Space Sunday: Artemis 2: around the Moon, home again – and beyond!

We see you: Christina Koch looks out of one of the Orion capsule’s windows towards a GoPro camera mounted on one of the four forward-swept solar array wings of the vehicle’s European Service Module (ESM). To her right, she is holding aloft the mission’s zero-gee indicator / mascot, “Rise”. Created by a 3rd grader, “Rise” has a smiley-faced Moon and is wearing a blue-and-green cap representing Earth, all in a homage to the famous Apollo 8 “Earthrise” photo. Credit: NASA

On Wednesday April 1st, 2026, NASA’s Artemis 2 mission launched on a 10-day cruise to the Moon and back (with time initially spent in Earth orbit), carrying a crew of four to test the capabilities and facilities of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The mission was a key preparatory step to send crews to the surface of the Moon, starting with the flight of Artemis 4, currently targeting a 2028 launch.

In the first part of this 2-part series I covered Artemis 2 from launch to TLI. Here I complete the voyage in summary form.

Whilst marked by a number of on-going space health experiments, video calls to Earth and performing sundry tasks and s few minor fixes, the outward trip from Earth to the Moon was pretty much a claim affair. A 17.5 second mid-course correction manoeuvre was performed automatically by Integrity, the Orion spacecraft, on mission day 5 – which was actually the first to be performed, the initial correction burn having been cancelled due to Integrity being so precisely on course whilst under its own flight control software.

Taken in high Earth orbit, this image shows the European Service Module and its main engine, with the Earth as a backdrop as the motor is test gimballed ahead of the TLI burn to send Integrity to the Moon. Captured by a solar-panel mounted GoPro camera. Credit: NASA

Day five also saw the crew test their dual-purpose Orion Crew Survival System (OCSS) suits – the orange-coloured space suits the crew wore during the Artemis 2. Designed for quick donning, the suits function as a contingency safety system during the crew’s time aboard and Orion spacecraft, providing up to 144 hours of life support in the event of a cabin depressurisation.

Artemis 2 astronaut Christina Koch poses in her custom-made OCSS suit ahead of the Artemis 2 mission. Credit: NASA.

In their second role, the suits are intended to act as water survival suits in the event of an emergency evacuation of an Orion vehicle post-splashdown. In this role, the suits are intentionally coloured “international orange” so as to be more clearly visible in the water – just like survival suits used on ocean-going cargo vessels, oil rigs, deep sea fishing vessels, etc They additionally have inbuilt flotation devices. Each OCSS is custom made to fit an individual astronaut.

Day five also saw a series of discussions with Mission Control on the upcoming loop around the Moon to review lunar surface targets for observation and photography during the flyby and finalise observation techniques.

On flight day 6, Integrity officially entered the influence of the Moon, with lunar gravity now the dominant force in shaping the vehicle’s trajectory. Until now, Integrity had effectively (if slowly) been decelerating, due to the “pull” of Earth’s gravity behind it, effectively cruising at a few thousand kilometres an hour at it approached the Moon. Now, under the Moon’s influence the craft would start to very slowly accelerate, allowing the Moon’s gravity to swing it around the Moon and lob it back towards Earth without any significant engine burns.

In 1968, the crew of Apollo 8, the first humans to fly around the Moon, captured an iconic image of Earth “rising” over the Moon as the Apollo CSM re-emerged from being on the Moon’s far side. On April 6th, 2026, and 57 years later, the crew of Artemis 2 captured this image of a crescent Earth “setting” over the Moon as their Orion spacecraft started its journey around the Moon’s far side. Credit: NASA

Around the Moon

At 23:00 UCT on April 6th, Artemis 2 made its closest approach to the Moon, passing some 6,545 kilometres above the Moon’s far side. Shortly thereafter Integrity reached a distance of 406,771 kilometres from Earth, breaking the record for the furthest any humans had been from Earth and set by the crew of Apollo 13 in 1970. At this point, Integrity officially started its flight back towards Earth.

During the loop around the Moon, Artemis 2 was in communications black-out with Earth due to the bulk of the Moon being between the spacecraft and Earth, effectively blocking all signals. This blackout lasted 40 minutes, and ended with a successful recovery of comms and telemetry at the expected time.

A gif showing the solar eclipse as seen from deep space by Artemis 2. Credit: NASA

Following the comms blackout, the crew of Artemis 2 witnessed a solar eclipse from deep space as the bulk of the Moon came between them and the Sun. This allowed the crew to observe both the eclipse from a unique perspective, and witness a number of “impact flashes” of meteoroids striking the semi-dark lunar surface facing them. The Moon was not fully dark as the Earth was off to one side relative to Integrity, and so was reflecting sunlight back onto one hemisphere of the Moon, bathing it in “Earthlight”.

Also during the flight around the Moon, the crew christened two previously unnamed craters on the Moon. They named one for their spacecraft, Integrity, whilst the second was – in a poignant moment – named Carroll, in honour of Reid Wiseman’s late wife, who passed away from cancer in 2020.

Artemis 2 crew Commander, Reid Wiseman with his late wife, Carroll, after whom the crew named a crater on the Moon.

Between flight day 7 and flight day 9, Orion departed the Moon’s sphere of influence on its free return trajectory towards Earth, once again slowly accelerating. For most of Day 7 the crew were engaged in debriefing calls with Earth, recording their observations, feelings and emotions during their trip around the Moon whilst memories and reactions were still fresh. They also put in a call to astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS).

A further planned use of manual control by Wiseman and Pilot Victor Glover on Day 8 was cancelled in order to allow mission managers conduct a data-gathering exercise related to a non-critical helium leak within the Orion’s European Service Module (ESM), so that they might better analyse the issue post-mission. Two final trajectory adjustment burns were carried out on Days 9 and 10, lasting 8 and 9 seconds respectively. Most of Day 9 saw the crew packing and stowing experiments and equipment in readiness for re-entry and splashdown.

Following the course correction burn on Day 10, the ESM was jettisoned, its work done. The reaction control thrusters system (RCS) on Integrity then operated in sequence over 19-seond period, both manoeuvring the capsule away from the ESM and orienting it in readiness foe atmospheric re-entry.

A gif showing solar panel GoPro camera views of Integrity’s crew capsule sparating from the European Service Module in readiness for re-entry. Credit: NASA

EDS: Entry, Descent and Splashdown

Day 10 saw the most critical elements of the mission unfold: atmospheric entry, descent and splashdown. During Artemis 1, and as I’ve covered in numerous Space Sunday pieces, post-recovery, the heat shield showed some disturbing issues. As well as the expected ablation damage to the heat shield, it also showed signed of deep scoring and charring, with relatively large holes apparently seared through the heat shield material.

After extensive analysis, it was determined that an error in the fabrication process for the initial heat shields for Artemis 1 through 3 had resulted in pockets of gas being trapped in the layers of ablative material. Due to the original re-entry profile for Orion, as used on Artemis 1, which saw the vehicle “skip” in and out of the upper atmosphere to reduce its velocity prior to actual re-entry, these gases ended up being super-heated several times, weakening the heat shield’s structure and eventually blowing holes up and out of it as they outgassed.

While the fabrication process for the heat shields was revised to mitigate any issues of gases becoming trapped – Artemis 2, due to time constraints, would have to fly with its original heat shield. To compensate for this, NASA altered the mission’s re-entry profile to be more Apollo-like: a single direct re-entry. Whilst this might increase stresses on the vehicle and crew, it would reduce the time over which any trapped gases in the heat shield might have expand and contract and weaken its overall integrity, thus increasing the risk of failure.

As it turned out, the heat shield (subject to post-flight inspection) did its job in this new re-entry profile and protected Integrity and its crew, all of which descended by parachute post re-entry to splashdown off the coast of California, where a recovery operation overseen by the USS John P. Murtha out of San Diego saw the recovery of both crew and the space vehicle. Following initial medical checks on the Murtha, the four crew were then flown to the mainland for further check-ups, prior to proceeding on to the Johnson Space Centre in Texas to be reunited with families and loved ones.

The Artemis 2 crew at Johnson Space Centre, April 11th, 2026. (l to r): Jeremy Hansen (CSA); Christina Koch (NASA); Victor Glover (NASA) and a triumphant-looking Reid Wiseman (NASA), holding “Rise” the mission’s zero-gravity indicator and mascot. Credit: NASA

Research related to Artemis 2 will continue post flight, and some of it will continue to focus directly on the four crew, comprising functional check-out tests, simulated space walks, exercises, etc., to further gain insight into the human body’s ability to adapt to low gravity operations and work, and its ability to recover from them. As well as this, all four will be a part of a media circus for some time to come. To them, and all those involved in Artemis and Artemis 2 – congratulations.

What Comes Next?

Originally, Artemis 2 was to be followed by the first attempt at landing an Artemis crew on the Moon. However, this idea both spoke to an unwarranted gung-ho attitude on the part of Artemis management at NASA (no crewed pre-testing of the lunar landing system (called the Human Landing System, or HLS) in Earth orbit), and assumed the mission would actually have a lunar landing vehicle (from SpaceX) available to meet its 2027 launch date.

Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2 HLS (l) and SpaceX Starship HLS – NOT to scale. The Blue Origin vehicle is 16 metres high as benefits a low centre of mass – crew compartment, engines electronics, etc, all at the base of the vehicle, which includes broad-set landing legs for stability. The SpaceX design – 52 metres tall – suffers from a high centre of mass: crew compartment, electronics, batteries, engines all in the upper third of the vehicle, requiring an elevator (single point of failure) to get crews to / from the surface on the Moon, and a comparatively narrow-set landing legs, further increasing vehicle instability when landing on an unprepared surface like the Moon.

