbits the Sun at a distance of a few million kilometres. Rendering Credit: NASA

Since 1987 a team of scientists based out of the University of Birmingham in the UK have been operating a series of specialist observatories located in the Americas (California and Chile), Europe (Spain), South Africa and Australia (Western Australia and New South Wales). Across 40 years, the network – called BiSON (Birmingham Solar Oscillations Network) – has been listening to the Sun’s “heartbeat”, oscillations within the Sun caused by sounds generated inside the Sun’s churning innards and which bounce around through the various layers. These oscillations can actually reveal much about what is going on within the Sun in a science called helioseismology. And what BiSON has discovered is twofold.

The first has been that, contrary to expectations, the period of solar minimum in a cycle is significantly different to the last, and that far from being a calm interregnum between the more violent peaks of the Sun’s cycles, each period of solar minimum carries within it indicators of just how violent the next period of solar maximum is likely to be – at least, to a point.

The second finding is more confusing. The majority of the Sun’s magnetic activity occurs within a layer below its surface – and throughout the period of listening by BiSON, this layer has been growing increasingly shallow, effectively squeezing the Sun’s magnetic activity into a smaller and smaller area. In theory, this squeezing should result in the Sun’s magnetic activity becoming more energetic and the periods of solar maximum more violent; but that’s not the case. Instead, two things are happening.

The BiSON observatory at Las Campanas, Chile. Credit: University of Birmingham, UK

The first is that the most recent periods of solar maximum have been exactly as the preceding periods of solar minimum indicated: cycle 24 was a lot calmer than either cycle 23 and cycle 22. Likewise the period of solar minimum between cycle 24 and cycle 25 indicated the latter would be mild as well – and by-and-large it has been. However, in contrast to this, the BiSON data reveals the subsurface magnetic activity and its associated oscillations within the Sun’s layers during the solar maximums for cycles 24 and 25 have been every bit as powerful as recorded for cycles 22 and 23. Thus, it is like the Sun is seething with rage inside itself – but is showing no outward sign of that rage other than a handful of extremely power outbursts (which, as note, are to be expected during periods of solar maximum).

No-one is sure why either the squeezing of the magnetic activity layer within the Sun is occurring or why the measurements of the Sun’s oscillations appear to be so at odds with the levels of behaviour seen during the recent periods of solar maximum. Potentially, it might simply be we’re catching sight of a much longer cycle in the Sun’s behaviour in which the area of magnetic activity is periodically squeezed before gradually being allowed to “expand” again. However, it might also signify a much deeper change in the Sun’s behaviour which could result in a much greater shift in its fundamental character which could come to have a significant impact on our reliance on space-based technologies simply because such a shift could undo much of what we’ve learned about the Sun and make it harder to predict its future behaviour.

At the same time as the BiSON released its findings, another study published its review on a solar event which might  possibly indicate other changes might be taking place in and around the Sun – although in this particular instance it is far to early to draw any definitive conclusion.

As well as giving rise to solar flares and CMEs, periods of solar maximum tend to see an increase in large-scale radio bursts from the Sun. These come in a variety of types, one of the more powerful of which is the Type IV. These radio bursts have a broader spectrum band compared to other types, crossing multiple MHz and GHz frequencies. They can also last for longer – from several hours to a few days and can be a precursor warning for a CME. In August 2025, as cycle 25 was well on its way to the peak of its solar maximum period, the Sun let go of a type IV radio burst that lasted not for hours or a few days – but for almost three weeks. That’s four times longer than any other Type IV burst from the Sun ever recorded.

Such was its duration, the burst was recorded repeatedly by four separate space observatories watching the Sun from different locations. These comprised NASA’s STEREO-A, occupying a heliocentric orbit just inside that of Earth’s own orbit around the Sun; the Parker Solar Probe, also in orbit around the Sun, but practically right up in the Sun’s face; the Global Geospace Science Wind mission sitting in the Sun-Earth L1 Lagrange point; and Europe’s Solar Orbiter mission, which is also gets up close and with the Sun, but in a higher inclination orbit.

