Space Sunday: of China’s goals and radiation belts

A artist’s impression of the first Chinese crewed mission to the surface of the Moon, taking some liberties with the appearance of the Lanyue lunar lander and the position of the Earth relative to the horizon. Credit: Getty Images

I’ve covered China’s space programme in some detail in these pages, not so much because I’m a fan of the Chinese government, but because – and US readers may not like it – China has proven it can put together a highly competent and integrated national space programme. One that is, and despite all of its magnificent achievements to date over the decades, is far more integrated in terms of projects and goals than the US national space programme, which has, where manned space exploration is concerned, largely plodded along somewhat aimlessly for some 40 years.

Obviously, a lot of this comes down to politics and governance. The US government is answerable to the people, and this includes NASA which is – completely and utterly wrongly – seen by many as a high-cost waste of taxpayer money. I say “wrongly” deliberately, as NASA’s budget accounts for just 0.35% of the US federal budget. Compare that to the 62% gobbled up annually by the Pentagon.

Of course, there are considerable differences in scale and need between the Pentagon and NASA, but considering all the latter does achieve annually in the fields of space science, astronomy, space exploration health and safety, avionics and aeronautics even without firmer integration of its major goals and ambitions, adds up to NASA doing a huge amount for very little in the overall scheme of things.

China’s government does not answer to its people, ergo, its spending is entirely at its own whim. This means China can be more indulgent in its spending around space goals (something also helped by the fact that a good portion of the Chinese space programme is linked to the People’s Liberation Army, which can swallow costs and overruns in what might otherwise be seen as civilian operations in the name of “national security”).

Even so, since the 1970s, China has sought to pace its activities in space in a manner that is both pragmatic and which has enabled them to build expertise in planetary science, rocketry, launch capabilities and to develop a coordinated approach to space exploration. The latter, as I recently covered in these pages, is particularly notable within China’s lunar ambitions, which have throughout seen both robot missions (their family of Chang’e landers, orbiters and rovers) and upcoming human missions tied together in one over-arching programme – the Chinese Lunar Exploration Programme, or CLEP. True, NASA did something similar with Project Apollo and is doing so again with Project Artemis, but the degree of shared goals and progression from robotic to human exploration is not on the same scale as China’s.

China’s Tiangong space station not only operates as a Earth-orbiting research station, it has a number of roles to play in China’s lunar ambitions. Credit: CMSA

The same is true when it comes to China’s Tiangong space station and CLEP. This operates both as an independent orbital research facility and as an Earth-bound extension to CLEP, providing an on-orbit medical research facility, a training environment to help lunar crews carry out tasks in microgravity as they might whilst going to or returning from the Moon, and providing the means to develop food cultivation methods which could be employed on the Moon to help supplement diets.

As a part of this work, 2026 will see the launch of Shenzhou 23 in April. The 17th Chinese crewed spaceflight and the 23rd for the Shenzhou programme overall, the mission carry three tiakonauts to Tiangong, as is usual for such missions. However, unlike all crewed missions to date, which have seen personnel spend no longer than 6 months on the station, Shenzhou 23 will see one of the crew (as yet unnamed) spend a full year in orbit.

Such long duration missions are the stuff of legend for NASA and Roscosmos, with astronauts and cosmonauts alike spending in excess of a year in space, largely for medical research purposes (such as studying the impact of microgravity on the human physiology) and kind-of tangentially focused on some ideas of human deep space missions, such as the now defunct near-Earth asteroid rendezvous mission or looking towards some far-off mission to Mars.

For China, the goals are both similar and more immediate: the Chinese want to know more about the physical and psychological impact of a long-duration stay in near zero gravity and how the more debilitating effects might be countered and they want to start gathering data on the effects of something like a voyage to Mars undertaken in microgravity – a human mission to Mars also being one of their stated medium-term goals once they have established a presence on the Moon.

Also coming up this year is the first – and uncrewed – orbital flight test of China’s Mengzhou multi-purpose crewed space vehicle. Set to initially operate alongside Shenzhou (itself a derivative of Russia’s Soyuz vehicle), Mengzhou is set to be – as I’ve also mentioned previously – an integrated and highly-capable vehicle, designed to both provide three crew (as standard, although it can carry up to 6 or 7) with access to Tiangong, and also in an extended operations mode providing 3-4 taikonauts with a ride to lunar orbit.

China’s workhorse Shenzhou (left), comprising a forward cargo module with integrated airlock, a central crew module capable of supporting up to three tiakonauts and large service module, is due to be joined by the more up-to-date Mengzhou vehicle, capable of carrying crews of up to 6 or 7 in the forward (top) capsule unit, which can also include cargo racks, and a service module for power and propulsion. Credit: various

No target date for this orbital flight test has yet been given, but all major milestones required for it to take place have been successfully cleared, and its dedicated launch vehicle, the Long March 10 (CZ-10) is also very close to being ready for an orbital launch attempt, having passed the majority of its development and testing milestones.

Nor does it end there in terms of ambitions and integration. Like NASA and Roscosmos, China is working to encourage international cooperation and participation in its space aspirations.  CLEP is set to evolve into the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) project which will see participation in China’s lunar project from Russia, South Africa, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Pakistan and Egypt, to name the headline nations.