In taking over at NASA, Jared Issacman saw the gung-ho approach of Artemis 3 as a step too far, and so  – with Congressional and White House approval – determined Artemis 3 should be an Earth-orbiting testy of the HLS vehicle by a crew. Also, in keeping with his predecessor, Sean Duffy, he indicated that SpaceX was no longer the sole provider of the Artemis 3 HLS; but would directly face off against Blue Origin, who had been awarded a HLS contract by order of Congress after NASA changed the scope and rules of the original HLS contract to favour SpaceX.

Given that the SpaceX HLS continues to exist as little more than a few disparate elements (such as the crew elevator – largely developed by NASA) and pretty computer renderings, this move to include Blue Origin – who are actively testing elements of their HLS, Called Blue Moon Mark 2 with NASA astronauts – is a wise one, given the SpaceX CEO appears to believe time frames and delivery dates are purely functions of his ego.

A full scale mock-up of the Blue Origin Blue Moon Mark 2 crew section with airlock undergoing testing for astronaut egress / ingress and the recovery of an incapacitated crew member, using the neutral buoyancy facility at NASA’s Johnson Space Centre. Credit: Blue Origin / NASA

As it is, this year should see Blue Origin fly a Blue Moon “pathfinder” mission to the Moon. This will see a scaled-down version of the Blue Moon cargo lander fly a payload from NASA to the Moon, allowing it to test the flight control, navigation, and data communications systems and avionics which will all be part of both the Blue Moon Mark 1 cargo vehicle and Blue Moon Mark 2 HLS. If successful, the mission could put Blue Origin in a strong position to provide the HLS vehicle for both Artemis 4 and Artemis 5.

However, even if one (or both) HLS vehicles get successfully tested in Earth orbit in 2027, it does not mean NASA will be ready to send astronauts to the lunar surface – there is another hurdle to overcome, one entirely of NASA’s own making: cryogenic orbital refuelling.

To explain: while techniques for transferring hypergolic propellants between space  craft has long been available (the ISS, for example, routinely takes on propellants for its manoeuvring thrusters), cryogenic propellant transfer in space is entirely new. It’s not been used before simply because cryogenic propellants are not exactly stable. For one thing, they don’t like heat (and in space, in direct sunlight it s very hot). Heat makes them revert to a gaseous state, expanding their volume. This puts greater and greater pressure on the tanks holding them, such that if the gas isn’t vented to some degree, everything is going to quickly vanish in a brilliant (if silent – in space, no-one can here you go pop!) explosion.

Renderings like this showing one vehicle (in this case a SpaceX Starship (uppermost) transferring propellants to another may look good, but the fact is, such transfers have never been tried in space and are far more complex than hypergolic propellant transfer and storage. Credit: SpaceX

Cryogenic propellants are also heavy in their liquid state, making them somethings of a deadweight if you’re attempting to lift them to orbit rather than burning them as a means to get to orbit. This latter point means that in order just to get to Earth orbit or to the Moon, the SpaceX HLS and Blue Moon Mark 2 (respectively) must launch without the fuel needed to get to the Moon, land a crew and get them back to lunar orbit. Thus, the fuel must be ferried to them post launch.

For Blue Origin, this means launching a Blue Moon HLS to lunar orbit, but without the propellants it needs to operate between lunar orbit and the Moon’s surface. Instead, these must be delivered by a “tanker” craft called the Cislunar Transporter, being developed by Lockheed Martin. But here’s the catch: the Cislunar Transporter has to be launched without the propellants it needs to get to the Moon or those it must transfer to the waiting HLS. So, once in orbit it also has to be “refuelled” by at least two Blue Origin New Glenn rockets.

And if that sounds complicated – SpaceX much do much the same with their HLS, which will launch with only sufficient propellants needed to get to Earth orbit. After this it must either make up to sixteen individual dockings with Starship “tankers” to take on the propellants it needs to reach the Moon and perform its duties there, or it must rendezvous with a (also yet to be built) “orbital fuel depot” previously filled with the propellants it needs by multiple Starship “tanker” flights.

And this is where boil-off comes into play: all of these approaches will result in large volumes of cryogenic propellants spending a lot of time in direct sunlight, turning back to a gaseous state, expanding and requiring venting to prevent their storage tanks rupturing. So techniques and entirely new technologies need to be developed and tested in order to reduce the overall boil-off issues lest more time is spent on “tank top-up” missions than in actually sending humans to the Moon. Further, no-one knows if large volumes of cryogenic propellants can easily be pumped from one vehicle to another in microgravity.

Thus, even though Artemis 2 has been a huge success and NASA is turning its attention to Artemis 3, the programme as a whole still has some hefty hurdles to clear before it is close to being ready to send humans back to the surface of the Moon, and at the current rate of progress, I cannot see all those hurdles being cleared by “early 2028 – less than 2 years from now – when Artemis4 is supposed to launch on its crewed mission to the lunar surface.

Space Sunday: Artemis 2: from launch to TLI

Ignition of the four RS-25 engines on the Artemis 2 SLS, several seconds before the ignition of the two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) seen either side of the SLS core stage, take from a protected camera in the base of the Mobile Launch Platform. Credit: NASA

On Wednesday April 1st, 2026, NASA’s Artemis 2 mission launched on a 10-day cruise to the Moon and back (with time initially spent in Earth orbit), carrying a crew of four to test the capabilities and facilities of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) when used for human spaceflight.

The mission marks a number of firsts for NASA, all critical to future Artemis missions, including:

  • The first launch of a Space Launch system (SLS) rocket with a crew aboard.
  • The first launch of the Orion spacecraft – this one christened Integrity by its crew – with people aboard.
  • The first time an Orion spacecraft has flown under manual control.
  • The first time an Orion vehicle will attempt a re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere carrying a crew aboard.
  • The first time humans have surpassed 400,000 kilometres from Earth.
  • The first time a vehicle intended for use in the vicinity of the Moon has carried an actual toilet on board.
  • The first time a non-US citizen has travelled to the Moon.

The four crew in question are Mission Commander Reid Wiseman, Mission Pilot Victor Glover, Mission specialist Christina Koch (pronounced “Cook”), all from NASA, and Mission Specialist Jeremy Hansen of the Canadian Space Agency. If you’re interested in potted histories of the crew’s backgrounds, then please refer to my previous Space Sunday article.

The four crew of Artemis 2 department the Armstrong Building at Kennedy Space Centre, Florida. (l to r): MS Jeremy Hansen; Pilot Victor Glover; Commander Reid Wiseman; MS Christina Koch. Credit: NASA

Launch

Lift-off came at 22:35 UTC, some 11 minutes later than the target launch time after a couple of minor issues on the SLS vehicle had to be investigated and resolved. One of these related to one of the two battery systems powering the Flight Termination System. The latter is used to destruct the rocket once the crew have been pulled clear by the Launch Abort System (LAS), should a serious issue result in the rocket veering substantially off-course. This particular problem was identified as a sensor failure rather than any fault with the battery itself.

The power of the SLS was immediately apparent following launch – at just thirty seconds into the flight, the launch system has completed its roll to pitch over to the correct ascent angle and was punching through 4.8 kilometres altitude as a speed in excess of 1,920 km/h.  From there:

In just 30 seconds after launch, Artemis 2 was almost 5 kilometres above the Earth and accelerating rapidly. Credit: NASA
  • At T+1 minute the vehicle passed through ”Max Q”, the period when the rocket encounters the peak atmospheric dynamic stresses as it continues to accelerate through the denser portion of the atmosphere, the four RS-25 motors of the core stage throttling back to reduce the load on the rocket.
  • At T+ 90 seconds, with Max Q passed and the RS-25 motors running at 100% thrust, the SLS went supersonic and passing through 22.4 km altitude.
  • At T+2 minutes, with the RS-25 motors had again throttled to 85% thrust, and the two massive solid rocket boosters, their fuel expended, separated to continue on their own ballistic trajectory, eventually falling into the Atlantic Ocean.
  • By 3 minutes into the ascent, Artemis 2 was at 78.4 km altitude, and closing on the 80 km Kármán line, the conventional definition of “the edge of space”. Travelling at some 8,000 km/h, the rocket jettisoned the two fairings that had protected Integrity’s European Service Module (ESM).
  • This was followed almost immediately by the unlocking of the couplings between the LAS at the top of the rocket, and the Orion capsule. The motors on the LAS fired, pulling it clear of the SLS, exposing the Orion capsule to space.
Captured via a film camera mounted on one of NASA observation aircraft, this still shows the SLS rocket of Artemis 2 with its main engines running at full power, together with the separated Solid Rocket Boosters, ESM protective Fairings and the LAS tower, as they part company from the rocket to commence their destructive falls into the Atlantic Ocean. Credit: NASA – Click for full size
  • MECO – main engine cut-off – occurred at 8 minutes 2 seconds after lift-off, with Integrity and the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) continuing to ascend, the reaction control systems (RCS) on the ICPS sufficient to pull it and Integrity clear of the SLS core stage, which, like the SRBs, continued on its own ballistic trajectory, prior to starting a long fall back to Earth, breaking up in the process and falling into the Atlantic Ocean.