Analysis of the data supplied by these observatories reveal that the burst came from a large magnetic structure in the Sun’s outer atmosphere called a helmet (or coronal) streamer. These are distinctive V-shaped loops of matter rising away from regions on the Sun’s surface which have the opposite magnetic polarity to the surrounding areas and the corona. They can rise up to 1.5 solar radii before lopping back to the surface, with the solar wind often pushing the uppermost material even further from the Sun in the form of tapering spears or stalks. These spears can occur at any time in the Sun’s 11-year cycle, but during periods of solar minimum then tend to form around the heliographic equator and are far less prominent.

However, during periods of solar maximum, they tend to be more symmetrically distributed around the Sun, and like the Type IV radio bursts, can be portents of a CME, as the latter can often start at the base of such a streamer, with the “cavity” in the streamer’s loop becoming the conduit through which the core of the CME then rises and is ejected from the Sun.

A coronagraph image of the Sun taken by High Altitude Observatory, of Boulder, Colorado during solar maximum in 1980. The disk of the Sun is covered, revealing numbers helmet streamers radiating away from the Sun, indicative of magnetic activity. Credit: National Centre for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)

In the case of the August 2025 radio burst, the data gathered by the four probes revealed that no fewer than three CMEs had originated in rapid succession from the base of the one streamer – which in itself is unusual. Lead to also three CMEs becoming one massively supercharged event which fortunately did not intercept Earth in its orbit, but which did feed a huge amount of energy into the radio burst, leading to its longevity.

What is not understood is why these three CMEs occurred in pretty much overlapping proximity. Where they a freak occurrence, or a further sign the Sun is experiencing changes in its behaviour? If the latter, then is it something that is related to the squeezing of the layer in which the majority of the Sun’s magnetic activity occurs, or something else entirely? Will it become more expected during periods of solar maximum, and if so, what does it mean for our space-based systems?

Right now, the answers are far from clear – but the findings of both BiSON and the recording of this massive radio burst and recognition of its underlying cause reveal that the more we learn about our Sun, he more we have yet to understand about its complex nature.

Zevzda Leak: NASA and Roscosmos Again at Odds

An animation of the ISS core assembly process (1998-2011). Zvezda was the third module to be launched (2000). Credit: NASA

I’ve written about the long-standing atmosphere leak aboard the International Space Station (ISS) on several occasions – the last being in 2024. An issue for some seven years now, the leak lies within the aft airlock of the Russian Zvezda (aka PrK) module. Several attempts have been made to fix the issue down the years and none have succeeded.

At the time I last wrote about the situation, NASA and Roscosmos had once again figuratively butted heads on the issue and its possible cause. In 2024, the Russian space agency was adamant the slow leaks were the result of thermal contraction and expansion as the ISS orbited the Earth, passing in and out of sunlight and thus experiencing large swings in temperature across its structure.

NASA, however, was of the opinion that the leaks are indicative that the airlock itself was at risk of failure, the result of the massive stresses periodically placed on it.

A Progress resupply vehicle docked at the rear end of the Zvezda Module. NASA believes the cracks causing the atmospheric leaks inside the module are in part the result of stresses induced on the module by Progress operations related to periodically boosting the station’s orbit. This image was captured during a station “flyaround” by the shuttle Discovery during STS-102, March 2001. Credit: NASA

To explain: the airlock at the aft end of the Zvezda module is aligned to the station’s centreline, making it one of the main ports used to carry out periodic and necessary “reboosts” to raise the station’s orbit as the tenuous drag of Earth’s upper atmosphere causes it to slowly descend. Whilst there are other ports on the station which can perform such reboosts, it is the Zvezda port which has commonly been used for boosting operations as Russian Progress resupply vehicles are well suited to the task. NASA has therefore been – and remains – of the opinion that these operations over the years have placed enormous stress on the airlock structure, resulting in the micro-cracks and the atmosphere leaks.

Because of this, NASA and the European Space Agency have long called for use of the Zvezda module to be discontinued, and the hatch linking it to the rest of the ISS permanently closed. Russia has disagreed, mainly because the docking element in question houses the connectors required to bring propellants for the station’s stations manoeuvring thrusters located in the Russian section of the station and the delivery of water supplies for the crew. Thus, losing the use of the docking port limits the station’s ability to carry out the kind of minor orbital adjustments it needs to avoid space debris, etc., and also potentially limits crew activities within the Russian section of the station.

