Category: Space Sunday

Billionaire Jared Isaacman was confirmed by the US Senate as NASA’s new Administrator under the Trump administration – more than half a year after his appointment had originally been expected. The delay in the confirmation was the result of Trump himself, who withdrew Isaacman’s nomination virtually on the eve of his initially expected confirmation, possibly as a result of Trump’s public falling-out with the CEO of SpaceX, with whom Isaacman has close ties.

Those ties were a cause of concern back in April 2025, and rose again in the December hearings on Isaacman’s re-nomination, with some within the Senate questioning how unbiased he might be when it comes to making decisions around NASA’s human space efforts – particularly with regards to the Artemis Programme. In particular, questions have been raised over Isaacman’s financial ties to SpaceX – a company he has twice used for private-venture launches which have seen him gain almost 8 days experience in orbit with two crews. Isaacman himself has remained opaque on his precise financial ties with SpaceX, stating NDAs prevent him being more candid, whilst offering – at least prior to his confirmation – to seek release from his obligations by SpaceX to disclose them.

Another cause for concern over her appointment lay in the form of the 62-page Project Athena document. Penned by Isaacman and his team earlier in the year, this outlined a radical direction for NASA which many saw as not particularly in the agency’s best interests.  Within it, Isaacman pushes for various aspects of NASA’s research work to be handed over to the private sector whilst also seeking to continue the – contentious, as I’ve noted in these pages in the recent past – work of apparently winding down the many functions and much of the work of the Goddard Space Flight Centre (GSFC) by either transferring them (e.g. to the Johnson Space Centre) or “deleting” them.

Whilst there is nothing wrong with commercialisation where it can be carried out properly and with the right supervision, history has already shown that when it comes to R&D and development, it doesn’t always work out.

Boeing’s Starliner is perhaps the most identifiable case in point here, even allowing for the company having to absorb the majority of the cost over-runs; however, it also overlooks SpaceX, which remains the greatest benefactor of NASA funding with absolutely no return to the American taxpayer. Without NASA’s intervention in the early 2000s, SpaceX would have failed completely with the Falcon 1 rocket, NASA effectively covering the lion’s share of development costs associated with Falcon 9, and with both the Dragon and Crew Dragon vehicles.

For his part, Isaacman has continued to deflect from the Athena document, calling it a set of “ideas” and “thoughts” rather than an actionable plan – this despite the fact that a) it is actually entitled a “strategic plan” for NASA, and b) it lays down a pretty clear roadmap that is heavily biased towards commercialisation, even in areas where it is difficult to see commercial entities being willing to engage unless assured of significant government financing.

However, all of this might now by a side note in terms was to what happens at NASA next, given that on the very day Isaacman took up his new post at NASA, December 18th, 2025, Trump issued an executive order outlining much of NASA’s immediate future priorities – and in places, quite ironically so.

Trump’s New Executive Order for “American Superiority” In Space

Whilst not including anything Earth-shatteringly new, the December 18th executive order focus on four areas:  expanding America’s human exploration of space, but with the focus confined to the Moon and Earth orbit; expanding America’s strategic and national security needs in space; “growing a commercial space economy”; and “developing and deploying” advanced technologies “to enable the next century of space achievements”.

Specifically with regards to NASA, the order calls for:

• Returning Americans to the Moon by 2028 via Artemis.
• Establishing the initial elements of a Lunar South Pole outpost by 2030.
• Enabling the use of nuclear power in Earth orbit and on the surface of the Moon.
• Further NASA’s reliance on commercial launch vehicles and providers.
• Streamline NASA’s procurement processes, again with a bias towards buying-in rather than in developing.
• Offset costs by decommissioning the International Space Station (ISS) in 2030, and moving to private sector space research and orbital facilities.

In addition, the Executive Order requires that in his first 90 days, Isaacman must submit a report on how the above – and other goals impacting NASA, such as financing commercial space activities – are to be achieved.

The goal of landing humans on the Moon by 2028 remains something of a reach. As was noted by Acting NASA Administrator Sean Duffy – and despite the SpaceX CEO’s protestations otherwise – it is very hard to see the SpaceX Human Landing System – the vehicle needed to get crews from cislunar space to the surface of the Moon and back again – and its many complex requirements being anywhere near ready and fully tested by 2028.And while Blue Origin, with their slightly less complicated Blue Moon Mark 2 HLS apparently well ahead of the curve in terms of development – including active astronaut testing of various elements of the vehicle as well as having a launch vehicle proven to be able to reach Earth orbit with a payload in place – it is not without complexities of its own which could yet impact on its ability to overtake the SpaceX Starship-derived system.