At this point, Integrity was travelling at 27,200 km/h – slightly above the speed required to achieve Earth orbit and on a trajectory intended to put it into an elliptical orbit around Earth with a perigee (closest point to Earth) of around 200 km. At this point, operations switched from launch to initial mission activities.

A rear-facing camera on the Orion capsule capture another view of the ESM fairings being separated (centre bottom and (just visible) centre top). Credit: NASA

The latter comprised two major elements: inside the Orion capsule, Christina Koch and Jeremy Hansen left their seats to set-up critical equipment and services. These included unstowing the fire-fighting equipment and mounting it on its assigned racks and then doing the same with the drinking water dispenser, toilet (which had its first malfunction, requiring Koch and Hansen to carry out a fix (the Toilet would again have issues on Flight Day 4, with the crew reporting it was depositing unpleasant odours in the main capsule) and other crew-related equipment. At the same time, Wiseman and Glover remained in their seats and ran through the protocols and check sheets for deploying the ESM’s solar arrays – vital for supplying Integrity with electrical power.

The solar arrays were deployed some 25 minutes after launch, and powered-up to start producing electrical power. At 50 minutes after lift-off, Hansen and Koch were back in their seats, the solar arrays were producing power and the go was given for two orbit-changing manoeuvres.

One of Integrity’s four deployed solar arrays with Earth as a backdrop, as seen from a camera mounted on one of the other solar arrays. Credit: NASA

The first was a short burst of the ICPS RL-10 engine, raising the perigee of Integrity’s orbit whilst maintaining its elliptical form. This was followed by a second 15-minute burn of the RL-10, extending Integrity’s perigee and apogee (the latter to some 70,000 km from Earth, placing the vehicle in a high Earth orbit.

This second RL-10 burn expended almost all remaining fuel in the ICPS, accelerating Integrity almost to the velocity required to complete a trans-lunar injection (TLI) manoeuvre. However, this is not what happened. Instead, with the ICPS separated and orbiting Earth independently of Integrity, Glover and Wiseman commenced what NASA normally refers to as an RPOD simulation, but which for Artemis 2 was simply called “proximity operations”.

RPOD Simulations / Proximity Operations

RPOD – Rendezvous, Proximity Operations and Docking – is a core part of modern day space operations with NASA, being fundamental to crews and supplies being able to launch to and reach the International Space Station (ISS) and then dock safety with it either under automated or manual control.

For the Artemis programme, being able to carry out a successful RPOD is vital to all the lunar surface missions, as they must be able to rendezvous and temporarily dock with the Moon- orbiting Human Landing System (HLS) vehicle which will actually deliver nominated crew members to the surface of the Moon, and then re-dock with the HLS vehicle to allow the surface mission crew return to their Orion craft for a return to Earth.

A conceptual rendering of Integrity performing a simulated RPOD with its ICPS as part of the proximity operations. Thee “docking target” can be seen within the open end of the ESM adaptor fairing. Credit: ESA

To this end, the ICPS had been equipped with a rendezvous and docking target, allowing Wiseman and Glover to test out the docking heads-up display whilst also using Integrity’s RCS thrusters to make simulated rendezvous approaches to the ICPS, aborting before the two vehicles actually made contact. In addition, Wiseman and Glover used manual control of the Orion to test proximity manoeuvring and close formation flying around the ICPS – both the POD and proximity operations marking the first time Orion had ever been manually flown. Both astronauts praised the vehicle’s handling qualities prior to returning the craft to its autopilot.

With Integrity well clear of the ICPS, the latter deployed two CubeSats then fired its RL-10 for a final time, placing it on a destructive re-entry into the upper atmosphere. At this point the crew moved to the next phases of initial operations.

Initial Mission Highlights

First, the Orion’s “gymnasium” – a flywheel device capable of allowing multiple exercises – was set-up and crew members took it in turns exercising, putting Integrity’s life support system through something of a stress test. After this, the crew set-up the food reheater and had dinner together from their rather impressive menu of meal choices. A 4-hour sleep period was then taken, allowing the crew some much needed rest.

Artemis 2 is providing unprecedented coverage, with 2/7 livestreams from the vehicle, frequent mission updates and interviews with the crew – such as this one from Saturday, April 4th, 2026. Form l to r: Reid Wiseman, Jeremy Hansen, Christina Koch and Victor Glover. Credit: NASA / AP

The sleep period was short as a further orbital manoeuvre was required to again raise Integrity’s perigee away from Earth and place it on a trajectory suitable for a TLI burn. With this complete, the crew settled back for another 4-hour sleep period whilst NASA mission control reviewed the overall performance of Orion and its systems to determine if Integrity was good to go for a free-return flight for the Moon.

Authorisation was given for TLI on flight day 2 after the crew had risen and eaten. The manoeuvre comprised a burn of the ESM’s AJ10 main engine of just under 6 minutes, using some 450 kg of hypergolic propellants. It pushed Integrity out of Earth’s orbit and on its way to pass around the Moon. This free return trajectory meant the vehicle would not need to use its AJ10 engine as it passed around the Moon in order to head back to Earth – gravity would do the work for the mission. However, the ESM’s propulsion systems would be required for various mid-course correction manoeuvres.

Captured through a window of the Orion capsule shortly after IPCS separation and with Integrity in a high Earth orbit (HEO), it images shows the night side of Earth, brightly illuminated by sunlight reflected by the Moon. The Sun is on the far side of Earth relative to Integrity, its light causing parts of the atmosphere to glow aurora-like. Credit: Reid Wiseman / NASA

The first of these course corrections was due on Flight Day 3. However, such was the accuracy of the SLS’s performance coupled with that of Integrity itself, this manoeuvre was discarded – the vehicle was precisely on the course it needed. On Flight Day 4 Hansen (a Canadian fighter pilot) and Koch (a jet-qualified civilian pilot) took the controls of Orion and put the vehicle through a further series of RCS tests, evaluating its ability to complete both 3- and 6-degrees of freedom of movement manoeuvres (that is, rolling, pitching and yawing around various axes without altering its general trajectory). Both Koch and Hansen reported the vehicle presented excellent and stable  handling.

Currently, the crew is due to pass around the Moon on Monday, April 6th. 2026 as they do so, they will reach a distance of approximately 406,773 kilometres from Earth, beating the previous record for the furthest humans have travelled from Earth to date – set by the abortive Apollo 13 mission in 1970 – by some 6,000 km. At this point, Integrity will be some 7,600 km beyond the surface of the Moon’s far side as it starts its journey home. The closest Artemis 2 will come to the surface of the Moon is approximately 6,513 km.

Taken on Saturday, April 4th, 2026 through a window on Integrity, this image captures the Moon’s nearside from a distance of around 180,000 km. Credit: NASA (astronaut response for image unnamed).

During the intervening period, the crew continue to test Integrity’s systems and capabilities and carry out a range of experiments, notably related to crew health and welfare. As a part of this work, Integrity carries two key experiments: AVATAR – A Virtual Astronaut Tissue Analogue Response, and an experiment system called ARCHeR (Artemis Research for Crew Health & Readiness (if there is one thing you definitely can say about NASA is that they work very hard at their acronyms!)

AVATAR can mimic individual astronaut organs, allowing medical experts evaluate tissue and other responses to various aspects of spaceflight and monitor essential biomarkers. AVATAR has been flown aboard the ISS several times, but this mission marks its first deep space mission – one that carries it and the Artemis 2 crew through the Van Allen radiation belts – thus offering the opportunity to gain further insight into the potential impact of these highly radioactive zones as Integrity zooms through them at several thousand km/h.

 ARCHeR (which I cannot help think was named by an NASA fan of Star Trek (see Jonathan Archer (Scott Bakula), first commander of the Star Ship Enterprise, NX01) uses movement and sleep monitors worn by the crew to gather real-time health and behavioural information for crew members so scientists can study sleep patterns and overall health performance.

Further, Artemis 2 is testing and demonstrating the Orion Artemis II Optical Communications System (O2O). This is an optical communications system uses laser beams for two-way communications between Earth and the mission. Smaller and lighter than a conventional radio system, O2O also uses less power and increases transmission rates (up to 200 Mbits per second). If successful, O2O could become a feature of future Artemis missions from Artemis 4 onwards and used in potential human missions to Mars.

I’ll have more on Artemis 2 next week. In the meantime, you can follow the mission in real-time, via NASA’s 24/7 livestream.

Space Sunday: four around the Moon and pausing Gateway

The Artemis 2 crew: (l to r): Commander Reid Wiseman; Pilot Victor glover; Mission Specialist Jeremy Hansen; Mission Specialist Christina Koch – but who are they? Find out below. Credit: NASA

If all goes according to plan, this coming week – possibly Wednesday, April 1st – we’ll see the Artemis 2 mission lift-off from Kennedy Space Centre, Florida, carrying four humans to the vicinity of the Moon, the first mission to do so in over half a century.

The journey to get to this point has been long and arduous; projects have been initiated, cancelled, re-organised and recommenced, funding has been provided, cut, renewed, reduced, extended… but the dream of returning to the Moon had remained steadfast in the eyes of enough people (doubtless aided by China’s emergence on the human spaceflight scene with their announced intent to go to the Moon), to keep political minds engaged in the journey.

Artemis 2 is very much a proving mission, aimed at ensuring the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and its European-built service module are both fit for purpose in supporting crews of four on extended missions to the Moon, as well as testing critical capabilities required for those missions which will actually deliver humans to the South Polar Region of the Moon starting with Artemis 4 – such as rendezvous and docking with the lander vehicle those headed for the Moon will use.