As a compromise, it was agreed that as there was not an imminent risk of explosive decompression (or anything remotely violent), the hatch linking Zvezda should remain closed unless the module was in use – and that use would be largely limited to off-loading Progress craft. And there the matter has largely rested – until the late April 2026.

The Russian Zvezda Module (also called the PrK module), seen from its aft end, with the Progress dock post visible. The airlock tunnel where the leaks are occurring is the cream-white cylinder just inside the module’s main structure, surrounding the docking port. Credit: NASA

That was when Progress MS-34 docked with Zvezda with supplies for the station. Almost immediately after the vehicle’s arrival, the atmosphere loss within the module increased; not enough to endanger the station, but enough to be noticed. After monitoring the situation for a month, Roscosmos decided to take action  – by ordering the cosmonauts on the station to drill into the module’s structure and then cut away part of a structural support.

This didn’t exactly go down well at NASA and ESA. Objections were lodged, exchanges became heated – and Roscosmos stop responding to the other agencies, declaring the operation would go ahead on June 5th. In response, NASA and ESA declared an emergency and ordered the three US and one French astronaut into the docked Crew Dragon under shelter in place / safe heaven rules, meaning they should be ready for immediate departure should anything happen.

This caused Roscosmos to reconsider their idea and ultimately call it off. Several further days of discussions were held and a compromise was eventually reached. This will see Zvezda sealed and depressurised so it is no longer directly used. However, Progress resupply missions carrying propellants and / or water will dock with the module for the purpose of transferring these items (which can be done automatically). Otherwise, Progress dockings (including those bringing propellants / water to the station alongside of other supplies) will occur at other docking ports in the Russian section of the station to facilitate the transfer of supplies.

Space Sunday: Artemis 3 – of Crew and Mission

The Artemis 3 Crew (l to r): Bresnik (commander), Parmitano (Pilot); Rubio (MS-1); Douglas (MS-1). Credit: NASA

On Tuesday, June 9, 2026 NASA held a major event to reveal the 4-man crew to fly the upcoming Artemis 3 Earth-orbit rendezvous mission and provide more information on the mission itself.

Originally planned to be the first Artemis mission to return humans to the Moon, Artemis 3 was wisely re-purposed early in 2026 to give astronauts a chance to get a hands-on feel for the vehicles intended to get them from lunar orbit to the surface of the Moon and back again, by testing them in the relative safety of low-Earth orbit. Prior to this re-purposing, the first opportunity any crew would have had to test either vehicle – to be supplied by Blue Origin and SpaceX and referred to a the Human Landing System (HLS) by NASA – in space would have been immediately before the first attempt to land one of the vehicles on the Moon. Needless to say, this was hardly an ideal approach.

Instead, Artemis 3 will now be a 2-week mission (the longest yet for a crewed Orion vehicle) that will be a sort-of updated version of 1969’s Apollo 9 mission, which saw the Apollo Lunar Module tested in orbit around Earth during a 10-day flight. However, there will be a number of obvious and key differences which I’ll be getting to shortly.

The all-male crew for Artemis 3 comprise three US astronauts and one European Space Agency astronaut, with three of the crew highly experienced spaceflight veterans and the fourth making his first trip into space. They are:

Randolph “Randy” James Bresnik, 58 (NASA): Commander

  • Randolph “Randy” Bresnik, Artemis 3 Mission Commander

    Born in Fort Knox Kentucky, Bresnik served in the US Marine Corps, logging an impressive 6,000 hours flying 81 different aircraft types, including time served as a test pilot before retiring with the rank of Colonel.

  • He joined the NASA astronaut corps in 2004, completing his training two years later.
  • First flew in space STS-129 in 2009 aboard space shuttle Atlantis. The 13-day mission was part of the International Space Station (ISS) construction, and he performed two EVAs alongside crewmates Michael Foreman and Robert Satcher respectively, to install external payload / experiment pallets on to the space station.
  • In 2011, he participated in the first ESA CAVES mission, a training course in which international astronauts train in a space-analogue cave environments such as might be used on Mars missions. Then in 2014 he commanded the NEEMO 19 mission, another analogue mission type, this one operated by NASA and using an underwater laboratory.
  • In 2017, he made his second trip to the ISS, this time launching aboard Soyuz MS-05 and spending 138 days on the space station as a part of the Expedition 52/53 crews, during which he performed three more EVAs, bringing his total “spacewalk” time to 32 hours.