Whilst not as all encompassing as the Artemis Accords (which involve 61 countries at the time of writing), ILRS nevertheless points to the fact that China is determined to be a major leader in space-based human activities. To this end, Shenzhou 24, scheduled for later in 2026, will see a Pakistani astronaut fly to Tiangong, and there are plans to fly astronauts from both Macau and Hong Kong to the station as well (although these are more from Chinese-managed Special Administrative Regions rather than representatives from genuine foreign nations).

China’s First lunar Mission May Target Rimae Bode

Whilst the Chinese Lunar Exploration Programme is, like Project Artemis, focused on the South Polar Region of the Moon for the establishment of a lunar research station, the first crewed lunar landing on the Moon by Chinese nationals will not be in that region; instead, it will likely be to the lunar nearside, not too far from the equator.

Currently, the possible prime candidate for China’s first crewed mission to the Moon is Rimae Bode  (crater Bode) located to the left of Mare Vaporum (seen towards the right of the image above), within semi-chaotic and volcanic terrain. Credit:  Selenochromatics

There are several good reasons for this. Most notably, such a location would enjoy direct line-of-sight communications with Earth throughout the majority of the mission. Secondly, it can be timed to take place under more favourable lighting conditions than might be the case with a mission to the South Polar Region. Thirdly, it doesn’t require a lot of complex orbital manoeuvring in order to get the lander into the desired obit, again simplifying the overall mission profile. There’s also the fact that China has never been to the Moon before with a human crew, thus a nearside mission with full communications, etc., allows mission managers to gain vital experience in managing such a mission without the complications a polar landing might bring.

The potential landing zone for this – as yet unnamed mission, which is targeting 2030 – is Rimae Bode. Located at the boundary between Mare Vaporum and the highlands on the central lunar nearside, the area has been selected as the likely landing site because of its scientific value. Diversely volcanic, the region provides easy access to assorted  lunar material and differing terrain types within a relatively small area – ancient lava flows, rilles (long, narrow, channel-like features formed by ancient lava flows) and local impact craters which have left subsurface materials exposed on the surface for easy collection and study.

The Rimae Bode region (Bode also being the name of a local crater) is rich in “young” impact craters which may reveal secrets as to the Moon’s interior. Credit: NASA

Rimae Bode is actually one of 106 potential landing candidates under consideration for the first Chinese crewed landing on the Moon, but it has grown in popularity with scientists and mission planners because of its sheer diversity and opportunities for exploration. further, it has long been considered a site worthy of human and / or robotic exploration and because it is relatively accessible.

Of particular interest to scientists is the potential for Rimae Bode to reveal insights into the Moon’s deep interior.

The most ground-breaking discovery from the Rimae Bode region would likely come from the dark mantle deposits, which consist of volcanic ash and glass beads that were violently erupted from the moon’s deep interior billions of years ago. These samples act as ‘messengers’ from the lunar mantle, offering a rare opportunity to directly analyse the chemical composition of the moon’s deep heart — information that is usually hidden beneath miles of crust.

– Professor Jun Huang, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan

Examining this material together with studying the region’s complex network of lava channels, could help in the reconstruction of the Moon’s early volcanic history, with samples perhaps indicating how the Moon cooled and what triggered its most massive eruptions. Studies of the region and its rocks and minerals might even inform scientists on how all rocky planets, including Earth, cooled and evolved after their birth.

The final decision on a landing zone for the first Chinese crewed mission to the Moon has yet to be made, so Rimae Bode may yet lose out. However, given the nature of the region, its location and the fact it has long been the focus of scientific curiosity possibly makes this unlikely.

Van Allen Probe Makes Belated Return to Earth

Wednesday, March 11th, 2026 saw the return to Earth of one of two probes launched in 2012 to increase our understanding of the Van Allen radiation belts around our planet.

Named for James Van Allen, who discovered them in 1958 using data gathered by America’s first successful satellite, Explorer 1, the Van Allen belts are missive, if invisible doughnut like structures surrounding Earth in two layers – the inner and outer radiation belts. Combined, they range in altitude from a few hundred kilometres to some 96,000 km, and comprise protons and electrons trapped within the Earth’s magnetic field.

A simplified cross-section of the Van Allen radiation belts. Credit: Booyabazooka

The Van Allen belts are what might be called frienemies of life. On the one side, they act as a shield, deflecting harmful cosmic radiation and the relentless stream of charged particles blasted out by the Sun, making our planet far more supportive of life than would otherwise be the case. On the other, they’d happily kill you if you loiter in them for too long. They are also a constant hazard to satellites orbiting through them, as they will also merrily fry unprotected electronics and, during periods of high solar activity, they “puff up” with even greater concentrations of radiation which can easily kill satellites completely and disrupt Earth-based communications, GPS systems, and so on.

Spaceflight and Moon landing deniers point to the Van Allen Belts as “proof” that all space missions are “fake” as “no-one can survive them” – although their reasoning is far more a demonstration of their inability to grasp concepts such as velocity together with an overly simplistic view of what the belts are and what is required form them to have a lasting impact. However, they are correct in their stance that loitering within the influence of the belts is definitely not a good idea.