But who are the four people who will be aboard Artemis 2’s Orion capsule, with its “space toilet” that has so fixated much of the media? I thought I’d offer some brief biographical notes.

Commander Gregory Reid Wiseman, Mission Commander

NASA Astronaut and Artemis 2 Commander, Reid Wiseman. Credit: NASA

Known simply as Reid, and a US Naval aviator and Captain, Wiseman has already accumulated 165 days, 8 hours and 1 minute in space (including 12 hours and 47 minutes split across 2 EVAs), having flown to the International Space Station aboard Soyuz TMA-13M and as a part of the Expedition 40/41 crew between May and November 2014.

Born in Baltimore, Maryland in 1975, Reid earned a degree in computer science from  Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, new York. In 2006, whilst a member of the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), he gained a master’s degree in systems engineering from Johns Hopkins University.

In 1999, Wiseman was designated a Naval Aviator and underwent training to fly the famous F-14 Tomcat. Initially based at Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia, he was deployed prior to being deployed to the Middle East for two tours of combat duty.  During his second tour of duty, he was selected to attend the US Navy Test Pilot School, where on graduation he was assigned as a test pilot and Projects Officer at the Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. Following this, he was assigned to carrier duty and transitioned to flying the F/A-18 super Hornet, once again seeing overseas deployments. He transferred to NASA in 2009.

Following his time aboard the ISS as a part of Expedition 40/41, Wiseman was appointed Chief of the Astronaut Office, a post he held for 2 years (December 2020 through the end of November 2022), stepping down from the post to active flight status in the hope of securing a position on one of the Artemis missions.  In April 2023, he was selected to command Artemis 2.

Wiseman was married to Carroll Wiseman (nee Taylor), with whom he had two daughters, through to her death from cancer at age 46.

Victor Jerome Glover Jr, Mission Pilot

Artemis 2 Pilot Victor Glover. Credit: NASA
Born in 1976 in Pomona, California, Victor Glover was a keen sportsman in his youth, playing for the California Jaguars football team as both a quarterback and running back and receiving the Athlete of the Year award in 1994. However, his father helped nurture a deep interest in science and engineering, leading him to earn a Bachelor of Science degree in general engineering in 1999 whilst attending the California Polytechnic State University, where he continued to play football as well as turning his hand to wrestling.

During the three years between 2007 and 2010, Glover earned three further degrees: a Master of Science in flight test engineering; a Master of Science in systems engineering and Master of Military Operational Art and Science, all of which were earned whilst he was a serving officer in the US Navy. He gained his aviator wings in 2001, and like Wiseman, trained on the F/A-18 Hornet. Also like Wiseman, he saw duty at NAS Oceana prior to being assigned to the USS John F. Kennedy and deployed to the Middle East as a part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Following this, Glover also entered the US Navy Test Pilot School, and served as a test pilot based at China Lake, California. Subsequent to this, he was sent to the US Naval Air Facility, Atsugi, Japan, and thence to the USS George Washington for a Pacific Ocean tour of duty.  Throughout his military career, Glover used the call sign “Ike”, a sobriquet jokingly given him by his first commanding officer, which was said to mean “I know everything”, on account of his long list of degrees.

As well as earning multiple technical degrees, Glover also obtained a Certificate of  Legislative Studies which led him being offered a role within Senator John McCain’s staff.

Glover joined NASA in 2013, and following the completion of his training, he was assigned to fly on the first operational flight (and second crewed flight overall) of SpaceX’s Crew Dragon, also serving as a crew member for Expedition 64/65. The mission launched in November 2020, with Glover clocking 167 days 6 hours and 19 minutes in space, 26 hours and 4 minutes of which were spent performing four separate EVAs.

He was announced as the Artemis 2 Pilot alongside Wiseman and the other crew members in April 2023. He is married to Dionna Odom Glover and they have four daughters.

Mission Specialist Christina Koch

Artemis 2 Mission Specialist Christina Koch. Credit: NASA

Christina Koch (pronounced “cook”, and nee Hammock) has accumulated the most time in space thus far of any of the Artemis 2 crew – a total of 328 days 13 hours and 58 minutes; 42 hours and 15 minutes of which were spread across 6 individual EVAs.

Born in Grand Rapids, Michigan in 1979, Koch was raised in Jacksonville, North Carolina. From the earliest she can remember she had always wanted to be an astronaut. Following schooling, she enrolled in the North Carolina State University, earning Bachelor of Science degrees in engineering and physics before going on to gain a Masters in electrical engineering. In 2001, whilst still studying, she was accepted into the NASA Academy Programme at the Goddard Space Flight Centre (GSFC), Maryland.

At GSFC, Koch worked out of the High Energy Astrophysics facility, contributing to scientific instruments on several NASA missions that studied astrophysics and cosmology. In 2004, Koch took a 3-year secondment with the US Antarctic Research Programme as a Research Associate, spending her time in both the Antarctic and Arctic regions. Whilst in Antarctica, Koch experienced temperatures of -79.4º C. She also served as a member of the fire fighting teams at the various bases she worked at, and also joined the Ocean / Glacier Search and Rescue teams.

Returning to the US in 2007, Koch contributed to instruments studying radiation particles for NASA missions, including the Juno and Van Allen Probes whilst seconded to the Applied Physics Laboratory at John Hopkins University. She then spent time at NASA’s sister organisation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

In 2013, Koch was selected for astronaut training alongside Victor Glover. She was subsequently selected for Soyuz MS-12 as a part of the Expedition 59/60/61 crew. Koch joined astronaut Jessica Meir in the first all-female EVA ever undertaken, carrying out a series of upgrades to the power systems on the ISS across a total of three joint EVAs.

Originally, Koch was to have returned to Earth at the end of the Expedition 60 rotation. However, due to reassignment schedules, she was asked to remain aboard the ISS a further 6 months, allowing her to clock up her 328 days record in space – the longest continuous stay in space by a woman.

Jeremy Hansen (CSA), Mission Specialist

Artemis 2 Mission Specialise Jeremy Hansen. Credit: unknown

Jeremy Roger Hansen is the rookie among the crew and the only non-American. Born in London, Ontario, Hansen attended the Royal Military College, Ontario following his high school education. At RMC Ontario, he earned a Bachelor of Science degree with First Class Honours in space science in 1999, before going on to earn a Master of Science degree in physics  with a research focus on wide field of view satellite tracking.

In 2009, Hansen was accepted into the ranks of the Canadian Space Agency, training as an astronaut. In 2013 he was selected to join the European CAVES programme, becoming a “cavenaut”. The following year NASA selected Hansen to serve as an “aquanaut” aboard the Aquarius underwater laboratory during the 7-day NEEMO 19 undersea exploration mission.

Hansen is married to Doctor Catherine Hansen, a distinguished expert in women’s health. Together, they have three children.

The Artemis 2 Mission Patch

The Artemis 2 mission patch

All NASA missions traditionally have a mission patch designed by the crew (with NASA management approval over the final design!).

These patches are generally symbolic in nature, often containing references to the mission or to current or past space events. In this, the Artemis 2 mission patch is no exception.

Firstly, its shape is symbolic of the Orion capsule’s general shape, indicating the vehicle as a home for the 4 crew. A stylised “AII” occupies the right side of the patch, signifying the mission umber and the fact that Artemis 2 is for “all humanity – a play on “for all mankind” of the Apollo era. This sits directly over the lunar far side – thus denoting the mission’s trip around the Moon, a red ribbon running from Earth and around the Moon mirrors a similar ribbon in the Project Artemis patch, the red of the ribbon indirectly referencing NASA’s role in aeronautics – as per the red chevron in the NASA insignia). The Moon is dominant in the patch, with the Earth rising behind it.

If this particular part of the patch rings bells, rest assured it is intentional: the Moon with the Earth rising behind it is designed to evoke memories of the famous Apollo 8 image Earthrise, thus linking Artemis II with the first Apollo space mission to fly around the Moon and back to Earth.

How to Watch the Launch

Artemis 2 is due to launch no earlier than 22:24 UTC on April 1st, 2026. You can watch the countdown and launch via NASA’s livestream (commencing 17:50 UTC on April 1st).

Lunar Gateway ”Paused”

Jared Isaacman, NASA’s current Administrator, continues to shake things up around Project Artemis – and quite possibly for the better in terms of focus and goals.

As I’ve previously covered, Isaacman has already made significant changes to Project Artemis which impact both missions and hardware (e.g. Artemis 3 will now be an Earth-orbiting mission, not a lunar landing mission).

Gateway Station: a necessary adjunct to lunar research and surface operations or a funding boondoggle? Jared Isaacman appears to lean towards the latter, “pausing” the Gateway programme in favour of more direct lunar operations.

On March 24th, 2026, Isaacman informed NASA personnel and the press that the space agency will be “pausing” work on its proposed Gateway Station, the much heralded space station occupying an extended halo orbit around the Moon. For those (myself included) who could not see any practical benefits in spending time and money developing yet another (if much smaller than the ISS) space station in lunar orbit, this is welcome news.

Gateway station has always come across as an unnecessary complication in getting people to / from the Moon. It’s halo orbit means it will only be within reach of crews on the lunar surface once every seven days – which is great when you have an emergency and need to evac someone pronto and then have to rendezvous with the station in order to get them back to Earth. It will also require a lot of additional faffing around with rendezvous and docking manoeuvres and generally act as something of a boondoggle, drawing on funding that could be better spent elsewhere – such as the infrastructure actually required to establish a permanent base on the Moon.

NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman continues to shift NASA’s course towards the Moon – for the better. Credit: NASA

This is what Isaacman is proposing: spending some US $20 billion over a period of seven years – a good portion of that money coming from allocations that would otherwise have gone to gateway – to develop and construct a permanent base on the Moon. Isaacman also expects member states involved in the Artemis Accords to help cover a portion of the of the costs – although as I’ll come to, this might not be so easy.

No hard details on the base were given – such as location, what infrastructure will be required (such as power systems – presumably nuclear – and so on), or how delivering the infrastructure and materials required to build the base will be achieved – although presumably Isaacman will be looking to the likes of Blue Origin and SpaceX with cargo variants of the lunar landing systems.

Not everyone is happy with the move, however. Japan and the European Space Agency were already partners in Gateway and due to provide core components and elements for the station and have been gradually ramping-up for production of said elements. Neither appear to be entirely sanguine over Isaacman’s decision, with ESA issuing a terse statement that could be read as meaning they’d been giving little or no warning of Isaacman’s decision, re Gateway.

The European Space Agency is currently holding close consultations with its member states, international partners and European industry to assess the implications of this announcement.

– ESA quote via AFP in response to Isaacman’s announcement on “pausing” Gateway Station

If this is the case – that there was no in-depth consultation on Gateway’s future with the likes of ESA and JAXA, then  while the “pausing” of Gateway is welcome, the handling of the announcement could be seen as somewhat less than diplomatic.

Space Sunday: more Moon bits

The Artemis 2 SLS and Orion MPCV depart the Vehicle Assembly Bulding at Kennedy Space Centre on March 20th (UTC), heading back out to the pad for a potential launch on April 1st, 2026. Credit: Terry Renna / Associated Press

The Space Launch System (SLS) which will launch a crew of four on a trip around the Moon aboard their Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) during the Artemis 2 mission, has returned to the launch pad at Kennedy Space Centre’s Launch complex 39B (LC-39B).

The rocket had to be returned to the Vehicle Assembly Building on February 25th, 2026 after a helium pressurisation issue was found in the rocket’s upper Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), resulting in a helium leak.  While the leak could be resolved with the vehicle on the pad, the need to ensure the ICPS has a stable helium pressure flow when in operation called for a rollback to the VAB to allow engineers unfettered access to the upper stage in order to resolve the problem.

The second roll-out to the pad mirrored the preparations for the Artemis 1 uncrewed mission in late 2022, which also saw the SLS rocket used on that flight rolled out to the pad, encounter issues (with the main propellant feed mechanism intended to fill the rocket’s tanks with liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen) then rolled back to the VAB, before a second roll-out to the launch vehicle back to the pad. Given the overall success of Artemis 1 (despite leading to concerns over the Orion capsule’s heat shield), the roll-out, rollback, roll-back of Artemis 2 might be seen as a good (if delaying) omen.

A close-up of the Orion MPCV encased within its Launch Abort System (LAS) shroud, the LAS motor visible on the tower above it, and the European service Module (ESM) directly below the capsule’s “dome” protected by its pair of white payload fairings. Credit: Terry Renna / Associated Press

The second roll-out took place overnight on March 20th, 2026 UTC (March 19th – 20th, US EDT) with the rocket and its Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) inching away from the confines of the VAB atop one of NASA’s mighty Crawler-Transporters. The 6.4 kilometre journey to the pad took almost 12 hours to complete, with the SLS and MLP positioned on the pad at around 15:20 UTC on March 20th.

The next launch window for the mission opens on April 1st, 2026 and runs through the first few days of April. NASA is currently targeting the very opening of the launch window on April 1st for a launch attempt, giving them maximum leeway should any minor issues occur or the weather decides to play a hand in matters.

An infographic produced by L3Harris, an Artemis contractor, highlighting features of the Artemis 2 mission, including the on-orbit rendezvous and docking simulations the crew will perform using the SLS ICPS as a dummy target, and the fact the flight will be a last hurrah for NASA’s most reliable Space Shuttle Main Engine, having flown 15 previous times. Credit: L3Harris

Once launched, Artemis 2 will initially enter a 24-hour orbit around Earth. During this time several critical systems not carried aboard Artemis 1 will be tested and checked. Additionally the ICPS will be used to lift Orion into an elliptical orbit with a high apogee whilst imparting the craft with much of the velocity it will need to head for the Moon.

The ICPS will then separate from Orion and its European Service Module (ESM) and become a passive dummy target for the crew on Orion to carryout mock rendezvous and docking manoeuvres of the kind Orion will have to perform when operating around the Moon in future missions in order to dock with the lunar landing vehicles and (later) Gateway station.

Once these tests have been completed, Orion will use the ESM’s min motor to push it into a free return trajectory around the Moon on a trip lasting 9-10 days, affording the crew time to thoroughly check-out Orion’s systems and amenities.

EUS Replacement  – I Called It

On February 27th, 2026, NASA provided an update on the entire Project Artemis, noting some significant changes to mission and vehicles (see Space Sunday: major Artemis updates and a rollback).

One of these changes was the cancellation of the planned Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) the more powerful upper stage for the SLS that has been under development at Boeing for several years, and would replace the ICPS on mission from around Artemis 5 (now Artemis 6).

ULA”s Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) for the SLS rocket, now set to be replaced in the future by ULA’s Centaur V. Credit: ULA

At the time of the announcement no indication was given as to what would be used to replace the EUS and ICPS, or whether NASA was looking at something to match the ICPS or EUS in capabilities. However, in my article linked to above, I noted that as far as I could see, there were only two possible contenders: Blue Origin, with their New Glenn upper stage, or United Launch Alliance (ULA) with their Vulcan-Centaur V upper stage, part of a family of Centaur upper stages that has gained a long and venerable operational history.

On March 10th, 2026 NASA confirmed my thinking by making a procurement filing to replace the ICPS and EUS with ULA’s Vulcan-Centaur V. Whilst some modifications to the stage will be required, the V-C 5 was selected by NASA in part because of its pedigree stretching back over 60 years (which was seen as overcoming the fact the Centaur V has itself only flown twice), and in part because it is almost a simple drop-in replacement for EUS and (particularly) ICPS.

The first Centaur V (officially designated the Vulcan-Centaur V) to roll off of ULA’s production line, and used in ULA’s first Vulcan-Centaur rocket launch. Credit: Tony Burno (former CEO of ULA)

Once upgraded, the V-C 5 will offer more-or-less the same capabilities as ICPS, but not as great as the EUS. However, the lineage of Centaur means NASA has an assured route to have the system upgraded to meet future needs, if required.

The NASA announcement also indicated that, per my theorising, they had also considered the Blue Origin New Glenn upper stage. This was only ruled out on the basis it has only flown twice thus far – albeit completely successfully on both occasions – and NASA wanted an upper stage replacement will a decent launch / success / failure history and a track record of development they could properly evaluate.

ULA’s established infrastructure, resources, flight history, existing cross-program integration, and human-rating familiarity with the Centaur upper stage represents the only currently viable opportunity for the Government to accomplish Artemis mission objectives and requirements while also maintaining the agency’s programmatic goals.

– From the NASA procurement filing

So, yay me for calling it.

Artemis Accord Signatories Mull How to Deal with Emergencies and More

When a single nation goes to the Moon, there’s a pretty narrow field of operational requirements that need to be dealt with to keep people safe, avoid misunderstandings, demote working areas, and in handling thing like emergency situations.

When multiple nations decide to not only head for the Moon, but head for the same part of the Moon – in this case the South Polar Region – such requirements get a lot more complicated.

Currently, there are two confirmed groups of nations participating in projects aimed towards a long-term human presence within the Moon’s SPR – those of the US-led Artemis Accords (numbering, at the time of writing, 61 nations – not all of whom will be seeking to send their own astronauts to the Moon) and the China and (nominally) Russian-led International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), comprising (at the time of writing) 13 nations.

As such, serious considerations need to be given to managing diverse (or even competitive) lunar operations, denoting separate research and work environments, establishing buffer zone between different interests and working areas, and – critically – how to handle emergencies and provide emergency support.

The latter is something very much up in the air – although one would hope any emergency call for assistance would be responded to without regard to the nationality or allegiance of those making the call. For the former – the establishment of buffer zones is seen by members of the Artemis Accords as the way to go, although they prefer the term “safety zones”.

These would, in theory, allow signatory states pursue their own specific research interests on the Moon without the risk unintentional (or even intentional) interference from other member states. The problem is, how should a “safety zone” be defined? Should limits be placed on the size of such zones? How should they be recognised? How lawful would they be? How can they be enforced when it comes to non-Artemis nations?

A major concern here is that of territorialism: member states (or even the Artemis project as a whole) laying claim to a large area of the Moon, or even an entire region. Such claims are explicitly outlawed under the 1967 Space Treaty, but if sufficient resources of a valuable nature are found in a particular area of the Moon, is that treaty enough to stop a nation establishing a presence there and declaring an exclusionary “safe zone” around it before hoisting their flag and treating it as a national enclave? And what sort of response should that garner if it did happen?

We’re a long way away from where these issues might start to become problems, but they do need to be addressed in some form – and not just by members of the Artemis Accords – but by all nations, whether or not they are signatories to the Accords or the ILRS.