Luca Salvo Parmitano, 49 (ESA): Pilot

  • Luca Parmitano (ESA): Artemis 3 Pilot

    Sicilian-born Parmitano was the first Italian (and third European overall) to command a crew rotation aboard the ISS.

  • He was educated in both Italy and the USA, gaining holding a masters degree in political science from University of Naples.
  • He served in the Italian Air Force after training with the US Air Force, rising to the rank of Colonel and logging over 2,000 hours on over 40 types of aircraft (both fixed-wing and rotary), including time as a test pilot.
  • Joined the European Astronaut Corps in 2009, and made his first flight to the ISS in 2011 aboard Soyuz TMA-09M.
  • During this mission he carried out two EVAs, the second called short after he almost drowned when a fault in his spacesuit filled his helmet with coolant water up to his nose, shorting out his communications headset in the process.
  • On returning to Earth, he indirectly followed in Bresnik’s footsteps, being selected for the 2014 ESA CAVES mission and then the NASA NEEMO 20 mission in 2015. He also participated in the ESA PANGAEA analogue mission in 2016.
  • He returned to the ISS as a part of the Expedition 60 in 2019, flying alongside Christina Koch, one of the Artemis 2 crew. Whilst there, he completed four more EVAs for a total EVA time to 33 hours 9 minutes; became the first DJ to perform a live set from space (as a part of an music festival taking place in Ibiza) and took command of the ISS for 3 months as a part of Expedition 61.
  • With a total time of just 59 minutes shy of 367 days in space, he is the second most experienced member of the Artemis 3 crew in terms of time in space.

Francisco “Frank” Carlos Rubio, 50 (NASA): Mission Specialist 1

  • Francisco “Frank” Rubio, Artemis 3 MS-1

    A graduate of the United State Military Academy, holding a bachelor’s degree in international relations, he logged over 1,100 hours flying helicopters for the US Army, with 600 hours on combat missions in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

  • He then transferred to the Army’s medical service, qualifying as a flight surgeon and then a field surgeon with the US Army Special Forces, rising to the rank of Colonel in the process.
  • Joining NASA in 2017, he made his first flight into space aboard Soyuz MS-22.
  • Planned for 6 months, as I reported at the time, this mission lasted more than a year after the Soyuz vehicle suffered a serious coolant leak. As a result, he and cosmonauts Sergey Prokopyev and Dmitry Petelin eventually returned to Earth aboard Soyuz MS-23 after completing 2 back-to-back 6-month tours on the ISS.
  • As a result of this, he clocked up almost 371 days in orbit, taking the record for the longest continuous time in space for a US astronaut.

Andre Douglas, 40 (NASA): Mission Specialist 2

  • Andre Douglas, Artemis 3 MS-2

    The mission rookie, making his first flight in space, he serves in the US Coast Guard (USCG) as a special advisor to the commander of the service. During his career, he served both at sea and on-shore, including time as Commandant of the USCG Academy.

  • He holds both a bachelor’s and master’s degree in mechanical engineering; and further three master’s in naval architecture, marine engineering and electrical & computer engineering.
  • In 2015 he transitioned from active service to the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins University. Here he carried out wide-ranging research, published several papers and collaborated with NASA to assess lunar surface needs for human and robotic missions, and helped to guide technology development in both.
  • He joined NASA in 2021, completing his astronaut training in May 2024.
  • His first active duty role was on the back-up crew for Artemis 2, training alongside the prime crew ready to replace any one of them in the event of injury or illness. He also served as a member of the launch pad close-out crew responsible for getting the crew safety into their Orion capsule on the day of the mission’s launch.

Following the announcement of the crew, NASA came in for criticism in that it is an all-male team, critics claims the selection was the result of the Trump administration’s determination to eliminate all aspects of DEI from the federal workforce. Responding to the criticism, NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman pointed out that crew selection is based on specific criteria notably in this case, the need for well-qualified test pilots (Bresnik and Parmitano) and someone closely involved in the development of lunar flight systems (Douglas), whilst Rubio’s medical experience would enhance the science elements of the mission.

Artemis 3 Mission Profile

As currently defined, Artemis 3 will proceed in four parts.

