Category: Space Sunday

Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner programme, designed to offer both NASA and commercial space companies with the means of delivering astronauts to low-Earth orbit space stations such as the International Space Station (ISS) and the Blue Origin / Sierra Space led consortium’s Orbital Reef station, has had a very chequered history with the number of issues far outweighing the number of successes.

On all three occasions the CST-100, comprising a capsule with a capacity for up to seven crew – although 4 plus a measure of cargo is liable to be the usual complement, together with a service module – has reached orbit, it has done so while encountering a series of issues / failures.  Indeed, such is the nature of some of the problems, they actually led to delays in getting the second flight test off the ground. More significantly, some of the issues were potentially known about as far back as June 2018. It was then, during a hot fire test of one of the vehicle’s RS-88 launch abort motors, when four of eight values on the vehicle’s propellant flow system failed, releasing 1.8 tonnes of highly toxic  monomethylhydrazine propellant and causing a fireball that engulfed the test rig.

Whilst blaming engine supplier Aerojet Rocketdyne for the hot fire test incident, Boeing simultaneously sought to keep the news of the incident quiet, and limited the circulation of information relating to it to a few senor programme managers at NASA, who agreed to also keep the incident out of the public eye as much as possible so as not to further delay the programme, which was already behind schedule.

Although it is near impossible to state with certainty that this event market the start of successive failures of management both within Boeing and NASA as to how Starliner and its various issues and problems were both handled and communicated between the two parties, it fits with a pattern seen throughout the last several years of Starliner’s troubles.

All of this has now been made clear in a comprehensive report released by the new NASA Administrator, Jared Issacman, in the wake of an in-depth investigation covering several months into the Starliner project. Released during a public press briefing, the 311-page report (partially redacted) goes into extensive depth relating to the three Starliner flights to orbit to date: the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test 1 (OFT 1, 2019) and its follow-up Orbital Flight Test 2 (OFT 2, 2022), and the first Crew Flight Test (CFT 1, 2024) which famously resulted in heady reports of the mission crew – Sunita Williams and Barry Wilmore being “stranded” in space as if they were utterly helpless when in fact they are working aboard the ISS.

The report goes to great length to outline the core technical issues with Starliner relating to the four “doghouse” thruster packs mounted equidistantly around the circumference of Starliner’s service module and containing multiple large and small thrusters designed to provide the vehicle with flight motion and manoeuvring capabilities, together with the software issues which proved to be the undoing of the original OFT 1 mission which ultimately left the vehicle unable to rendezvous with the ISS and attempt an automated docking.

But most startlingly, the report reclassifies the Crew Flight Test 1 as a Type A mishap. This is NASA’s most extreme rating for malfunctions aboard crew carrying vehicles; for example, both the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle losses were classified as Type A mishaps on account of the loss of all board both vehicles. Type A mishaps have several main criteria: Injuring or fatalities during flight; loss of a vehicle or its control; damage exceeding US $2 million.

At first glance, and given that a) Williams and Wilmore did manage to maintain control over their vehicle and make a successful docking with, and transfer to, the ISS; b) there were no injuries or fatalities; and c) US $2 million in damages is an exceedingly small amount in the scheme of things, reclassifying CFT 1 a Type A mishap might appear to be more a knee-jerk reaction than might be warranted. However, the events experienced during CFT 1 make it abundantly clear that designating it a Type A mishap should have occurred at the time  of the flight – or at least immediately afterwards as the situation was fully understood.

The key point here is the second criteria for specifying a Type A mishap: the loss of the vehicle or its control. During CFT 1’s approach to the ISS for rendezvous and docking, the vehicle suffered a critical failure of five thruster sets required for manoeuvring control ( in NASA parlance, the vehicle lost its required 6 degrees of freedom manoeuvring). Regardless of the fact that the crew regained the use of four of the thrusters units in short order and went on to complete a successful docking at the ISS, at the time the failure occurred, Starliner was effectively adrift, unable to correct its orientation or motion – or even safely back away from the ISS to avoid the risk of collision. In other words, loss of the vehicle’s control had occurred.