Lunar Ice Might be Rarer than Thought

One of the reasons for the interest in sending humans to the lunar South Polar Region has been the fact that the region is heavily cratered, and due to their position, many of the bottoms of these craters never see daylight or feel the Sun’s heat. Referred to as permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) it has been theorised that these craters could be home to large, accessible (or at least semi-accessible) deposits of the Moon’s water ice – which would be enormously beneficial to human operations on the Moon if they could be exploited.

This idea is backed-up by PSRs elsewhere in the solar system being home o water ice, including the planet mercury and the asteroid Ceres, to name two examples. However, despite all our orbital observations of the Moon, confirming the presence of water ice in lunar PSRs has been difficult; not least because of the orbital complexities involved in get a satellite to overfly them and the fact they are very deeply shadowed when seen form orbit.

To try to understand just how much ice might be present in the bottoms of permanently shadowed craters on the Moon, a team of US researchers operating out of the University of Hawaii at Manoa developed ShadowCam, an imaging system 200 times more light-sensitive than most other cameras used to study and map the Moon from orbit.

ShadowCam forms a part of the payload flown aboard the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter Danuri, South Korea’s first lunar mission, which entered orbit around the Moon in December 2022. Classified as a NASA experiment, ShadowCam first flexed its muscles in mid-2023, demonstrating it raw ability to see in to PSRs and reveal never-before-seen details.

A computer rendering of the 678 kg Danuri (Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter), which hosts the ShadowCam imaging system. Credit: South Korea Ministry of Science and ICT

More recently, ShadowCam has been engaged in a campaign to image multiple PSRs in the Moon’s Polar Regions (north and south) to reveal more of their secrets. And while the campaign has been very successful in providing new data and information on the observed craters, the one thing it hasn’t found is any sign of water ice deposits.

To be clear, any water ice contained within lunar craters is not going to be pure. It’s going to be mixed with and even covered by a layer of lunar regolith (the loose dust and rock fragments making up the surface material of the Moon). As such, these mixtures would produce different levels of reflectance and light scattering depending on the regolith-to-ice ratios encountered, although astronomers work on the basis that a mixture that is around 20-30% water ice would be enough to be detected by a sensitive-enough imaging system – and as noted, ShadowCam is very sensitive.

A selection of ShadowCam images of lunar North Pole and south Pole PSRs, with features and details the system has revealed for the first time – although none of them show any indication of water ice within the craters. Credit: Nasa / University of Hawaii

However, none of the dozens of PSRs on the Moon imaged by the instrument showed any signature that might indicate water ice was present in some degree. This doesn’t necessarily mean the water ice is not there; it could exist in percentages as low as 10%, or even in single digits – as these are levels too small for ShadowCam to currently detect, although the University of Hawaii team hope to be able to use software updates in their processing software that would reveal water ice in concentrations as low as 1%.

But that said, the real rub here is that even if such low percentages of water ice are revealed, and assuming ShadowCam’s results hold as more lunar PSRs are examined, then it is obvious that the hoped-for abundance of water ice to assist in lunar operations simply don’t exist or might be so small as to not be worth the expense and effort in trying to exploit them. As such, the water needed to help sustain human operations on the Moon and to enable various construction and technology options is going to become a further payload mass that will have to be routinely shipped from Earth.

Space Sunday: major Artemis updates and a rollback

Credit: NASA

Yes, there’s been a lot in this column about Project Artemis and the US-led programme to return humans to the Moon, and while it might make Space Sunday sound a bit like a scratched record (Artemis..,Artemis…Artemis…), there is good reason for this: there’s a lot of news about the entire programme, from the anticipated launch of Artemis 2 and its crew on a trip around the Moon and back, to the focus of the main part of this article: major changes to the Artemis programme as a whole; so bear with me!

NASA’s current Administrator, Jared Isaacman, continues to surprise and impress despite concerns over his non-NASA activities and involvement with favoured space contractors. In my previous Space Sunday article, I covered Isaacman’s direct and open approach to the problems endemic to the Boeing CST-100 Starliner programme, and to the core of NASA’s management responsible for managing it (with two of the most senior resigning in the aftermath).

Following the press conference on that matter – which included the reading out of a letter to all NASA staff-  Isaacman was present at a February 27th, 2026 Project Artemis update which carried its own surprises whilst signalling a change in direction for the programme – potentially putting it on a far better footing that had previously been the case.

The update saw a number of significant announcements:

  • The much-criticised Space Launch System (SLS) is not to be cancelled as yet – something many outside NASA have called for, despite there being no currently-available launch vehicle that can match its capabilities (see: Space Sunday: of Artemis and Administrators).
  • However, SLS will be changing, with one significant element – the Exploration Upper Stage – now cancelled.
  • As a result of the Exploration Upper Stage cancellation, the Block 1B variant of SLS will no longer be part of the SLS enhancement programme, nor, potentially, will be the even more powerful Block 2 version.
  • NASA will attempt to raise the launch cadence for SLS from approximately once every 3 years to once every 10 months.
  • Artemis 3 is no longer a lunar landing mission, but will be an Earth-orbiting test flight involving at least Human Landing System vehicle.
  • The original Artemis 3 lunar landing mission is therefore redesignated Artemis 4, but the time frame remains a (optimistic) 2028.

SLS Changes

Much of the critique surrounding SLS has been on the matter of launch cost, which stands at some US $2.5 billion per vehicle. However, these costs are based on the overall development of SLS and Orion, and are not simply the physical cost of get a specific launch stack off the pad. This is something many of the louder voices raised against SLS – notably those from the SpaceX corner – tend to ignore when pointing to the “lower” cost of something like Starship, which is put at around US $100 million per launch. In this, it needs to be pointed out that this has yet to be proven, as Starship has yet to actually achieve orbit, and even then, launch costs for NASA could be as much as US 1.3 billion, when all of the required tanker launches and the launch of the (also unproven) orbital propellant station the Starship HLS will require just to get itself to the Moon.

That said, SLS is a costly launch mechanism; in 2023, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report stating SLS was “unsustainable” at current spending levels, and suggested that launch costs could increase over time to as much as US $4 billion as a result of the technical complexity of the system, plans to try to extend its capabilities and its low launch cadence.

Exploration Upper Stage and “Near Block 1” SLS Development

Dropping the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) from the SLS development curve should address some of these concerns over rising costs.

EUS was due to debut with the Block 1B development of SLS, providing it with a more powerful and capable upper stage than the current Interim Cryogenic Propulsion (ICPS) upper stage. As it is now cancelled, NASA is pivoting away from the Block 1B version of SLS in order to develop a “near Block 1” upgrade, which will use a new upper stage in place of both ICPS and EUS.

The original planned evolution of SLS, from the current Block 1 version for crewed launches through a cargo variant of the same vehicle to the Block 1B version utilising the EUS in both crewed and cargo versions, through the evolved Block 3 design with more powerful solid rocket boosters. Under the new plan, NASA will replace the Block 1B version with a “near Block 1” enhanced variant. Credit: NASA

Just how much this will save is open to debate: some US $3 billion has already be spent in developing EUS, and there will obviously be costs involved in developing a commercially-based replacement for it and ICPS. But there are other another compelling reasons for replacing EUS with a unit more in line (if more powerful) than the ICPS: simplicity of overall design and design and continuity of experience.

The Block 1 SLS is now a known creature, foibles and issues all taken as read. It’s a vehicle NASA is continually gaining knowledge and understanding in operating. Block 1B, with the EUS, it’s extended core stage elements (extended interstage and the enlarged universal stage adaptor) is a different beats, liable to demonstrate different flight characteristics and dynamics as well as introducing new elements which could have their own teething problems. Sticking with an only slightly modified vehicle to supersede the current Block 1 vehicle, reduces many of these factors, allowing NASA to “standardise” the SLS design and continue to gain data, knowledge and understanding on  / of its characteristics incrementally. This was pretty much how things were handled back in the Apollo era, and the approach has a lot going for it, a point acknowledged during the briefing.

After successful completion of the Artemis I flight test, the upcoming Artemis II flight test, and the new, more robust test approach to Artemis III, it is needlessly complicated to alter the configuration of the SLS and Orion stack to undertake subsequent Artemis missions. There is too much learning left on the table and too much development and production risk in front of us. Instead, we want to keep testing like we fly and have flown. We are looking back to the wisdom of the folks that designed Apollo. The entire sequence of Artemis flights needs to represent a step-by-step build-up of capability,

– NASA Associate Administrator Amit Kshatriya

Exactly who will provide the replacement for ICPS / EUS and what form it will take was now discussed at the briefing. However, it was made clear that all of NASA’s contractors and partners in Artemis were consulted through the driver to redirect the programme, and all have been supportive of the moves – even Boeing, who stand to lose the most with the EUS cancellation, whilst SpaceX and Blue Moon have both opted to “accelerate” the development of their HLS systems.

Perhaps two of the strongest potential contenders for producing a new upper stage for SLS are United Launch Alliance (ULA) and Blue Origin.

ULA already has the powerful cryogenic Centaur V upper stage. Centaur is a venerable launch vehicle stage with a lot of expertise behind it, with the Centaur 5 already forming the upper stage of ULA’s Vulcan-Centaur rocket. Blue Origin, meanwhile, has the upper stage of their New Glenn booster. Whilst a “new kid on the block”, the stage has already proven itself reliable on two high-profile flights for New Glenn, and will shortly be back in action for a third flight, thus experience is quickly being gained in its operation. Further, blue Origin are already looking to develop an enhanced version of the stage in line with their plans for an even more powerful variant of their New Glenn vehicle, thus there is potential here as well.