In the first, Blue Origin will use their New Glenn rocket to launch their Blue Moon MK2 Pathfinder to low Earth orbit. Pathfinder is essentially a working crew module from their actual HLS vehicle, complete with RCS thrusters, solar arrays and a simulated set of cryogenic tanks actual Blue Moon HLS vehicles will require.

With the Pathfinder vehicle in orbit, NASA will launch the Artemis crew aboard an Orion vehicle atop a modified Space Launch System (SLS) rocket. This rocket will lack the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion (ICPS) upper stage replaced by a mass simulator, as the ICPS is not required for the mission. The Orion will then rendezvous with the Pathfinder vehicle to commence two days of vehicle testing. This work will include:

  • Docking against Pathfinder’s orbital docking adopter/airlock.
  • Testing the airlock system on the Pathfinder vehicle, with two members of the crew boarding the vehicle.
  • Testing the module’s life support system through practical use, and also testing the on-board control, data management, navigation and communications systems.
  • Carrying out a practical evaluation of the module’s living spaces in micro-gravity.
  • Testing the module’s spacesuit storage and dressing spaces, with one of the crew actually donning and doffing one of the new Artemis space suits being developed by Axiom (or a non-functioning prototype thereof, depending on which is available at the time of the mission).
A still from a NASA / Blue Origin animation of the Artemis 3 Orion vehicle approaching the orbital docking port on the Blue Moon MK2 Pathfinder vehicle. Credit: NASA / Blue Origin

This is a fairly comprehensive test of the Blue Moon MK2 HLS crew module; however, it slips behind Apollo 9 in that there will be no testing of the HLS main propulsion system, and Pathfinder will not detach from Orion for a free-flight test of its RCS systems; Orion will manage all control and manoeuvring of the combined vehicles.

Following the Blue Moon tests, Orion will then shift to a single day of testing the docking system that will form part of the SpaceX Starship derived HLS. This docking system will be sent aloft on a “standard” Starship vehicle which – as of June 9th – is not expected to carry any other elements of the SpaceX HLS, severely limiting the idea of on-orbit system testing.

The fourth part of the mission will be peppered across the entire 2 weeks, comprising a range of science studies. These will include observations and measurements of the Earth’s atmosphere, together with medical and environment studies that build on the human science experiments carried out as a part of Artemis 2, and which are designed to further increase our understanding of dynamic space environments and radiation patterns.

A still from a NASA / Blue Origin animation of the Artemis 3 Orion vehicle docked with the Blue Moon MK2 Pathfinder vehicle. Credit: NASA / Blue Origin

One additional element of the mission has yet to be confirmed, and that is the potential for an EVA test. Details on this are currently sketchy, and it ultimately depends on whether or not Axiom can deliver a working version of the new Artemis space suits. These are intended to be a modular, dual-purpose design so they can either be used as part of surface operations on the Moon or as EVA suits for micro-gravity work aboard the ISS and other space stations, so a test on Artemis 3 would help further validate the suit design for both roles.

If the suit carried aboard the Blue Origin Pathfinder vehicle is fully functional, then there will likely be a full test of the vehicle’s main lunar surface airlock system, including depressurising and repressurising it, testing the hatch mechanisms, etc. However, the individual wearing the suit will not actually exit the vehicle.

That the SpaceX vehicle is unlikely to be equipped with anything other than the HLS / Orion docking adaptor potentially puts SpaceX at a further disadvantage in terms of which HLS craft will be selected for Artemis 4 (and possibly Artemis 5), simply because the tests with the Blue Moon MK2 Pathfinder are liable to give NASA a greater degree of confidence in that vehicle. This is further supported by the fact that Blue Origin have already supplied NASA with two test articles of their lander’s crew module, own of which is fully equipped for ground-based training and simulations. SpaceX are unlikely to achieve this before late 2026 at the earliest.

However, this does suppose that Blue Origin will actually be able to participate in Artemis 3 as currently scheduled. As I’ve previously reported, the only launch pad capable of handling New Glenn was destroyed on May 18th, 2026, during the testing of a New Glenn rocket in preparation for its next flight. Whilst Blue Origin is hoping to have all reconstruction work at LC-36 completed well in time for Artemis 3, there is a huge amount of work to be done in this regard.