Perhaps the biggest issue facing both of these vehicles is NASA’s own insistence that they use cryogenic propellants. This makes both vehicles massively more complex than the likes of the Apollo Lunar Lander, which used a hypergolic motor system and thus it required no complex turbopumps or other systems in its engines, and the propellants did not require an external ignition source (they would ignite on contact) and could be stored relatively compactly.

Cryogenic propulsion, whilst providing a potentially greater bang, does require more complex engines, an ignition source, and substantial storage as they are bulky. Ergo, for either of the two HLS systems NASA plans to employ, there exists a requirement to be able to “refuel” the HLS vehicle when on-orbit, with the SpaceX HLS requiring substantially more in the way of propellant reloading than Blue Moon.

Further, and as the name suggests, cryogenics propellants require very low temperatures in order to remain in a liquid state (essential for reducing their bulk and enabling their flow). That’s hard enough when on Earth; in space, where either HLS vehicle will spend much of its time in the full blazing heat of the Sun, it’s much harder.

Thus, for both HLS vehicles to work, SpaceX and Blue Origin must be able to develop and test a reliable system to transfer tonnes (hundreds in the case of SpaceX HLS) of propellants between craft, and develop a means to minimise potential boil-off and loss through gaseous venting of side cryogenics. Again, neither company is anywhere near achieving either of these milestones.

Establishing the elements of a lunar outpost by 2030 is at best an ambiguous goal within the executive order, in that no effort is made to expand on whether this means on the surface of the Moon or just in cislunar space, such as by the positioning of initial elements of the Lunar Gateway station.

Gateway is a further questionably element of Artemis, with critics pointing to the fact that it is not actually needed for any return to the Moon by America. And while NASA promotes it as a “command and control centre” for lunar operations and a potential “safe haven” in emergencies, the fact remains that it is anything but.

When deployed, the station will likely occupy a 7-day near-rectilinear halo orbit (NRHO) around the Moon, making its closest passes (1,500 km altitude) over the lunar North Pole, and extending out as far as 70,000 km from the lunar South Pole, the area selected for surface operations, thus limiting its ability to respond to any surface emergency.

That said, the lack of any indicators as to what is meant in terms of a lunar outpost within the executive order does give Isaacman a relatively free hand with his response.

Similarly, the reference to the use of nuclear power is somewhat ambiguous. While there have been studies and proposals on using compact nuclear plants on the surface of the Moon (see: Space Sunday: propulsion, planets and pictures), nothing concrete has been put forward for Artemis, which gives Isaacman some room. However, in terms of propulsion systems (if these are included in the order’s reach), it is interesting to note that the joint DARPA-NASA DRACO project, which would have potentially seen a nuclear propulsion demonstrator flown in 2027, was cancelled earlier in 2025 because – irony – the Trump administration was looking to cancel it anyway under the 2026 budget proposal.

Looking to leverage more commercial launch services is something that fits with Isaacman’s Athena document, as mentioned above. Also as mentioned, there is nothing wrong with this if it s done right, but this is harder to achieve than might otherwise appear to be the case (again, note the comments vis Boeing / Starliner and SpaceX Starship), and too much reliance on commercial entities can led to delays and issues as much as seen with SLS, simply because commercial entitles can have their own goals and requirements which can come at a higher priority.

Again, part – not all, given the fubar over the Artemis space suits – of the fact that Artemis 3 slipped from a 2026 date to 2028 is down to SpaceX consistently failing to prove Starship can do what is promised of it. This includes statements from the company’s CEO that a Starship would fly around the Moon with a crew of 8 in 2023, and the HLS version would make an unscrewed demonstration landing on the Moon in 2024. As such, there is much to be cautious about when it comes to any off-loading of capabilities to commercial entities.

The ISS retirement is easier to rationalise. Like it or not, the entire structure is aging and much of it is passing its planned operational lifespan. Even the most recent large Russian module to join the ISS – Nauka, launched in 2021, started construction in the early 1990s, marking its core structure older than its planned operational lifespan of 30 years. But the Russian modules are not alone, the US Unity module was constructed in the 1990s and launched in 1998, and thus is sitting on top of its 30-year planned lifespan.