Nor, as it turns out, was this the only issue. During its re-entry and descent through the atmosphere, the Starliner capsule Calypso suffered a failure with one of its RCS thruster systems, resulting in a “zero fault tolerance” situation – meaning there was no back-up for the failed unit during what was a critical phase of the vehicle’s flight.

So why wasn’t CFT 1 designated a Type A mishap immediately after the fact? Here the report is uncompromising in its assessment: NASA managers overseeing the Starliner contract were more concerned with getting the vehicle certified for routine crew operations than with admitting it still has major flight qualification issues which should disbar it from routine use to launch crews. It is in this approach of directly pointing the finger and throwing back the covers on how NASA and its contract have been functioning within the Starliner contract that the report – despite the redactions within it – is uncompromisingly clear in apportioning blame.

In particular, the report highlights numerous issues with the way the contract – and by extension – all commercial partnership contracts are handled by NASA. Chief among these is that, whilst charged with overall oversight responsibilities for such programmes, NASA took an almost completely hands-off approach to Starliner, bowing to Boeing when it came to most critical decision making on the overall fitness  for purpose of the system. Challenges to internal decision making at Boeing were muted or non-existent, and when it was felt Boeing were obfuscating or failing to be properly transparent, NASA tended not to challenge, but simply started mistrusting their contractor, allowing further breakdowns in communications to occur.

For its part, Boeing felt it could compartmentalise issues into individual fault chains and fixes, rather than seeing and reporting them as they were, a series of interconnected chains of design issues, faults and upsets. As a result, issues were dealt with on a kind of patch-and-fix approach, rather than a systematic examination of chains of events and proper root cause analysis. In this, the report particularly highlights the fact that whilst Boeing has a robust Root Cause / Corrective Action (RCCA) process, all too often it was never fully deployed in dealing with issues, the priority being to find a fix for each issue in turn and move on in the belief things would be rectified once all the fixes had been identified and implemented.

The report goes into a number of recommendations as to how NASA must handle future commercial partnerships such as the Commercial Crew Programme (CCP) of which SpaceX and Boeing are both a part, and how it should exercise full and proper oversight and lose its hands-off attitude. Time will tell in how these changes will affect such contracts – not just with Boeing and CST-100, but also with the likes of SpaceX and the development of their lunar lander, a project where NASA has again been decidedly hands-off in it approach to the work, allowing SpaceX to continually miss deadlines, fail to produce vehicle elements in time for testing, and to seemingly pushed vehicle development to one side in favour of pursuing its own goals whilst still taking NASA financing to the tune of US $4.9 billion.

In respect of Starline itself, the root cause(s) of the thruster issues on the vehicle still has/have yet to be fully determined. However, Issacman has made it clear NASA will not be withdrawing from the contract with Boeing; instead he has committed NASA to refusing to flying any crew aboard Starliner until such time as Boeing can – with NASA’s assistance – demonstrate that the issues plaguing the vehicle have been fully understood and dealt with properly and fully.

Whether that can be done within the next 5 years of ISS operational life remains to be seen.

Artemis 2: WDR Success; Launch Again Delayed

The Artemis 2 Space Launch System (SLS) rocket successfully completed its pre-flight wet dress rehearsal (WDR) test on Thursday, February 19th, 2026, potentially clearing the path for a mission launch in early March – or at least, that was the hope.

As I’ve noted in recent Space Sunday updates, the WDR is a major test of all the ground systems associated with launching an SLS rocket, together with the on-board systems and all ground support personnel  to make sure all systems are ready for an actual launch and staff are up-to-speed with all procedures and possible causes for delays, etc. Such tests run through until just before engine ignition, and include fully fuelling the booster’s core stage with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

The WDR had previously revealed issues with the propellant loading system at the base of the mobile launch platform on which the rocket stands ahead of lift-off, with various leaks being noted the both the first Artemis 2 WDR and previously with the uncrewed Artemis 1 mission of 2022.

The original Artemis 2 WDR suffered issues with the liquid hydrogen feed into the rocket and with a filter designed to keep impurities out of the propellants. Both the problem valves and the filter were swapped-out ahead of the second WDR together with the replacement of a number of seals which showed minor signs or wear. Following the second WDR test, an initial review of the gathered data was performed, and the results gave NASA managers the confidence to officially name March 6th, 2026 as the target launch date for the mission, marking the opening of a 5-day launch window in March, with a further window available in April.