The two Van Allen Belt probes double stacked in one half of the payload fairing of their Atlas V 401 launch vehicle, ahead of their 2012 launch. Credit: Kim Shiflett

The twin Van Allen Probes were specifically built and launched to increase our understanding of the Van Allen Belts in terms of their ability to severely harm the inner electronics and workings of satellites that have no other choice but to loiter within the radiation environment as they orbit the Earth. Armed with hyper-sensitive sensors and recorders, the two probes of an identical design were given an initial 2-year primary mission. However, both continued to operate through until 2019, when their stocks of manoeuvring propellants were exhausted, leaving them unable to main a proper communications / power generation orientation, and both were retired. In that time, the craft – called simply “Probe A” and “Probe B” gathered a huge amount of data concerning the belts and the dynamics at work within them; data which has both altered our understanding of the belts and which is still being researched and studied.

Given their extreme orbital regime (617 km to over 30,000 km), both Probe A and Probe B were expected to remain in orbit until the mid-2030s. However, such has been the level of solar activity from 2019 onwards (with Solar Maximum being reached in 2024), the upper reaches of our atmosphere have been greatly inflated as a result of solar radiation influx. This has increased drag on multiple satellites, including the 600 kg Van Allen probes, with Probe A in particular being impacted.

By 2025 it was clear that Probe A was coming down sooner rather than later, the atmospheric drag having significantly lowered its altitude overall, with its perigee in the low hundreds of kilometres. By early 2026, it became obvious the probe only had weeks or months at the most left before it reached interface with the denser atmosphere and started to break / burn up. This started on March 11th (UTC) as it entered the denser atmosphere over the Galapagos Islands. The majority of the probe was destroyed in the upper atmosphere as it passed over South America, although some debris is believed to have fallen into the Atlantic Ocean.

Whilst also affected by the Sun’s activity, Probe B currently remains in orbit, although it is expected to now re-enter the atmosphere in 2030, rather than the mid-2030s as originally anticipated.

Space Sunday: of Vera C. Rubin, pollution and a question of life

The Vera C. Rubin Observatory is a facility I’ve covered numerous times in Space Sunday as it has been constructed and outfitted. Perched atop Cerro Pachón in Chile, at an altitude of 2.67 kilometres, the Vera C. Rubin promises – with a caveat – to totally alter the way we see the cosmos around us.

This is because the telescope is to carry out a 10-year survey to probe the deepest reaches of our universe to reveal its secrets. Called the Legacy Survey of Space and Time, or LSST (“legacy” here referring to the fact that the observations and images the telescope makes will be of interstellar objects as they appeared hundreds of thousands through hundreds of millions of years ago), the survey will be the most comprehensive of its kind to date, and involve astronomers from around the world.

The secret weapon the observatory uses in this survey is the largest telescope-camera system ever built. The primary lens of this behemoth is 8 metres across, with the entire camera weighing some 3 tonnes. Its construction took a decade, after which it had to be carefully packaged and shipped to Chile and up to the observatory, where it was installed into the facility as the core part of the Simonyi Survey Telescope (named for the private donors who sponsored the telescope, Charles and Lisa Simonyi).

A rendering of Vera C. Rubin’s Simonyi Survey Telescope with the camera system and lenes at its centre. Credit: Rubin Observatory project office.

Overall, the telescope is a 6.5m class optical telescope, with a 3.2 gigapixel charge coupled device (CCD) for imaging. Over the course of the LSST, the observatory is expected to reveal and catalogue a wide range of objects, including some 5 million Sun-orbiting asteroids (including around 100,000 near-Earth asteroids at least 300 metres across, some of which might present the risk of colliding with our planet at some point in the future); imaging around 20 billion galaxies, 17 billion stars and up to 6 million planetary systems orbiting other stars.

In addition, it is hoped the observatory will be able to catalogue “primitive” objects in the Kuiper belt (i.e. those thought to have existed at the time of the birth of our Sun), observe thousands of novae and supernovae to help astronomers to further understand the nature of the galaxy

The telescope had is “first light” – the first practical use of a telescope after it has been constructed, calibrated and commissioned – took place in June 2025. These took the form of “teaser” images as to what the telescope would be capable of, featuring the  Trifid and Lagoon nebulae and extracts from a wide-field view of galaxies in the Virgo Cluster.

More recently, the images of the Virgo Cluster have been further cleaned-up and re-annotated, revealing the sheer power and depth of observations Vera C. Rubin can make. The image below covers a 3.5 degree diameter field-of view and reveals over 100 galaxies and numerous stars (particularly those within the constellation of Virgo) within our own galaxy, presenting a stunning insight into just how vast our universe is.

An annotated version of the Vrgo Cluster showing some of the 10 million galaxies captured in the observatory’s first light images. (Image credit: RubinObs/NOIRLab/SLAC/NSF/DOE/AURA) – click for full size & then zoom for detail

The telescope is designed to take multiple pictures during each observation period, the main camera taking a 30-decond exposure for each image, with an active optics system with wavefront sensors within the telescope keeping the mirrors precisely configured, aligned and focus for the clearest possible images.

