A daring rescue attempt in space is due to commence at 10:23 UTC on June 30th. It will cost NASA some US $30 million, but if successful it will be priceless.
The mission is to rescue the Swift Observatory, a three telescope observatory operating in low Earth orbit for primarily studying gamma ray bursts (GRBs). Smaller than the famous Hubble Space Telescope, Swift – and that’s a name, not an acronym – has been in operational since 2004. It’s a partnership programme between NASA Goddard, the UK and Italy, and was in part intended to take over the work of the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, which ceased operations in 2000, only with far greater sensitivity.
Originally intended to have a primary nominal mission of just 2 years, Swift has continued to operate almost flawlessly and its science mission has expanded so it ow functions as a general-purpose multi-wavelength observatory, particularly for the rapid follow-up and characterization of astrophysical transients of all types. It was given its name because of the speed with which it can move between targets of interest. Where Hubble can take up to 2 days to re-orient itself to observe different targets, Swift can do so in minutes, allowing it to carry out up to 70 individual observations a day.
This speed is important and the phenomena it is observing can be relative transient – particularly GRBs. What’s more it can re-orient itself complete autonomously; when its Burst Alert Telescope (BAT) picks up on a target, it can rapidly slew itself to observe the event without ground-based intervention. Afterwards, it will also automatically re-orient itself to resume whatever other observations it was carrying out beforehand.
Now officially called the Neil Gehrels Swift Observatory in honour of the mission’s first Principal investigator, who passed away in 2017, Swift has been in trouble over the course of the last 18 months as increased solar activity during the current Solar Maximum cycle has caused an expansion in Earth’s atmosphere (as commonly happens) which has exacerbated the observatory’s rate of orbital decay. If not corrected, Swift’s altitude will fall below 300 km, and shortly thereafter it will start to tumble and re-enter the atmosphere.
Given its science value and relative low cost (US $250 million), the decision was taken to try to boost Swift’s altitude using a custom-build satellite designed and built by Katalyst Space in just nine months. Called LINK, the relative small, solar-powered vehicle is due to be air launched aboard a Northrop Grumman Pegasus XL vehicle carried aloft by a modified Lockheed L-1011 aircraft called Stargazer.
Taking off from the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range located on Kwajalein Atoll in the South Pacific, Stargazer will carry the Pegasus XL to altitude before releasing it to allow its rocket motor to ignite and carry it to orbit were the nose-mounted payload can be deployed.
The plan calls for LINK to spend a number of weeks undergoing its own commissioning tests prior to it rendezvous with Swift and use three small robot arms to connect to the observatory and then use its ion thrusters to gently push Swift into a higher orbit – up to its original 600km orbit – before detaching to allow the observatory to continue operations for at least another five years.
If LINK is successful, it will be a remarkable success – and a major gain for Katalyst, which plans to start offering satellite reboosting services to customers and already has a contract with the United States Space Force. This involves the company’s larger Nexus vehicle, with the first flight due in 2027 with LINK being very much a proof of concept flight for Nexus.
NASA’s OIG Reveals Out-of-Control Nature of Artemis Expenditure
The US Space Launch System (SLS) rocket has frequently been criticised on the basis of its huge launch cost – around US $2.5 billion, which the US government’s own Office of Management Budget (OMB) indicated would likely rise to US $4 billion per launch. However, given it is the only vehicle currently able to launch America’s only deep space capable crew vehicle in the form of Orion, it is not easily replaced.
Hence why in February 2026, rather than cancelling SLS outright as some pundits had been demanding, NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman announced significant changes to the Artemis programme to return humans to the moon (see: Space Sunday: major Artemis updates and a rollback), which included cancelling just the Block 1B and Block 2 enhancements of SLS whilst extending the capabilities of the current Block 1 version to meet launch requirements until such time as alternative vehicle capable of launching Orion – most likely a modified version of the Vulcan-Centaur from United Launch Alliance – become available.
Now, a memo made public on June 24th, 2026, NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reveals just how badly costs were getting out of control for the SLS enhancements and part of Gateway Station.
Core to the Block 1B and Block 2 versions of SLS were the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) and the Universal Stage Adapter (USA). Ordered in 2017 from Boeing as a prime SLS contractor, EUS was supposed to be a more powerful upper stage for SLS Block 1B and Block 2, allowing SLS (together with more powerful versions of the vehicle’s solid rocket boosters (SRBs)) SLS to lift up to 130 tonnes to orbit and deliver up to 46 tonnes to lunar orbit.
Because Boeing stated EUS development could be folded-in to their current SLS workflow, the cost for its development was put at US $962 million with initial delivery to be in 2021. By 2026 and its cancellation, some US $2 billion had been spent on EUS, with a further US $1.7 billion likely required to get it to a position where the first units could be delivered to NASA – in 2028.
The USA contract was awarded to Dynetics Inc., in 2017. It called for the development of a conical unit massing some 2.7 tonnes designed to mate the Orion space vehicle to the EUS on Block 1B and Block 2 SLS vehicles, with Orion. At 10 metres in length, 8.5 metres across where it connected to the EUS and 5.4 metres across where it connected to the Orion, USA was to carry electrical and communication paths between the two and provide environmental control to payloads during ground operations and launch and ascent.
The original contract was put at US $131 million with initial delivery to be in 2022. By the end of February 2026 and USA’s cancellation, the cost had risen to US $497 million, with initial delivery pushed back to 2030.
Finally, for SLS at least, was the Mobile Launcher 2 (ML-2), a new version of the platforms and towers used to support SLS vehicles on their journey to the launch pad and then support them throughout launch operations. In particular, ML-2 was supposed to support Block1B and Block 2 SLS launches.