Neither Centaur V nor the New Glenn upper stage would be suitable for SLS straight off the shelf, but using them as either a basis for a new stage design or developing a variant off of an existing design (Blue Origin) could significantly reduce the costs and time involved in developing and testing a new SLS stage.

Launch Cadence

Another mitigating factor when it comes to reducing overall costs is the decision to try to launch SLS on a greater cadence than has thus far been seen. Isaacman would specifically like to see an SLS / Artemis launch once every 10 months, putting Artemis almost on a similar launch cadence as Apollo. Doing so will likely increase Artemis costs, but it also brings some very clear benefits:

  • Personnel expertise. Gaps measured in years between launches can result in personnel expertise loss as people become tired of waiting for the next launch and seek a career move elsewhere, taking their expertise with them. A faster launch cadence with clear mission objectives is more likely to keep more of that expertise in-house at NASA for longer.
  • It makes Artemis potentially more robust, presenting NASA with a chance to present a clear roadmap for achieving the goals of establishing a lunar base and maintaining a human presence there. Clear time frames and mission objectives also help Congress in allowing the money to flow into NASA to support the programme.

Of course, achieving such a cadence is no easy task; thus far, Artemis 1 and Artemis 2 (of which more below) have demonstrated that, like it or not, SLS and its ground support systems are extremely complex and subject to technical issues which can so easily upset launches.

Artemis 3 – No Longer Aiming for the Moon

The decision to “divert” Artemis 3 to an Earth orbital mission was perhaps the biggest surprise in the update – although “divert” is not entirely correct.

What is proposed is the insertion of an additional Artemis / SLS launch between what is currently Artemis 2 and what would have been Artemis 3, the first crewed lunar landing in the programme. That mission – presumably utilising the same crew – will now effectively become Artemis 4, with the new Earth-orbital mission taking the name Artemis 3.

An infographic outlining the revised Artemis missions (2 through 6), with the Artemis 2 crewed mission around the Moon and back (2026) at the top; the new Artemis 3 mission (2027) centre and the first three crewed lunar landing missions (Artemis 4 through 6). Credit NASA
The aims of the revised Artemis 3 mission – scheduled for a 2027 launch – so far comprise (additional mission goals may be added as the mission requirements are further assessed):

  • On-orbit rendezvous and docking with one or other (or possibly both) of the current Human Landing System vehicles in development: Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2, and the nascent SpaceX  Starship-derived HLS.
  • Perform integrated checkout of life support, communications, and propulsion systems on both HLS vehicles and assess their suitability / practically for zero gravity operations.
  • Carry out comprehensive tests of the new extended extravehicular activity (xEVA) suits to be used both with Artemis as as a replacement for the current generation of US EVA suits on the International Space Station.

This is actually a smart step on NASA’s part, and harkens back to the Apollo era and specifically, the Apollo 9 mission.

Artemis 3 will focus on earth-orbit rendezvous with either Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2 HLS or the SpaceX Starship HLS (depending on which is available at the time) or both (if both prove to be ready for testing – which right now looks unlikely in the case of the SpaceX HLS). Credit: NASA

Under the original Artemis plan, no provision was made for any on-orbit human testing of the SpaceX HLS vehicle ahead of Artemis 3. Instead, SpaceX were obliged to send and uncrewed HLS lander to the Moon and conducted an automated landing (or possibly 2) – but there were no provisions for any crewed testing of the vehicle prior to Artemis 3.

Conversely, Blue Moon Mark 2, with its longer lead time (not being required – in theory – until Artemis 5 under the previous plans, and now Artemis 6 under the revised approach) would have undergone Earth orbit crewed testing prior to being used for lunar operations.

As such, this new step offers a means by which both vehicles (assuming both are ready for a 2027 launch) can be properly tested in Earth orbit, where the risks to the crew are potentially reduced, simply because they can use Orion to make a fast return to Earth. Thus, both can be properly assessed, including any shortfalls they might exhibit in advance of any attempt at a lunar landing. This is something that is clearly much better for all concerned than otherwise sitting and crossing fingers, as would have been the case with the original Artemis 3 mission.

Other Changes

Additionally, the Artemis Update indicates further changes within NASA’s operating structure as a whole with a drive to rebuild core competences and to better oversee commercial contracts and be more hand-on with commercial partners (as indicated in the Starliner press briefing). Key to this will be the implementation of standard processes right  across the space agency, not just covering Artemis, but all commercial partnership and space projects.

Further, the space agency will embark on a process of new and more extensive involvement with Congress to keep them appraised of progress with SLS and Artemis, and has already embarked on a restructured process of negotiating with commercial partners and engaging them in NASA’s decision-making processes.

Whilst nothing should be definitively drawn from it, it is somewhat interesting that the new SLS upper stage designed to replace both ICPS and EUS (seen in the centre, above, with Orion attached) has a marked similarity to the New Glenn upper stage, seen to the right Orion and powering the Blue Moon Lander Mark 2 to orbit.

In the meantime, the NASA announcement has received a largely positive reaction from observers and stakeholders, and the approach it advocates potentially helps put Project Artemis on a much more realistic footing to achieve its goals.

Artemis 2 SLS Rolled Back to the VAB

As I reported in my previous Space Sunday update, Artemis 2 suffered another setback in plans to get a crewed Orion space vehicle on a 10-11 day free return flight to the Moon (with a day spent in a high Earth orbit beforehand) off the ground in March.

The Crawler-Transporter edges the Artemis 2 SLS stack and mobile launch platform into one of the two massive high bays of the VAB at Kennedy Space Centre near the end of an 11+ hour journey back from the launch pad. Credit: NASA livestream

The issue this time resides within the helium pressurisation system within the rocket’s Interim cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), which is required to get Orion to orbit and plays a role in meeting all of the mission’s planned goals. As I noted at the time of writing that update, NASA felt there were two potential routs to resolving the issue: by leaving SLS on the pad at Kennedy Space Centre’s Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B). Or rolling the entire stack back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), where a more comprehensive examination of the issue could be performed.

It was decided the latter was the better choice of action, and so on February 25th, 2026, the Artemis 2 launch vehicle and its Mobile Launch Platform were slowly and gently rolled back to the VAB atop one of the famous Crawler-Transporters.

A view from inside the VAB as Artemis 2 arrives. Note the curved gantries either side of the  upper parts of SLS. These can be extended outwards (as can other levels within the high bay) to encapsulate the rocket and provide ease of access to its vitals for engineers. Credit: Cameron (@nyoomtm)

The physical move of the rocket and its launch tower structure commenced at 14:38 UTC, and took over 11 hours to complete, the Crawler-Transporter inches the entire structure into one of the VAB’s massive high bays inch by inch with incredible precision given the overall size of the Crawler-Transporter and its payload. The night-time arrival also afforded some unique views of the entire stack edging up to and then entering the VAB.

Currently, the hope is to correct the helium pressure issue in time to get the rocket back to the pad so it can meet an April 1st through 6th (inclusive) launch window. However, more extensive rectifications to the helium system, if required, will be left for the next SLS vehicle which will carry the crew selected for the new Artemis 3 mission to orbit.

Space Sunday: Starliner and Artemis woes

An uncrewed CST-100 Starliner vehicle approaching the International Space Station during the vehicle’s Orbital Flight Test 2 mission, May 2022. Credit: NASA

Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner programme, designed to offer both NASA and commercial space companies with the means of delivering astronauts to low-Earth orbit space stations such as the International Space Station (ISS) and the Blue Origin / Sierra Space led consortium’s Orbital Reef station, has had a very chequered history with the number of issues far outweighing the number of successes.

On all three occasions the CST-100, comprising a capsule with a capacity for up to seven crew – although 4 plus a measure of cargo is liable to be the usual complement, together with a service module – has reached orbit, it has done so while encountering a series of issues / failures.  Indeed, such is the nature of some of the problems, they actually led to delays in getting the second flight test off the ground. More significantly, some of the issues were potentially known about as far back as June 2018. It was then, during a hot fire test of one of the vehicle’s RS-88 launch abort motors, when four of eight values on the vehicle’s propellant flow system failed, releasing 1.8 tonnes of highly toxic  monomethylhydrazine propellant and causing a fireball that engulfed the test rig.

The July 2018 hot fire test of an RS-88 launch escape motor used on Boeing’s Starliner. During the test 4 of eight valves failed, resulting in the dumping 1.8 tonnes of highly toxic propellants which in turn caused a fire which engulfed the engine and test stand. Credit: Boeing / Aerojet.

Whilst blaming engine supplier Aerojet Rocketdyne for the hot fire test incident, Boeing simultaneously sought to keep the news of the incident quiet, and limited the circulation of information relating to it to a few senor programme managers at NASA, who agreed to also keep the incident out of the public eye as much as possible so as not to further delay the programme, which was already behind schedule.

Although it is near impossible to state with certainty that this event market the start of successive failures of management both within Boeing and NASA as to how Starliner and its various issues and problems were both handled and communicated between the two parties, it fits with a pattern seen throughout the last several years of Starliner’s troubles.

All of this has now been made clear in a comprehensive report released by the new NASA Administrator, Jared Issacman, in the wake of an in-depth investigation covering several months into the Starliner project. Released during a public press briefing, the 311-page report (partially redacted) goes into extensive depth relating to the three Starliner flights to orbit to date: the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test 1 (OFT 1, 2019) and its follow-up Orbital Flight Test 2 (OFT 2, 2022), and the first Crew Flight Test (CFT 1, 2024) which famously resulted in heady reports of the mission crew – Sunita Williams and Barry Wilmore being “stranded” in space as if they were utterly helpless when in fact they are working aboard the ISS.