However, whilst images from the telescope are stunning an informative, they also come with a problem, albeit not one of the observatory’s own making. That problem is satellite pollution. In short, megaconstellations like SpaceX Starlink and China’s Guowang are lobbing thousands of low-Earth orbiting satellites into the space around us. These satellites inevitably reflect the Sun’s light as they travel across the sky, and in time-lapse images, this reflected light appears as narrow streaks across an image – and not just one or two, but potentially dozens at a time. All of which has to be painstakingly cleaned-up in order for the full value of images to be obtained.

The issue here is that removing satellite steaks is not just a case of pulling up Photoshop and then editing – the very act of trying to clean up images to remove the streaks can introduce its own errors which might prove impossible to account for and which risk misinterpretations of what is being seen being made.

A time-lapse image of Comet C/2023 A3 (Tsuchinshan–ATLAS) taken from Italy on August 1st, 2024, demonstrating the issue of satellite pollution – the lines crossing the image are caused by the passage of satellites (predominantly Starlink) Credit: Rolando Ligustri)

Nor do the problems end there. A relatively new company, Reflect Orbital has grand designs of orbiting a 50,000-strong megaconstellation of satellites which can deploy large Sun-reflecting mirrors. The aim? To provide “responsive lighting after dark and to increase the effective hours of solar energy production”.

Currently, the company plans to launch a proof-of concept satellite called Eärendil-1 (which likely has Tolkien spinning in his grave) capable of deploying and 18m by 18m Mylar mirror utilising the same material as used to reflect sunlight off of space vehicles, sometime in 2026. This project has drawn such condemnation from astronomers and others (additional concerns about directing sunlight onto specific parts of the Earth and turning “night into day” are that it could have a serious negative impact on the circadian cycles of animals and humans), that Reflect Orbital has promised to work to minimise the broader impact of their idea. Time will tell on whether this offer is genuine or not.

Both the International Astronautical Union (IAU) and the US National Science Foundation have called on companies launching satellite constellations to be more aware of their negative impact and to reduce the reflectivity of their satellites – the IAU recommending that all satellites should appear no brighter than magnitude 7 objects.

Multiple companies have agrees to try to reach this goal, but thus far few have shown any real movements towards it. SpaceX, for example, gave assurances that it would work to reduce the reflectivity of its version 2 Starlink satellites compared to its version 1.x units. However, whilst effects were made, they fell far short of the level requested by the IAU, and efforts to further reduce reflectivity appear to have ceased. Others, such as  Texas-based AST SpaceMobile raised a middle finger to the IAU’s recommendation by launching its Bluewalker 3 satellite with a reflectivity some 400 times greater than magnitude 7. Currently, that company plans to launch some 60 even larger and more reflective Bluebird Block 2 satellites into LEO during 2026/27.

The Vera C. Rubin Observatory imaged in 2022 during the final construction phase, seen against the backdrop of the Milky Way galaxy. time-lapse views of the night sky like this – and those captured by observatories like the Vera C. Rubin, are under increasing threat from low earth orbiting satellite clusters like Starlink and  Guowang. Credit: Rubin Observatory/NSF/AURA/B. Quint

What is evident from this is that formalised regulation is required to try to minimise the impact the over-use of the low-to-medium Earth orbit regime, lest our ability to learn about our planet, solar system and the cosmos around us be otherwise degraded to an unconscionable level.

“Life Here Began Out There”

Battlestar Galactica fans will likely recognised this quote, being some of the opening words of the original series (as spoken by Patrick “John Steed” Macnee!), and a refrain which popped up in Ronald D. Moore’s largely excellent reimagining of the Galactica tale. It’s also a phrase which has taken on a certain nuance in recent times.

ALH84001 on display at the Smithsonian Museum of Natural History, Washington DC

It has long been known that – particularly in the very early history of the solar system – asteroid and other impacts on Mars could carry enough force to send chunks of Martian rock clean off the planet and into space, with some of them eventually coming under the influence of Earth’s gravity and falling down on our planet. One of the most famous pieces of evidence for this is the notorious Allen Hills fragment ALH84001. This was a fragment of rock shown to be consistent with the rocks of Mars discovered in the Allen Hills region of Antarctica in 1984,and which went on to cause a stir when it was announced the rock apparently contained evidence of fossilised Martian life (spoiler alert: it likely didn’t).

ALH84001 is not the sole example – Antarctica is actually a popular (but not the singular) place for asteroid fragment hunting, as the charred and discoloured can often be found close to the surface of the ice and snow fields, where they send out starkly to the human eye. Multiple expeditions have found lumps of asteroid and rocks which have later proven to have arrived here from the Moon or Mars.

Whilst the investigations around ALH84001 may have been flawed, they did help kick-start a debate as to whether life here on Earth might have originated elsewhere – such as on Mars – or might have been kick-started not by Earthly processes alone, but with the assistance of organics-bearing asteroid fragments plummeting through our atmosphere to arrive here.  The idea even as a name: lithopanspermia.