However, within 24 hours of the target launch date being announced, NASA was forced to issue a further mission postponement when another issue was discovered – this time a helium leak in the booster’s upper stage.

The new leak is entirely unrelated to those within the umbilical propellant system on the mobile launch platform and lies within the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) pressurisation system.

The ICPS plays a critical role in both lifting the Orion vehicle to its initial orbit following separation from the booster’s core stage, and then moving it to a high altitude orbit prior to it and Orion entering a trans-lunar injection orbit, where – after the ICPS has separated from Orion, it will be used as a target for a series of planned rendezvous and simulated docking exercises to test Orion’s ability to carry out the precise manoeuvring required to dock with Moon-orbiting Moon landers and (eventually)with the Gateway station.

However, in order to function optimally, the ICPS requires a  “solid” – that is a specific rate of flow and pressure for the helium. Fluctuations in the flow – such as caused by a leak – cannot be tolerated. This means that in order to fly, Artemis 2 requires the issue to be properly addressed. This is something that might be done whilst leaving the vehicle on the pad; however, it might require the vehicle to be rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) to allow complete access to the ICPS. At the time of writing, engineers at NASA were still evaluating which option to take.

But one thing is clear – with just two weeks between the discovery of the issue and the opening of the March launch window, there is precious little time to fully investigate and rectify the issue. As such, NASA is now shifting its focus towards having the mission ready for lift-off in time to meet the April 2026 launch window.

I’ve written about the issues of space debris on numerous occasions in these pages (for example, see: Space Sunday: debris and the Kessler syndrome; more Artemis or Space Sunday: Debris, Artemis delays, SpaceX Plans). Most of these pieces have highlighted the growing crowded nature of space immediately beyond our planet’s main atmosphere, the increasing risk of vehicle-to-vehicle collisions and the potential for a Kessler syndrome event.

However, there is another aspect of the increasing frequency of space launches and the number of satellites and debris re-entering the atmosphere: pollution and an increase in global warming. This is something I covered in brief back in October 2024, and it is becoming a matter of growing concern.

Currently, there are 14,300 active satellites orbiting Earth (January 2026), compared to just 871 20 years ago. Some 64.3% of these satellites belong to one company: SpaceX, in the form of Starlink satellites. Launches of these commenced in 2019, with each satellite intended to operate between 5 and 7 years. However, because of their relative cheapness, combined with advances in technology and the need for greater capabilities means than since August 2025, SpaceX has been “divesting” itself of initial  generations of their Starlink satellites within their anticipated lifespan at a rate to match the continued use of newer satellites, freeing up orbital “slots” for the newer satellites.

As a result, SpaceX is now responsible for over 40% of satellite re-entries into the atmosphere, equating to a net of over half a tonne of pollutants – notably much of it aluminium oxide and carbonates – being dumped into the upper atmosphere a day, all of which contributes to the greenhouse effect within the upper atmosphere.

These particulates drift down into the stratosphere where monitoring is showing they are having some disturbing interactions with everything from the ozone layer through to weather patterns.

We’re really changing the composition of the stratosphere into a state that we’ve never seen before, much of it negative. We really don’t understand many of the impacts that can result from this. The rush to space risks disrupting the global climate system and further depleting the ozone layer, which shields all living things from DNA-destroying ultraviolet radiation.

– John Dykema, applied physicist at the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard

In a degree of fairness to SpaceX – who will continue to dominate the issue of re-entry pollutants if their request to deploy a further 15,000 Starlink units is approved – they are not the only contributor. One Web, Amazon, Blue Origin and China via their Qianfan constellation, all stand to add to the problem – if on something of a smaller scale (Amazon and Blue Origin, for example, only plan to operate a total of 8,400 satellites, total). Further, NASA itself is a contributor: the solid rocket boosters used by the space shuttle and now the Space Launch System have been and are major depositors of aluminium and aluminium oxides in the upper atmosphere.

Nor does it end there. The vehicles used to launch these satellites are a contributing factor, whether semi-reusable or expendable. They add exhaust gases – often heavy in carbonates – into the atmosphere, as well as continuing to the dispersion of pollutants in the upper reaches of the atmosphere as upper stages re-enter and burn up.