The contract went to Bechtel National, Inc., in 2019 at a cost of US $383 million and an expected delivery in 2023. By its cancellation in April 2026, the cost had risen to some US $1.6 billion with delivery pushed back to the end of 2026, earliest and it would then require some two years of validation and testing at a further cost of US $2 billion.
It addition to this, the memo highlights the Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO) module, indicating a reason why the planned lunar Gateway Station was cancelled beyond its sheer pointlessness.
HALO, as built by Thales Alenia Space in Europe (responsible for the International Space Station modules Harmony, Tranquillity and Columbus and the observation Cupola) under contract to Northrop Grumman, is essentially a modified version of the pressurised module used in Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus resupply vehicle, also manufactured by Thales. HALO was contracted at 1.3 billion, with that cost rising to US $1.9 billion by the time the basic module had been delivered to Northrop Grumman ready for completion, with OIG estimating this would further increase the overall cost by the time it was ready for delivery to NASA in 2031, several years late.
OIG highlighted that some of the rising costs could be laid at the feet of the contractors, with all three responsible for delays and failures, and Bechtel National being particularly highlighted for refusal to work with NASA in the planning for ML-2 construction and then ignoring NASA’s expertise in developing the original Mobile launchers. However, it also notes there have been many failures at NASA in properly managing and controlling projects and in putting contracts in place which failed to allow for full fiscal control.
Responding to the memo, Isaacman’s office indicated they were a core part of why the Artemis programme was redirected in February and also why the agency was undertaking a broader overhaul of its methods and processes related to costing and contractual management in order to reduce the risks of such major over-runs in future projects.
NASA Needs US $1 Billion in Launch Facilities Infrastructure Investment
Ahead of the OIG’s memo, the Inspector General published a report into the state of NASA’s launch infrastructure at both Kennedy Space Centre (KSC) and Wallops Island, Virginia, and the ability of both meeting the needs of Artemis and commercial launch operations. It does not make for happy reading, with KSC alone requiring around US $1 billion for essential support infrastructure updates.
In short, whilst several of the actual launch complexes at both receive lease payments from the companies using them – SpaceX, Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, United Launch Alliance, etc., – NASA is responsible for all of the underpinning infrastructure required to support such launch operations at both Wallops and KSC (with the responsibilities at the latter extending into the commercial launch facilities in the neighbouring Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS) in what is called the “common infrastructure agreement”).
This infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, the roadways linking various parts of the space centres; the critical electrical power grids serving all launches facilities; the neutral gas supply systems serving them; fuelling capabilities; communications and data capabilities; flight hardware transportation – even elements such as security support and occupational and environmental health services.
The problem here is that many of these physical infrastructure elements – the roads, electric and gas systems, etc., have not been updated in a long time – in KSC’s case, not since the centre was being built in the 1960s. The result is that many are now in danger of breakage or complete collapse.
The report highlights this with just a single example: the electrical supply feeder system at KSC’s Launch Complex 39. Laid in the 1960s, this runs from the C5 substation near the Vehicle Assembly Building along underground conduits to a switch station and from there to LC-39A and LC-39B. However:
- The loads placed on these cables are reaching the limits of their capability.
- The conduits through which they run are a decade beyond their lifespan and literally disintegrating.
- There is therefore a real risk of overload or short circuit which could completely remove electrical power from one or both launch pads, and there is no back-up.
- Further, the transformers at the C5 substation are at the end of their plan lifespan and are suffering degraded performance and severe corrosion.
Elsewhere, the infrastructure is simply being over-stretched and is in need of comprehensive surveys to assess their condition and ability to meet the continued growth in demand. This is a problem exacerbated by the rapid growth of launches in the last 5.5 years. The combined launch facilities at KSC and the neighbouring Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS) have, for example, seen their overall annual launch cadence increase by 352%.
This means that the volume of heavy refrigerated transporter carrying liquid propellants into the tank farm at KSC / CCSFS has risen from fewer than 2,000 annually in 2017 to over 8,700 in 2025 – on roads never designed to take such mass or see such volume of use.
Nor does it end there. The report indicates that with the state of the current support infrastructure at KSC / CCSFS, NASA will be over capacity in terms of the launches it can handle by 2029 unless serious work commences now – and will be unable to meet the demand for launches required to support Artemis (such as the high-cadence, 16 short-period launches required by SpaceX to send each of its HLS vehicle to the Moon (depending on how many of these are actually used)).
The irony here is that NASA did actually make an attempt to deal with the crisis well ahead of time: in 2016, it sought Congressional approval to implement the Infrastructure Investment Fund. This would have allowed the agency to accept contributions from non-federal sources for long-term, large-scale shared infrastructure projects. Congress refused, and continued to refuse each time NASA raised the idea in various forms through until 2022.
Whilst the situation is not exactly rosy at Wallops, the approach to leasing agreements and responsibilities for infrastructure maintenance are a little different, which has the potential to help alleviate some of the concerns – which is not to say action is not required. The report duly notes that Wallops has seen launch cadence increase from 3 to 17 a year in the past 5 years, and this will increase to 43 in the next couple of years, and so elements of infrastructure there do need improving.
The report outlines a step-by-step plan for addressing the most significant infrastructure issues NASA faces at both Wallops and KSC/CCSFS. It also notes that unless Congress significantly re-evaluate infrastructure funding for NASA, under the current annual funding levels for support infrastructure, it will take NASA 260 years to complete all the required updates and modernisation.
Inara Pey: Living in a Modemworld 