As such, while there is no reason much of the ISS could continue beyond 2030, it is not without increasing risks and / or rising issues. Thus, decommissioning it does, sadly make a degree of sense.

What does not make sense, however, is the failure to plan for any real replacement for it in Earth orbit and simply relying on “commercial entities” to continue the tradition of research and science established by the ISS. The latter, as a government operation, does not have to generate a return on investment and is ideally suited by its governing articles to be a centre of research and study. Commercial entities, however, will be driven by a need to be profitable – hence why, while there are a number of commercial space stations is development (take Blue Origin’s Orbital Reef as an example, being perhaps the largest), their focus leans far more towards orbital tourism, their operators intending them to become resorts in space for those who can afford a ticket. Using them as a centre of research sits some way behind this, and will not be without a range of its own costs, both in terms of getting to / from a station and in actually spending time aboard it, as well as the time researchers might be permitted to stay.

Another risk in ending the ISS and not supporting any form of replacement potentially undermines the Trump administration’s desire (and the concerns of Congress and the Senate) to curtail (or at least slow) China’s growing ascendency on the international stage. With the ISS gone, Tiangong will become the only large-scale and potentially expandable orbital research facility – thus it could become the hub of international space-based research.

Which is a long way of saying that Jared Isaacman has come into NASA at a time of potential turmoil and with a possible agenda which could do much to completely alter the agency.  But whether this is to its betterment or not will have to be seen in time.

A handful of updates for this week covering some previous reports and articles.

Shenzhou 22launches to Tiangong

In my previous Space Sunday article, I covered the unfolding situation aboard the Chinese Tiangong space station, where three tiakonauts – Zhang Lu, Wu Fei and Zhang Hongzhang – “stranded” on the station. This was because their Shenzhou 21 spacecraft had been used to return three other tiakonauts – Chen Dong, Chen Zhongrui and Wang Jie – to Earth after their vehicle was deemed unfit to bring them home following a strike by orbital debris, thus leaving the first three without a return vehicle.

At the time of writing that piece, I noted that China was ramping work on Shenzhou 22, originally due for launch with a crew in 2026, so it could launch to Tiangong in an uncrewed state to provide the three crew on the station with a return vehicle, and that this mission could launch as soon as November 25th.

This is precisely what happened, with the vehicle launched atop a Long March 2F/G rocket from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre in northwest China at 04:11 UTC on November 25th (12:11 Beijing time). The vehicle, flying under automated control, rendezvoused with Tiangong at 07:50 UTC, less than four hours after launch.

As it was flying without a crew, Shenzhou 22 brought with it additional supplies for the space station, including additional fresh fruit and vegetables for the crew, medical supplies, and equipment the crew might be able to use to repair the damaged viewport on Shenzhou 20’s orbital module, which also remains docked at Tiangong.

If this can be done, then Shenzhou 20 is liable to be returned to Earth under automated control; if not the Chinese Manned Spaceflight Agency (CMSA) has indicated it will be abandoned in orbit to free the docking port it currently occupies ready for the arrival of Shenzhou 23 in April 2026.Presumably, if abandoned, and giving the risk of collision, Shenzhou 20 will be commanded to make a controlled re-entry into the upper atmosphere to largely burn-up with any surviving elements targeting Point Nemo in the South Pacific Ocean.

Russia’s Only Active Manned Spacecraft Launch Pad Damaged

On Thursday, November 27th, at just before 09:28 UTC, Soyuz MS-28 lifted-off from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan. Aboard were the Expedition 73/74 crew bound for the International Space Station (ISS) comprising carrying cosmonauts Sergey Kud-Sverchkov (mission commander) and Sergey Mikayev, and US astronaut Christopher Williams (NASA).

The flight proceeded smoothly, with the Soyuz vehicle achieving orbit and rendezvousing with the ISS a little over three hours after launch, docking with the nadir port on the Rassvet “mini-module” (formerly known as the docking Cargo Module) of the Russian section of the station.

However, during the launch from Site 31/6, damaged was caused to the launch facilities, with the Service Platform apparently collapsing into the pad’s flame trench (used to direct a rocket’s super-heated exhaust away from the vehicle and pad during lift-off).