Given this, Blue Origin’s Senior Vice President of Lunar Permanence, John Couluris used the June 9th event to indicate that as well as trying to push ahead with on-site investigations and clean-up operations at LC-36 so as to allow rebuilding to commence sooner rather than later, Blue Origin is also seeking to accelerate plans submitted for approval in April 2026 for the construction of a brand new launch facility to support New Glenn operations.

A Google Maps view of Canaveral Space Force Base, Florida, showing the former “ICBM Row” along the coast, the “Skid Strip” runway originally use to test wing missile landings (and which is not the former Space Shuttle Landing Facility), with the locations of the current Blue Origin LC-36 facilities and the proposed location (LC-11) for the new “SLC-36B/11” New Glenn launch facilities.

Dubbed SL-36B/11, this is to be built on the company’s current engine test stand located at LC-11, Canaveral Space Force Station and a short distance from LC-36. The hope is that if the approval process can be accelerated, Blue Origin will be able to commence construction even as work continues at LC-36. If so, there is a possibility the company might have two launch pads available for New Glenn flights by the time of Artemis 3.

Obviously, this is a very ambitious plan, and as such there is still the possibility that Artemis 3 might yet be pushed back into 2028 (although political pressure could weigh heavily against this) in order to ensure Blue Origin is in a position to participate. This could also benefit SpaceX, as it might provide them with the opportunity to provide more than just the HLS docking adaptor for Artemis 3 testing (although this would likely be a long shot as well).

In the meantime, one interesting facet that did emerge from the June 9th event was that SpaceX and NASA are in discussions about changing the Artemis mission profiles when using the SpaceX HLS vehicle.

Renderings of the 16m tall Blue Origin HLS (l) and the 52m tall SpaceX HLS (r) as they are supposed to look on the Moon. The Blue Origin rendering  shows the surface airlock and egress/access steps to the right of the vehicle and the circular orbital airlock used for docking with Orion spacecraft to the left. The SpaceX orbital airlock is located at the nose of the vehicle, with the surface operations airlock + the elevator required to get crew from / to the surface of the Moon also shown. Credits: Blue Origin / SpaceX

Under current plans, both the Blue Origin and SpaceX HLS vehicles are launched into low-Earth orbit first and (after propellant loading / docking with a transport vehicle in the case of Blue Origin) then proceed to lunar orbit to await the arrival of a crew aboard an Orion spacecraft. However, the SpaceX / NASA discussions revolve around having the Orion vehicle rendezvous and dock with the SpaceX HLS whilst the latter is still in orbit and after it has received the propellant load-out it requires to carry out its lunar mission.

This approach actually makes a lot of sense. For one thing, it means that the crew could potentially make use of the the roomier facilities aboard the SpaceX HLS during the outbound trip to the Moon (and ensure it is all functioning smoothly) and it would potentially provide them was a “lifeboat” capability in the event of an Apollo 13-style accident. As such, it will be interesting to see had far these discussions progress.

Space Sunday: NASA’s nuclear electric plans, a goodbye to MAVEN and a New Glenn update

A composite image of SR-1 Freedom (rendering) approaching its orbit around Mars. Credit: NASA

Just over a month ago NASA announced plans to test a nuclear propulsion system on  mission to Mars. The news came as a surprise at the time, given it came a year after another nuclear propulsion project involving NASA had joined (along with the US Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) had been cancelled.

Called DRACO (Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations), that project was formally initiated in 2021, with the intention of finally evaluating the deep space use of nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) – that is, the use of a nuclear reactor to heat a propellant mass (usually liquid hydrogen) to generate thrust through the engine nozzles. Targeting a launch date in late 2027, DRACO was always ambitious, and inevitably ran afoul of technical and regulatory challenges starting it on the road to oblivion prior to funding via both DARPA and NASA being halted.

A rendering of the cancelled DRACO DRAPA / NASA nuclear thermal propulsion demonstrator mission. Credit: DARPA

The technological and regulatory problems faced by DRACO primarily concerned two key points. The first being the need for a liquid propellant (requiring substantial propellant mass and the additional mass and complexity of trying to keep the propellant in a liquid state through passive and active means in the full heat of the Sun).