Now, a new study suggests that, if not the actual case, either scenario is actually possible. Published in the journal PNAS Nexus, the study demonstrates how bacterium can survive the massive forces of an asteroid impact blasting the rock containing them into space, the extremes of interplanetary space and their fiery arrival on another world possibly altered, but otherwise largely unharmed.

In particular, the study shows that Deinococcus radiodurans, a particularly hardy bacterium known for its thick outer shell and an ability to repair its own DNA, as well as being tolerance of the kinds of radiation it might be exposed to in interplanetary space, could indeed survive all the trials and tribulations of being blown off of somewhere like Mars and landing here on Earth. In fact, so hardy is D. radiodurans that it has for some time had the nickname, “Conan the Bacterium”.

Most intriguingly, the bacterium has been found within rocks in the highlands of Chile and other regions were asteroid fragment hunting is popular.

To simulate the forces involved in an asteroid impact, the researchers sandwiched samples of D. radiodurans between two steel plates. Using a gas-powered gun, they fired a projectile at roughly480 km/h), subjecting the microbes to pressures between 1 and 3 gigapascals. That’s around 10 times greater than the maximum pressure which can be experienced here on Earth (and at the bottom of the Mariana Trench): 0.1 gigapascals.

At the low-to-mid-ranges of impact (1 to 2.4 gigapascals), D. radiodurans showed either no sign of damage or varying degrees of cell rupturing. At the higher pressure, damage was more extensive, but in both the mid-to-high level ranges, the team behind the study witnessed the bacterium’s self-repair mechanisms go into action, repairing damaged DNA and renewing damaged cell membranes.

Researchers exposed the bacterium Deinococcus radiodurans to the pressures experienced during an asteroid strike. The microbe survived, suggesting that impacts could spread life from planet to planet. Credit: Lisa Orye/Johns Hopkins University
We expected it to be dead at that first pressure. We started shooting it faster and faster. We kept trying to kill it, but it was really hard to kill.

– Lily Zhao, study lead, John Hopkins University

In fact, so hardy did the bacterium prove, the experiment was halted not because the team eventually killed it – but because the steel plates sandwiching the samples started giving out under the pressure of the gas gun impacts!

Of course, this doesn’t prove that life – or the ingredients of life – came to Earth from Mars or from asteroids. For one thing, we have yet to discover any solid evidence for Mars having once harboured basic life-forms, despite all the evidence it once have the conditions to do so, and they this formed in advance of Earth. There’s also currently no evidence for organics on asteroid having been able to form more complex structures.

However, and on a broad level, it does demonstrate that basic life forms such as bacteria are certainly hardly enough to travel from one place to another – and that if the conditions are just right in the place where they arrive, they might it turn go on to help kick-start more complex life there (assuming the place they arrive doesn’t already harbour some form of basic life which regards them as an invader to be wiped out).

Rockets and Satellites: Proof of Pollution

I’ve written about the growing problem of upper atmosphere pollution resulting from the increasing number of commercial launches around the world, and the potential impact it might be having or come to have on the stratosphere’s weather systems and in damaging things like the ozone layer (in particular, see: Space Sunday: space debris and atmospheric damage + some updates).

Now a team of researchers at the Leibniz Institute for Atmospheric Physics have published the first direct correlation between space vehicle debris re-entering the atmosphere and an increase in atmospheric pollutants – namely lithium.

In February 2025, Spaces launched a Falcon 9 to deliver 22 Starlink satellites to low Earth orbit (LEO). Whilst the upper stage of the rocket successfully delivered its payload to orbit, it suffered a malfunction during a planned de-orbit engine burn which should have lead to its controlled entry into the atmosphere and eventually destruction as it burned-up. As a result, the stage remained orbiting the Earth for 18 day before starting an uncontrolled re-entry some 100 km west of Ireland and proceeding over populated Europe to the point of kindly dropping debris on Poland.

During the event, atmospheric researchers at the Leibniz Institute, Germany, were surveying the upper atmosphere composition using a highly sensitive resonance fluorescence Lidar system when the noticed a sudden and rising spike in upper atmosphere lithium. Normally, lithium exists within the atmosphere to the tune of around 3 atoms per cubic centimetre, but the researchers at Leibniz saw levels climb to some 31 atoms per cubic centimetre at altitudes between 96.8 km and 94.5 km – the range in which Falcon 9 upper stages start to break-up and the risk of pollutant spillage is greatest.

The spike in upper atmosphere lithium (in red) as seen by the researchers at Leibniz Institute, showing its intensity and altitude – the latter of which matches the break-up of a Falcon 9 upper stage. Credit: Robin Wing et al

Intrigued, the atmospheric researchers continued to monitor the rising levels of lithium whilst also running some 8,000 simulations of backward wind paths from the Lidar station to the skies over Ireland. What they found, after eliminating any other potential causes for the spike they could think of, was that it commenced almost exactly at the time the Falcon 9 upper stage entered the Earth’s atmosphere west of Ireland and almost exactly tracked the stage’s passage over Ireland and the UK as it reached its point of initial break-up and fell through to around 94 km altitude, very much tying the plume to the stage’s demise – the upper stage of Falcon 9 rockets using lithium extensively in their components.