A three-decked unit, the Service Platform sits under the actual launch pad and Soyuz  the Soyuz rocket when in its upright position when on the pad, supported by three gantries on the pad itself (which open like jaws when the rocket lifts-off). Prior to launch, the service platform provides critical access to the lower portion of the booster as well as providing the mechanism required to support the rocket’s base. Its loss has temporarily rendered Site 31/6 inoperable.

What is particularly significant about this is the Site 31/6, first used in January 1961 and which has seen over 400 launches since then, is that currently, it is the only launch pad at Baikonur available for launching Soyuz and Progress. A second facility – Site 1, which was used as the launch pad for Yuri Gagarin’s historic flight, was decommissioned in 2020 due to lack of funds required for essential updates.

This means that, for the time being, Russia has no means to launch either Progress or Soyuz craft to the ISS. Following the incident, the Russian Space Agency Roscosmos issued a short statement confirming the damage, and stated that all the parts required to affect repairs are available, and repairs will be completed in the “near future”.

Russian spaceflight expert Anatoly Zak, who runs the Russian Space Website, and whom I’ve quoted in the past in these pages, notes that the platform could take up to 2 years to fully repair, but the pad itself could be brought back into use by Roscosmos “borrowing” the necessary hardware from the decommissioned Site 1, which is still standing.

Currently, the next planned launch from Site 31/6 is that of the uncrewed Progress MS-33 mission, due in late December 2025. At the time of writing, Roscosmos had provided no update on the status of that launch in light of the pad damage.

Boeing Starliner Update

NASA and Boeing have announced that the next flight of the latter’s troubled CST-100 Starliner crew vehicle will be an uncrewed flight to the ISS, and that overall, the number of operational crewed flights the vehicle will fly to the ISS will be reduced from 6 to 3 (for a total of four flights overall).

Starliner has been the subject of numerous articles in these pages, having suffered a series of embarrassing flaws and issues, the most recent being during the vehicle’s first crewed flight test, which saw issues with the vehicle’s thruster systems and resulted in the flight crew of Barry “Butch” Wilmore and Sunita “Suni” Williams remaining on the ISS for a total for 286 days rather than their originally planned 7-14 days.

On Monday, November 24th, NASA announced the next launch of Starliner to the ISS – targeting a possible April 2026 lift-off – will be uncrewed and only carry supplies to the space station. Officially referred to as Starliner-1 and originally intended to be the first operational flight of the vehicle with a crew of 4, the flight is viewed by NASA as a further flight test to confirm Starliner’s suitability to commence crewed flights to the ISS.

In the same announcement, NASA indicated that in light of the delays to Starliner operations, they had agreed with Boeing that the number of planned flights using the vehicle will be reduced from the contracted 6 to 4 – including the Starliner-1 mission. This means Starliner will now only be used for three operational crewed flights to the ISS, the remaining two being held as “options” by NASA.

This does raise some questions around the entire CST-100 contract. In 2014, NASA agreed a fixed-price contract of US $4.2 billion for the development of Starliner and six operational crew flights (Starliner-1 through Starliner 6). In 2016, NASA amended the contract to pay Boeing an additional US $287.2 million per launch for the original Starliner-3 through Starliner-6 missions. As such, it is not clear if holding on to what would effectively be the “starliner-5 and “Starliner-6” flights as “options” is to avoid NASA and Boeing getting into an argument over refunds in the original contract.

Overall, the Starliner project is now estimated to be some US $2 billion over-budget. While much of the additional cost has been paid for by Boeing, adding to the company’s word on top of the 737 MAX debacle, it is still a major embarrassment to NASA. For its part, Boeing may still hope to salvage its reputation (and generate revenue) by using Starliner in conjunction with the Blue Origin / Sierra Space led Orbital Reef commercial space station, in which Starliner a designated the crew transfer vehicle (a role Sierra Space also hope to fulfil if it can successfully implement the crew-capable  version of their Dream Chaser space vehicle).

Lawmakers Seek to Support Goddard

I’ve covered the disturbing situation at NASA’s Goddard Space Centre a few times in these pages recently (notably: Space Sunday: of budgets and proposed cuts and Space Sunday: more NASA budgets threats and Space Sunday: Goddard fears and comet updates), in which the NASA management appear to be facilitating a shut-down of facilities at the centre in accordance with the unapproved Trump administration budget for 2026, using the “20 year plan” for refurbishing and updating the centre as cover. It now appears that US lawmakers are asking questions as to what exactly is going on – and requesting NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) carry out a full audit to make a proper determination on whether the actions are harming individual projects based at Goddard – or NASA as whole.