More particularly, DRACO’s nuclear system was to be open cycle, meaning the liquid hydrogen would pass through the reactor system to turn it into the gas needed to propel the vehicle – irradiating it in the process. While people would likely not be too happy about a nuclear reactor spewing radioactive material into the upper atmosphere if it was used whilst in orbit around Earth, the bigger regulatory issue for DRACO was simply how could a system generating radioactive exhaust materials be safely tested on the ground?

Because of this, NASA’s new mission concept – called Space Reactor 1 (SR-1, with the vehicle itself to be called Freedom) instead intends to use nuclear electric propulsion. This is important because it allows the use of a closed cycle nuclear reactor – in this case a closed Brayton cycle fission reactor generating some 50 kW of electrical power. The key point here is that closed cycle reactors can avoid exposing a propellant to radiation, so the exhaust gasses exiting the engine is relatively “clean”. Thus, SR-1 theoretically avoids some of the regulatory issues faced by DRACO.

The “engines” in question for SR-1 are three 12 kW (nominal) Hall-effect thrusters. This in turn is important for a couple of reasons. Firstly, Hall-effect propulsion systems are well understood. Secondly, they utilise a far less volatile propellant than liquid hydrogen  – generally Xenon – which a) doesn’t need to be a liquid form,  and so b) avoids all the complexities of passive and active refrigeration. Both the use of the thrusters and the Xenon fuel therefore cuts out a lot of the technical complexities SR-1 could face when compared to DRACO. Further, SR-1 plans to use a propulsion module that has been in development for some time: the Power and Propulsion Element (PPE) which was to have been used on NASA’s (now cancelled) Lunar Gateway station. This could again help reduce the technical complexities designing SR-1 might otherwise face and it potentially gains political favour in that it offers a means to make good on some of the money already poured into Gateway.

A conceptual image with annotation of the proposed SR-1 Freedom vehicle. Credit: NASA

Nor is SR-1 intended to be a just demonstration of nuclear electric propulsion operating purely in near-Earth  / cislunar space as was the case with DRACO; it is to be a genuine deep-space mission, delivering a payload to Mars in 2029, In doing so it will prove the complete viability of nuclear propulsion in space missions. The payload in question is the Skyfall – and no, it has nothing to do with James Bond!

First revealed as a conceptual study in mid-2025 by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and AeroVironment, Skyfall is designed to build on the experience gained in flying the Ingenuity helicopter on Mars as a part of the Mars 2020 mission (in which it flew 71 times, often in support of the Mars 2020 rover Perseverance. As initially conceived, Skyfall would utilise six updated versions of the Ingenuity design to carry out a range of scouting flights across Mars. For the purposes of the SR-1 mission, the number of helicopters has been reduced to three – but how they will be delivered into the Martian atmosphere remains dramatic.

When first proposed, Skyfall was to carry six Ingenuity-class helicopter drones to Mars. As a part of the SR-1 mission the number has been scaled back to three. Credit: AeroVironment / NASA

In short, the mission will use a version of the capsule design used to deliver both Perseverance and the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) rover Curiosity to Mars in 2021 and 2012 respectively. This will protect the three helicopters both on the journey from Earth to Mars and through the heat and buffeting of entry into the Martian atmosphere. After deploying its main parachutes to slow its decent through the atmosphere and jettisoning its heat shield, the capsule will extend a launch platform underneath itself, allowing the three helicopters to power-up their blades and take flight.

Once airborne, the three craft will operate in parallel, carrying out daily low-level flights of Mars, landing to both recharge their batteries and pass the Martian nights. Each will carry a small science package on board, including high-resolution camera to image the terrain they are overflying (to be used in the planning for future missions to Mars) and ground penetrating radar to reveal what lies beneath that terrain, be it rock, permafrost or deposits of water ice.

However, neither Skyfall nor SR-1 are certain to go ahead as planned. Firstly, there is the extremely tight development / test and construction time frame – just 30 months if NASA really is going to achieve a December 2028 / January 2029 launch for the combined mission.

More particularly for SR-1, there are multiple complications still to be overcome. Perhaps the biggest of these is the reactor feedstock: high-assay low-enriched uranium 235 (aka HALEU, with between 5% and 20% enrichment). While this is ideal for use in compact reactors, it requires a dedicated nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure for its production, and this infrastructure is both limited and already at capacity. Whilst the US government is trying to scale HALEU production, this is not going to happen in the short-term. As such, SR-1 could take considerably longer than 30 months to reach a state in which it might reasonably be launched.