Whilst this is the first definitive time a significant increase in atmospheric pollutants has been directly tied to a re-entry event, but doesn’t supply all of the answers. For example, no-one actually knows how such concentrated dumps of lithium – which occur following every Falcon 9 launch and every re-entry of a Starlink satellite (which SpaceX have been disposing an accelerated rate in order to “get rid” of their version 1.x satellites in favour of the v2 unit) – will have on high-altitude weather systems or on other aspects of the atmosphere as they disperse and descend.

An images showing a backtracking of wind paths over Europe at the time of the Falcon 9 upper stage re-entry. Not how the initial track closely follows the track of the upper stage, including the period of maximal lithium dispersion as the vehicle breaks-up between 97 and 94 km altitude. Credit: Robin Wing et al   

However, it is indicative that the commercial launch sector as a whole has a major question to answer in terms of what they should be doing to minimise the potential for damage to our atmosphere they are creating

Space Sunday: major Artemis updates and a rollback

Credit: NASA

Yes, there’s been a lot in this column about Project Artemis and the US-led programme to return humans to the Moon, and while it might make Space Sunday sound a bit like a scratched record (Artemis..,Artemis…Artemis…), there is good reason for this: there’s a lot of news about the entire programme, from the anticipated launch of Artemis 2 and its crew on a trip around the Moon and back, to the focus of the main part of this article: major changes to the Artemis programme as a whole; so bear with me!

NASA’s current Administrator, Jared Isaacman, continues to surprise and impress despite concerns over his non-NASA activities and involvement with favoured space contractors. In my previous Space Sunday article, I covered Isaacman’s direct and open approach to the problems endemic to the Boeing CST-100 Starliner programme, and to the core of NASA’s management responsible for managing it (with two of the most senior resigning in the aftermath).

Following the press conference on that matter – which included the reading out of a letter to all NASA staff-  Isaacman was present at a February 27th, 2026 Project Artemis update which carried its own surprises whilst signalling a change in direction for the programme – potentially putting it on a far better footing that had previously been the case.

The update saw a number of significant announcements:

  • The much-criticised Space Launch System (SLS) is not to be cancelled as yet – something many outside NASA have called for, despite there being no currently-available launch vehicle that can match its capabilities (see: Space Sunday: of Artemis and Administrators).
  • However, SLS will be changing, with one significant element – the Exploration Upper Stage – now cancelled.
  • As a result of the Exploration Upper Stage cancellation, the Block 1B variant of SLS will no longer be part of the SLS enhancement programme, nor, potentially, will be the even more powerful Block 2 version.
  • NASA will attempt to raise the launch cadence for SLS from approximately once every 3 years to once every 10 months.
  • Artemis 3 is no longer a lunar landing mission, but will be an Earth-orbiting test flight involving at least Human Landing System vehicle.
  • The original Artemis 3 lunar landing mission is therefore redesignated Artemis 4, but the time frame remains a (optimistic) 2028.

SLS Changes

Much of the critique surrounding SLS has been on the matter of launch cost, which stands at some US $2.5 billion per vehicle. However, these costs are based on the overall development of SLS and Orion, and are not simply the physical cost of get a specific launch stack off the pad. This is something many of the louder voices raised against SLS – notably those from the SpaceX corner – tend to ignore when pointing to the “lower” cost of something like Starship, which is put at around US $100 million per launch. In this, it needs to be pointed out that this has yet to be proven, as Starship has yet to actually achieve orbit, and even then, launch costs for NASA could be as much as US 1.3 billion, when all of the required tanker launches and the launch of the (also unproven) orbital propellant station the Starship HLS will require just to get itself to the Moon.

That said, SLS is a costly launch mechanism; in 2023, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report stating SLS was “unsustainable” at current spending levels, and suggested that launch costs could increase over time to as much as US $4 billion as a result of the technical complexity of the system, plans to try to extend its capabilities and its low launch cadence.

Exploration Upper Stage and “Near Block 1” SLS Development

Dropping the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) from the SLS development curve should address some of these concerns over rising costs.

EUS was due to debut with the Block 1B development of SLS, providing it with a more powerful and capable upper stage than the current Interim Cryogenic Propulsion (ICPS) upper stage. As it is now cancelled, NASA is pivoting away from the Block 1B version of SLS in order to develop a “near Block 1” upgrade, which will use a new upper stage in place of both ICPS and EUS.

The original planned evolution of SLS, from the current Block 1 version for crewed launches through a cargo variant of the same vehicle to the Block 1B version utilising the EUS in both crewed and cargo versions, through the evolved Block 3 design with more powerful solid rocket boosters. Under the new plan, NASA will replace the Block 1B version with a “near Block 1” enhanced variant. Credit: NASA

Just how much this will save is open to debate: some US $3 billion has already be spent in developing EUS, and there will obviously be costs involved in developing a commercially-based replacement for it and ICPS. But there are other another compelling reasons for replacing EUS with a unit more in line (if more powerful) than the ICPS: simplicity of overall design and design and continuity of experience.