Carbonates and things like aluminium oxides are of particular concern because of their known impact on both greenhouse gas trapping and in the destruction of the ozone layer. A further factor here is that research suggests that interactions between aluminium oxide and solar radiation in the upper atmosphere can result in the production of chlorine in a highly reactive form, potentially further increasing ozone loss in the atmosphere.

We’re not only putting thermal energy into the Earth’s climate system, but we’re putting it in new places. We don’t really understand the implications of changing stratospheric circulation. It could cause storm tracks to move. Maybe it could shift climate zones, or possibly be a new source of droughts and floods. Chlorine is one of the key actors in the ozone hole. If you add a new surface that converts existing chlorine into reactive and free radical forms, that will also promote ozone loss. Not yet enough to create a new ozone hole, but it can slow the recovery that began after the 1987 Montreal Protocol phased out chlorofluorocarbons.

– John Dykema, applied physicist at the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard

There is something of a complex balance in all of this. We need the capabilities an orbital infrastructure can provide – communications, monitoring, Earth and weather observation, etc.,  – but we also need to be aware of the potential for debilitating the natural protections we need from our atmosphere together with the potential for pollutants to further accelerate human-driven climate change beyond the ability of the planet to correct.

This is further complicated by the inevitable friction between commercial / corporate need  – and much of modern space development is squarely in the corporate domain, where income and revenue are the dominant forces – and governmental oversight / policy making and enforcement. As such, how and when policy makers might act is also subject to some complexity, although many in the scientific community are becoming increasingly of the opinion that action is required sooner rather than later, and preferably on a united front.

Changes to stratospheric circulation may ultimately prove more consequential than the additional ozone loss, because the outcomes are so uncertain and potentially far-reaching. For the moment, many questions are not really amenable to straightforward, linear analysis. The ozone loss is significant, and we’re putting so much stuff up there that it could grow in ways that are not proportional to what has thus far been seen. The question is whether policymakers will act on those concerns before the invisible wake of our spacefaring ambitions becomes impossible to ignore.

– John Dykema, applied physicist at the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard

Brief Updates

Artemis 2 Launch targets February 8th As Earliest Opportunity

NASA has announced a new earliest launch target date for Artemis 2: Sunday, February 8th, 2026, some two days later than the initial earliest launch date target.

The decision to push the target date back was taken after the planned wet dress rehearsal (WDR) for the launch – which sees all aspects of a vehicle launch tested right up to the point of engine ignition – was postponed due to extremely cold weather moving in over the Kennedy Space Centre which could have impacted accurate data gathering on the 49-hour test, which had been slated to commence on January 29th, 2026.

The WDR was instead reset for the period of February 1st through 3rd, 2026, with the countdown clock to the start of testing resuming at 01:13 UTC on February 1st. It will run through to the opening of a simulated launch window for 02:00 UTC on February 2nd. This latter part of the test will see the propellant loading system – which exhibited issues during preparations for the 2022 Artemis 1 launch – put through its paces to confirm it is ready for an actual launch.

As a thorough testing of all ground  and vehicle systems, and a full rehearsal for all teams involved in a launch, the WDR is the last major step in clearing the SLS and Artemis 2 for it mission around the Moon. It will officially terminate as the simulated launch window opens, some 10 seconds before engine ignition – but data gathering will continue through until February 3rd as the rocket is de-tanked of propellants and made safe. Then will come a data analysis and test review.

The actual crew of Artemis 2 are not participating in the test, but will be observing / monitoring elements of the WDR as it progresses. NASA has a livestream of the pad as the WDR progresses, and a separate stream will be opened during the propellant loading phases of the test.

The push back to February 8th, means that NASA effectively has a 3-day opportunity through until February 11th (inclusive) in which to launch the mission before the current window closes. After that, the mission will have to wait for the March launch window to open.

NASA / SpaceX Crew 12 Looks to February 11th Launch

As NASA primarily focuses on Artemis 2, a second crewed launch is being lined up on the taxiway (so to speak) ready to follow the SLS into space – or possibly launch ahead of it.