Goodnight, MAVEN

On June 3rd, 2026 NASA confirmed their MAVEN (Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN) mission had come to an end after a total of 11 years and the orbiter officially classified as lost. The news came some 6 months after all contact with the orbiter was lost and after a long series of attempts to r-establish communications and to understand what might have happened.

Launched in 2013 and commencing its science mission around Mars in 2014, MAVEN was intended to study the Mars atmosphere in an attempt to understand the composition of the upper reaches of that atmosphere and better understand the mechanism at work in stripping away that atmosphere – particularly that of the solar wind. For over 10 years, MAVEN revealed many of Mars’ secrets and the risks human visiting the planet will face (such as solar storms striking the planet quickly doubling surface radiation levels on a temporary basis).

An artist’s impression of NASA MAVEN spacecraft orbiting Mars. Credit: NASA

The first indication that something had gone wrong with MAVEN came on December 4th, 2025, when it failed to resume contact with NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) after a routine passage around the far side of Mars. Two days later, JPL received a data fragment from the orbiter, suggesting it was rotating in an unexpected manner and may have deviated from its orbital track. On both December 16th and 20th, 2025, MAVEN passed directly over Gale Crater and the rove Curiosity, but despite the scanning the sky with its high-resolution MastCam along the orbiter’s expected track, there was no sign of MAVEN.

Attempts to regain contact with the orbiter continued at regular intervals throughout early 2026, but by April it was evident that the chances of re-establishing contact were rapidly diminishing. Thus, on By June 3rd, NASA issued a statement terminating the mission while efforts to understand exactly what had gone wrong would continue. Currently, the favoured hypothesis is that MAVEN had an unexpected issue, lost its communications orientation with Earth and was unable to recover. This may have additionally caused the vehicle to drift out of its expected orbit and / or result in its solar arrays being no longer able to generate sufficient power to keep the vehicle’s batteries operating, so it likely ran out of power.

In all, it’s a sad end to a mission that achieved so much, especially given the longevity we’ve come to expect of Mars missions around or on the planet once they have safely entered orbit or landed.

Blue Origin: A Major Malfunction – Update

As per my previous Space Sunday article, on Thursday, May 28th, 2026, a Blue Origin New Glenn booster exploded with tremendous force (estimated to be the equivalent of 1 kiloton of TNT), levelling much of Launch Complex 36 (LC-36) at Canaveral Space Force Base, California, the only facility in the world capable of handling the rocket.

Based on the available images and information available at that time, and as I noted in that article, it seemed that LC-36 would be out of action for at least a year; something that could have major ramifications for Blue Origin and NASA’s Artemis programme. However, June 2nd, 2026, Blue Origin CEO, Dave Limp took to social media with an update on matters which included some surprising news and ended with an even more surprising prediction.

Blue Origin’s launch facilities at LC-36(A) seen in 2025 from the roof of the vehicle and payload integration building, showing a New Glenn rocket atop the transporter-erector vehicle. Credit: Blue Origin

On summary, Limp indicated that:

  • The propellant farm alongside the launch pad weathered the explosion reasonably well and will not require significant rebuilding / replacement (although images have revealed a couple of the tanks do have significant denting).
  • The damage done to the main vehicle and payload integration building appears to far less severe than reports suggested, and the water tower serving the deluge / sound suppression system is largely undamaged.
  • Despite receiving some major damage near its base, the surviving lightning conductor tower can likely be repaired without being demolished – a comment which drew multiple surprised responses given the apparent extent of the damage.
  • Rather than building a new transporter-erector (TE – the 1800-tonne vehicle used to move New Glenn from the vehicle and payload integration building to the launch pad and then act as the rocket’s launch tower), the company will now pivot to a new vertical launch platform / transporter, something they were already planning to do prior to the explosion.

Most surprisingly, however, was Limp’s prediction that Blue Origin will resume New Glenn operations by the end of 2026. Given all that has to be done, both in terms of the rebuilding work at LC-36 (to say nothing as to how long investigations into the vehicle loss will take & what might yet be required to clear New Glenn to resume flights, it is fairly hard to see how this can be achieved. As such, a lot of eyes will be watching Blue Origin and LC-36 very closely over the next 6-7 months.