The Block 1 SLS is now a known creature, foibles and issues all taken as read. It’s a vehicle NASA is continually gaining knowledge and understanding in operating. Block 1B, with the EUS, it’s extended core stage elements (extended interstage and the enlarged universal stage adaptor) is a different beats, liable to demonstrate different flight characteristics and dynamics as well as introducing new elements which could have their own teething problems. Sticking with an only slightly modified vehicle to supersede the current Block 1 vehicle, reduces many of these factors, allowing NASA to “standardise” the SLS design and continue to gain data, knowledge and understanding on  / of its characteristics incrementally. This was pretty much how things were handled back in the Apollo era, and the approach has a lot going for it, a point acknowledged during the briefing.

After successful completion of the Artemis I flight test, the upcoming Artemis II flight test, and the new, more robust test approach to Artemis III, it is needlessly complicated to alter the configuration of the SLS and Orion stack to undertake subsequent Artemis missions. There is too much learning left on the table and too much development and production risk in front of us. Instead, we want to keep testing like we fly and have flown. We are looking back to the wisdom of the folks that designed Apollo. The entire sequence of Artemis flights needs to represent a step-by-step build-up of capability,

– NASA Associate Administrator Amit Kshatriya

Exactly who will provide the replacement for ICPS / EUS and what form it will take was now discussed at the briefing. However, it was made clear that all of NASA’s contractors and partners in Artemis were consulted through the driver to redirect the programme, and all have been supportive of the moves – even Boeing, who stand to lose the most with the EUS cancellation, whilst SpaceX and Blue Moon have both opted to “accelerate” the development of their HLS systems.

Perhaps two of the strongest potential contenders for producing a new upper stage for SLS are United Launch Alliance (ULA) and Blue Origin.

ULA already has the powerful cryogenic Centaur V upper stage. Centaur is a venerable launch vehicle stage with a lot of expertise behind it, with the Centaur 5 already forming the upper stage of ULA’s Vulcan-Centaur rocket. Blue Origin, meanwhile, has the upper stage of their New Glenn booster. Whilst a “new kid on the block”, the stage has already proven itself reliable on two high-profile flights for New Glenn, and will shortly be back in action for a third flight, thus experience is quickly being gained in its operation. Further, blue Origin are already looking to develop an enhanced version of the stage in line with their plans for an even more powerful variant of their New Glenn vehicle, thus there is potential here as well.

Neither Centaur V nor the New Glenn upper stage would be suitable for SLS straight off the shelf, but using them as either a basis for a new stage design or developing a variant off of an existing design (Blue Origin) could significantly reduce the costs and time involved in developing and testing a new SLS stage.

Launch Cadence

Another mitigating factor when it comes to reducing overall costs is the decision to try to launch SLS on a greater cadence than has thus far been seen. Isaacman would specifically like to see an SLS / Artemis launch once every 10 months, putting Artemis almost on a similar launch cadence as Apollo. Doing so will likely increase Artemis costs, but it also brings some very clear benefits:

  • Personnel expertise. Gaps measured in years between launches can result in personnel expertise loss as people become tired of waiting for the next launch and seek a career move elsewhere, taking their expertise with them. A faster launch cadence with clear mission objectives is more likely to keep more of that expertise in-house at NASA for longer.
  • It makes Artemis potentially more robust, presenting NASA with a chance to present a clear roadmap for achieving the goals of establishing a lunar base and maintaining a human presence there. Clear time frames and mission objectives also help Congress in allowing the money to flow into NASA to support the programme.

Of course, achieving such a cadence is no easy task; thus far, Artemis 1 and Artemis 2 (of which more below) have demonstrated that, like it or not, SLS and its ground support systems are extremely complex and subject to technical issues which can so easily upset launches.

Artemis 3 – No Longer Aiming for the Moon

The decision to “divert” Artemis 3 to an Earth orbital mission was perhaps the biggest surprise in the update – although “divert” is not entirely correct.

What is proposed is the insertion of an additional Artemis / SLS launch between what is currently Artemis 2 and what would have been Artemis 3, the first crewed lunar landing in the programme. That mission – presumably utilising the same crew – will now effectively become Artemis 4, with the new Earth-orbital mission taking the name Artemis 3.

An infographic outlining the revised Artemis missions (2 through 6), with the Artemis 2 crewed mission around the Moon and back (2026) at the top; the new Artemis 3 mission (2027) centre and the first three crewed lunar landing missions (Artemis 4 through 6). Credit NASA
The aims of the revised Artemis 3 mission – scheduled for a 2027 launch – so far comprise (additional mission goals may be added as the mission requirements are further assessed):

  • On-orbit rendezvous and docking with one or other (or possibly both) of the current Human Landing System vehicles in development: Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2, and the nascent SpaceX  Starship-derived HLS.
  • Perform integrated checkout of life support, communications, and propulsion systems on both HLS vehicles and assess their suitability / practically for zero gravity operations.
  • Carry out comprehensive tests of the new extended extravehicular activity (xEVA) suits to be used both with Artemis as as a replacement for the current generation of US EVA suits on the International Space Station.

This is actually a smart step on NASA’s part, and harkens back to the Apollo era and specifically, the Apollo 9 mission.