NASA and SpaceX have confirmed they are looking at February 11th, 2026 as a potential launch date for the Crew 12 mission to the International Space Station (ISS). The mission will lift-off from Kennedy Space Centre’s launch Complex 39A (LC-39A), just a few kilometres away from the SLS at LC-39B, carrying NASA astronauts  Jessica Meir and Jack Hathaway, together with ESA astronaut Sophie Adenot, and Roscosmos cosmonaut Andrey Fedyaev aboard the SpaceX Crew Dragon Freedom.

Officially classified as NASA Crew Expedition 74/75, the four will bring the ISS back up to it nominal crew numbers following the medical evacuation which saw the Crew 11 astronauts make an early return to Earth, as I’ve covered in recent Space Sunday articles.

The preparations for Crew 12’s launch means that in the coming days there will be two rockets on the pads at Kennedy’s Launch Complex 39, each proceeding along its own route to launch. As to which goes first, this depends primarily on how the Artemis 2 / SLS launch preparations go.  If it leaves the pad between February 8th and February 10th as planned, then there is nothing hindering Crew 12 lifting-off atop their Falcon 9 booster. However, any push-back to February 11th would likely see Crew 12 delayed until February 12th at the earliest. Conversely, if Artemis 2 is delayed until the March launch opportunity, this immediately clears the way for Crew 12 to proceed towards a February 11th lift-off, with both February 12th and 13th also available.

Habitability of Europa Takes Another Blow

In my previous Space Sunday article, I covered recent studies relating to the potential for Jupiter’s icy moon Europa to harbour life (see: Space Sunday: examining Europa and “The Eye of Sauron”). The studies in question were mixed: one contending that conditions on Europa might lean towards life being present within its deep water ocean, the other being more sceptical about the sea floor conditions required to support life (e.g. the presence of hydrothermal vents).

Now a further study has been published, and it also suggests the chances of life existing in Europa’s ocean are at best thin.

One of the core issues with Europa has been knowing just how thick its ice shell actually is. Some have suggested it could be as little as 2 kilometres thick, whilst others have stated it could be as deep as 30km.

Understanding the thickness of the moon’s ice crust is crucial, as it helps define whether or not processes seen to be at work on the Moon are sufficient enough to have an impact on what might be happening within any liquid water oceans under the ice.

If the ice crust is thin – say a handful of kilometres or less – then activities like subduction within the ice sheets have a good chance of carrying minerals and nutrients created by the interaction between brines in Europa’s surface ice down into the ocean below, where they might help support life processes. similarly, transport mechanisms within the ice could carry oxygen generated as a result of surface interactions down through the ice and into the waters below. If the ice is too thick, then there is a good chance such processes grind to a halt long before they break through the ice crust into the waters below, thus starving them of nutrients, chemicals and gases.

An analysis of data gathered by NASA’s Juno mission as it loops its way around Jupiter and making periodic fly-bys of Europa now suggests that the primary ice crust of Europa is potentially some 28-29 kilometres thick. That’s not good news for the moon’s potential habitability because, as noted it would severely hamper any movement of minerals and nutrients down through the moon’s ice and into the waters below. However, the researchers do note that this doesn’t mean such elements could not reach the waters below, but rather they would take a lot longer to do so, but rather their ability to support any life processes within Europa’s waters would be greatly diminished.

An unknown complication here is he state of the ice towards the bottom of the crust. Is it solid all the way through, or does it become more slush-like as it nears the water boundary layer, warmed by the heat of Europa’s mantle as it radiates outward through the ocean? If it is more slush-like, even if only for around 5 kilometres, this might aid transport mechanisms carrying nutrients, minerals, chemicals and oxygen down into the ocean. Conversely, if the ice is solid and there is a further 3-5 km thick layer of icy slush forming the boundary between it and liquid water, then it will act as a further impediment to these transport mechanisms being able to transfer material to the liquid water ocean.

As a result of this study, and the two noted in my previous Space Sunday article, eyes are now definitely turning towards NASA’s Europa Clipper, due to arrive in orbit around Jupiter in 2030, and ESA’s Juice mission, due to arrive in 2031, in the hope that they will be able to provide more detailed answers to conditions on and under Europa’s ice.