The report goes to great length to outline the core technical issues with Starliner relating to the four “doghouse” thruster packs mounted equidistantly around the circumference of Starliner’s service module and containing multiple large and small thrusters designed to provide the vehicle with flight motion and manoeuvring capabilities, together with the software issues which proved to be the undoing of the original OFT 1 mission which ultimately left the vehicle unable to rendezvous with the ISS and attempt an automated docking.

The Boeing CST-100 Starliner – A = crew capsule with major additional elements (1-9) comprising in order: the nosecone; parachute system cover; side hatch for ground-based access / egress; capsule RCS unit (x25 in total); landing airbags; heat shield; forward docking system port; 3x main parachutes; 3x windows. B = Service module with major additional elements (10 through 16) comprising in order: power and water, etc., umbilical connector to capsule; thermal control radiators for removing excess heat; “Doghouse” unit (x4), containing multiple RCS and OMAC thrusters each; monomethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide propellant tanks; roll control RCS thruster (part of the Doghouse units); RS-88 launch escape engines; solar panels for electrical power. Credit: Boeing

But most startlingly, the report reclassifies the Crew Flight Test 1 as a Type A mishap. This is NASA’s most extreme rating for malfunctions aboard crew carrying vehicles; for example, both the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle losses were classified as Type A mishaps on account of the loss of all board both vehicles. Type A mishaps have several main criteria: Injuring or fatalities during flight; loss of a vehicle or its control; damage exceeding US $2 million.

At first glance, and given that a) Williams and Wilmore did manage to maintain control over their vehicle and make a successful docking with, and transfer to, the ISS; b) there were no injuries or fatalities; and c) US $2 million in damages is an exceedingly small amount in the scheme of things, reclassifying CFT 1 a Type A mishap might appear to be more a knee-jerk reaction than might be warranted. However, the events experienced during CFT 1 make it abundantly clear that designating it a Type A mishap should have occurred at the time  of the flight – or at least immediately afterwards as the situation was fully understood.

The key point here is the second criteria for specifying a Type A mishap: the loss of the vehicle or its control. During CFT 1’s approach to the ISS for rendezvous and docking, the vehicle suffered a critical failure of five thruster sets required for manoeuvring control ( in NASA parlance, the vehicle lost its required 6 degrees of freedom manoeuvring). Regardless of the fact that the crew regained the use of four of the thrusters units in short order and went on to complete a successful docking at the ISS, at the time the failure occurred, Starliner was effectively adrift, unable to correct its orientation or motion – or even safely back away from the ISS to avoid the risk of collision. In other words, loss of the vehicle’s control had occurred.

Nor, as it turns out, was this the only issue. During its re-entry and descent through the atmosphere, the Starliner capsule Calypso suffered a failure with one of its RCS thruster systems, resulting in a “zero fault tolerance” situation – meaning there was no back-up for the failed unit during what was a critical phase of the vehicle’s flight.

Boeing Starliner capsule Calypso sitting on its airbags at the at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, following its successful return to Earth at the end of the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test 1 in December 2019. Calypso was also the capsule used for the Crew Flight Test in 2024. Credit: Bill Ingalis

So why wasn’t CFT 1 designated a Type A mishap immediately after the fact? Here the report is uncompromising in its assessment: NASA managers overseeing the Starliner contract were more concerned with getting the vehicle certified for routine crew operations than with admitting it still has major flight qualification issues which should disbar it from routine use to launch crews. It is in this approach of directly pointing the finger and throwing back the covers on how NASA and its contract have been functioning within the Starliner contract that the report – despite the redactions within it – is uncompromisingly clear in apportioning blame.

In particular, the report highlights numerous issues with the way the contract – and by extension – all commercial partnership contracts are handled by NASA. Chief among these is that, whilst charged with overall oversight responsibilities for such programmes, NASA took an almost completely hands-off approach to Starliner, bowing to Boeing when it came to most critical decision making on the overall fitness  for purpose of the system. Challenges to internal decision making at Boeing were muted or non-existent, and when it was felt Boeing were obfuscating or failing to be properly transparent, NASA tended not to challenge, but simply started mistrusting their contractor, allowing further breakdowns in communications to occur.

For its part, Boeing felt it could compartmentalise issues into individual fault chains and fixes, rather than seeing and reporting them as they were, a series of interconnected chains of design issues, faults and upsets. As a result, issues were dealt with on a kind of patch-and-fix approach, rather than a systematic examination of chains of events and proper root cause analysis. In this, the report particularly highlights the fact that whilst Boeing has a robust Root Cause / Corrective Action (RCCA) process, all too often it was never fully deployed in dealing with issues, the priority being to find a fix for each issue in turn and move on in the belief things would be rectified once all the fixes had been identified and implemented.

A time lapse photograph of the Boeing CST-100 Starliner featuring the capsule Calypso, docked at the ISS in June 2024 during Crew Flight Test 1, which saw a further series of thruster issues for the vehicle, ultimately leading it to make an uncrewed return to Earth. Credit: NASA

The report goes into a number of recommendations as to how NASA must handle future commercial partnerships such as the Commercial Crew Programme (CCP) of which SpaceX and Boeing are both a part, and how it should exercise full and proper oversight and lose its hands-off attitude. Time will tell in how these changes will affect such contracts – not just with Boeing and CST-100, but also with the likes of SpaceX and the development of their lunar lander, a project where NASA has again been decidedly hands-off in it approach to the work, allowing SpaceX to continually miss deadlines, fail to produce vehicle elements in time for testing, and to seemingly pushed vehicle development to one side in favour of pursuing its own goals whilst still taking NASA financing to the tune of US $4.9 billion.

In respect of Starline itself, the root cause(s) of the thruster issues on the vehicle still has/have yet to be fully determined. However, Issacman has made it clear NASA will not be withdrawing from the contract with Boeing; instead he has committed NASA to refusing to flying any crew aboard Starliner until such time as Boeing can – with NASA’s assistance – demonstrate that the issues plaguing the vehicle have been fully understood and dealt with properly and fully.

Whether that can be done within the next 5 years of ISS operational life remains to be seen.

Artemis 2: WDR Success; Launch Again Delayed

The Artemis 2 Space Launch System (SLS) rocket successfully completed its pre-flight wet dress rehearsal (WDR) test on Thursday, February 19th, 2026, potentially clearing the path for a mission launch in early March – or at least, that was the hope.

As I’ve noted in recent Space Sunday updates, the WDR is a major test of all the ground systems associated with launching an SLS rocket, together with the on-board systems and all ground support personnel  to make sure all systems are ready for an actual launch and staff are up-to-speed with all procedures and possible causes for delays, etc. Such tests run through until just before engine ignition, and include fully fuelling the booster’s core stage with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

The WDR had previously revealed issues with the propellant loading system at the base of the mobile launch platform on which the rocket stands ahead of lift-off, with various leaks being noted the both the first Artemis 2 WDR and previously with the uncrewed Artemis 1 mission of 2022.

A ground level view of the Artemis 2 SLS sitting atop its mobile launch platform at LC-39B, Kennedy Space Centre, Florida. Credit: NASA/Ben Smegelsky

The original Artemis 2 WDR suffered issues with the liquid hydrogen feed into the rocket and with a filter designed to keep impurities out of the propellants. Both the problem valves and the filter were swapped-out ahead of the second WDR together with the replacement of a number of seals which showed minor signs or wear. Following the second WDR test, an initial review of the gathered data was performed, and the results gave NASA managers the confidence to officially name March 6th, 2026 as the target launch date for the mission, marking the opening of a 5-day launch window in March, with a further window available in April.

However, within 24 hours of the target launch date being announced, NASA was forced to issue a further mission postponement when another issue was discovered – this time a helium leak in the booster’s upper stage.

The new leak is entirely unrelated to those within the umbilical propellant system on the mobile launch platform and lies within the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) pressurisation system.

The latest issue with the Artemis 2 SLS lies within the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), aka the rocket’s upper stage, seen above, which will perform a number of tasks in the mission – including getting the Orion crew vehicle to orbit in the first place. The issues are entirely unrelated to those seen with the main propellant loading system at the base of the rocket. Image credit: United Launch Alliance.

The ICPS plays a critical role in both lifting the Orion vehicle to its initial orbit following separation from the booster’s core stage, and then moving it to a high altitude orbit prior to it and Orion entering a trans-lunar injection orbit, where – after the ICPS has separated from Orion, it will be used as a target for a series of planned rendezvous and simulated docking exercises to test Orion’s ability to carry out the precise manoeuvring required to dock with Moon-orbiting Moon landers and (eventually)with the Gateway station.

However, in order to function optimally, the ICPS requires a  “solid” – that is a specific rate of flow and pressure for the helium. Fluctuations in the flow – such as caused by a leak – cannot be tolerated. This means that in order to fly, Artemis 2 requires the issue to be properly addressed. This is something that might be done whilst leaving the vehicle on the pad; however, it might require the vehicle to be rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) to allow complete access to the ICPS. At the time of writing, engineers at NASA were still evaluating which option to take.

But one thing is clear – with just two weeks between the discovery of the issue and the opening of the March launch window, there is precious little time to fully investigate and rectify the issue. As such, NASA is now shifting its focus towards having the mission ready for lift-off in time to meet the April 2026 launch window.