The effort is being led by Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member of the House Science Committee, who has been joined by 15 other lawmakers, including Valerie Foushee Ranking Member on the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics. The letter, forwarded to NASA OIG on November 21st, 2025, followed a November 10th letter Lofgren to NASA Acting Administrator Sean Duffy and Goddard centre management stating the closures “must cease” until such time as NASA has submitted the changes for oversight by Congress and OIG.

The concerns from Congress stem from the fact that while initiated prior to the government shutdown, the closures and moves at Goddard were accelerated during the shutdown period, with many staff at NASA being ordered to pack their offices and data whilst technically on furlough and without any of the necessary paperwork required to allow them to work during a shutdown – called federal work exceptions – being submitted by Goddard Centre management.

In particular, it has emerged that pressure has been placed on two of NASA’s flagship science projects – the Dragonfly quadcopter mission to Saturn’s moon Titan (see: Space Sunday: A Dragonfly for a moon) and the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope (shortened to RST).

Both of these missions are based within Goddard’s Building 11, one of those earmarked for update. Prior to the acceleration of the emptying of facilities under the “20 year plan”, those involved in both projects were assured their work would not be affected, and both would be allowed to continue within Building 11 through until July 2026. However, on November 3rd, both were informed they had just 4 business days to pack-up their work and move out of the building. This was followed by reports that contract movers arrived following the deadline and started to remove highly sensitive equipment from the RST laboratories without proper Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) oversight to ensure proper safety protocols were followed, potentially risking equipment to damage. Whilst these moves should not be taken as a sign either mission is at risk of cancellation, the lawmakers note in their letter to NASA’s OIG:

The rushed move introduced completely unnecessary cost, schedule and risk factors for Roman and Dragonfly that could have been avoided or mitigated if the agency had acted with due caution, care and patience … If this is how the agency handles one of its most high-profile flagship missions, how many other missions are in imminent danger of being irrevocably lost?

A further cause of concern is revelations that equipment including 3D printers, test instruments – even entire laboratories – with a value potentially reaching into the millions of dollars, has been labelled to be either given away or simply disposed of.

In requesting the NASA OIG – which is charged with oversight of NASA’s operations, specifically to prevent and detect crime, fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, as well to promote efficiency, effectiveness, and economy throughout the space agency – the letter requests that the OIG assesses cost impacts of the changes at Goddard, determine how the moves were funded and identify any negative effects on Roman, Dragonfly and other missions based within Goddard’s facilities.

Responding to Lofgren’s initial concerns and the letter to the OIG, Goddard Acting Director Cynthia Simmons and the associate administrator for NASA’s science mission directorate, Nicola Fox have stated what is happening at Goddard is “merely” an implementation of the 20-year plan (which was designed to be a phased approach to renovating / replacing  / closing many of the older facilities at the space centre over a 20-year period between 2017 and 2037), further claiming the current actions will reduce costs at Goddard by US $10 million per year and avoid US $64 million in deferred maintenance costs over the remaining years of the plan.

Rising operations and maintenance costs over a prolonged period have forced NASA to implement efforts to ensure the centre’s long-term viability through more efficiently utilizing available space and consolidating or reconstituting facilities. … All these efforts are in alignment with NASA Science Mission Directorate leadership and are designed to position Goddard for the future and protect ongoing missions, many of which are in pursuit of key decadal priorities and Congressional direction.

– Letter to Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren from Goddard Acting Director Cynthia Simmons and Nicola Fox, associate administrator for NASA’s science mission directorate

Whilst potentially accurate, the response from Simmons and Fox does not explain why the changes at Goddard are being carried out without the proper oversight from OSMA, and apparently without the proper transparency on the part of Goddard’s management or NASA Headquarters.

At the time of writing, George A Scott, NASA’s Acting Inspector General, has yet to respond to the lawmaker’s letter. Whilst OIGs frequently respond to Congressional requests for investigations by doing so, they are independent entities and so not actually obligated to do so. However, Scott is regarded as a capable and unbiased IG, having joined the office in June 2018 as NASA Deputy IG and following a 30 year career within the Government Accountability Office (GAO). He has previously been highly critical in how NASA manages itself and it funds, specifically with regards to contracts around major projects – such as the Space Launch System and its associated hardware – and in demanding better transparency by the space agency.