Artemis 3 will focus on earth-orbit rendezvous with either Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2 HLS or the SpaceX Starship HLS (depending on which is available at the time) or both (if both prove to be ready for testing – which right now looks unlikely in the case of the SpaceX HLS). Credit: NASA

Under the original Artemis plan, no provision was made for any on-orbit human testing of the SpaceX HLS vehicle ahead of Artemis 3. Instead, SpaceX were obliged to send and uncrewed HLS lander to the Moon and conducted an automated landing (or possibly 2) – but there were no provisions for any crewed testing of the vehicle prior to Artemis 3.

Conversely, Blue Moon Mark 2, with its longer lead time (not being required – in theory – until Artemis 5 under the previous plans, and now Artemis 6 under the revised approach) would have undergone Earth orbit crewed testing prior to being used for lunar operations.

As such, this new step offers a means by which both vehicles (assuming both are ready for a 2027 launch) can be properly tested in Earth orbit, where the risks to the crew are potentially reduced, simply because they can use Orion to make a fast return to Earth. Thus, both can be properly assessed, including any shortfalls they might exhibit in advance of any attempt at a lunar landing. This is something that is clearly much better for all concerned than otherwise sitting and crossing fingers, as would have been the case with the original Artemis 3 mission.

Other Changes

Additionally, the Artemis Update indicates further changes within NASA’s operating structure as a whole with a drive to rebuild core competences and to better oversee commercial contracts and be more hand-on with commercial partners (as indicated in the Starliner press briefing). Key to this will be the implementation of standard processes right  across the space agency, not just covering Artemis, but all commercial partnership and space projects.

Further, the space agency will embark on a process of new and more extensive involvement with Congress to keep them appraised of progress with SLS and Artemis, and has already embarked on a restructured process of negotiating with commercial partners and engaging them in NASA’s decision-making processes.

Whilst nothing should be definitively drawn from it, it is somewhat interesting that the new SLS upper stage designed to replace both ICPS and EUS (seen in the centre, above, with Orion attached) has a marked similarity to the New Glenn upper stage, seen to the right Orion and powering the Blue Moon Lander Mark 2 to orbit.

In the meantime, the NASA announcement has received a largely positive reaction from observers and stakeholders, and the approach it advocates potentially helps put Project Artemis on a much more realistic footing to achieve its goals.

Artemis 2 SLS Rolled Back to the VAB

As I reported in my previous Space Sunday update, Artemis 2 suffered another setback in plans to get a crewed Orion space vehicle on a 10-11 day free return flight to the Moon (with a day spent in a high Earth orbit beforehand) off the ground in March.

The Crawler-Transporter edges the Artemis 2 SLS stack and mobile launch platform into one of the two massive high bays of the VAB at Kennedy Space Centre near the end of an 11+ hour journey back from the launch pad. Credit: NASA livestream

The issue this time resides within the helium pressurisation system within the rocket’s Interim cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), which is required to get Orion to orbit and plays a role in meeting all of the mission’s planned goals. As I noted at the time of writing that update, NASA felt there were two potential routs to resolving the issue: by leaving SLS on the pad at Kennedy Space Centre’s Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B). Or rolling the entire stack back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), where a more comprehensive examination of the issue could be performed.

It was decided the latter was the better choice of action, and so on February 25th, 2026, the Artemis 2 launch vehicle and its Mobile Launch Platform were slowly and gently rolled back to the VAB atop one of the famous Crawler-Transporters.

A view from inside the VAB as Artemis 2 arrives. Note the curved gantries either side of the  upper parts of SLS. These can be extended outwards (as can other levels within the high bay) to encapsulate the rocket and provide ease of access to its vitals for engineers. Credit: Cameron (@nyoomtm)

The physical move of the rocket and its launch tower structure commenced at 14:38 UTC, and took over 11 hours to complete, the Crawler-Transporter inches the entire structure into one of the VAB’s massive high bays inch by inch with incredible precision given the overall size of the Crawler-Transporter and its payload. The night-time arrival also afforded some unique views of the entire stack edging up to and then entering the VAB.

Currently, the hope is to correct the helium pressure issue in time to get the rocket back to the pad so it can meet an April 1st through 6th (inclusive) launch window. However, more extensive rectifications to the helium system, if required, will be left for the next SLS vehicle which will carry the crew selected for the new Artemis 3 mission to orbit.

Space Sunday: Starliner and Artemis woes

An uncrewed CST-100 Starliner vehicle approaching the International Space Station during the vehicle’s Orbital Flight Test 2 mission, May 2022. Credit: NASA

Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner programme, designed to offer both NASA and commercial space companies with the means of delivering astronauts to low-Earth orbit space stations such as the International Space Station (ISS) and the Blue Origin / Sierra Space led consortium’s Orbital Reef station, has had a very chequered history with the number of issues far outweighing the number of successes.

On all three occasions the CST-100, comprising a capsule with a capacity for up to seven crew – although 4 plus a measure of cargo is liable to be the usual complement, together with a service module – has reached orbit, it has done so while encountering a series of issues / failures.  Indeed, such is the nature of some of the problems, they actually led to delays in getting the second flight test off the ground. More significantly, some of the issues were potentially known about as far back as June 2018. It was then, during a hot fire test of one of the vehicle’s RS-88 launch abort motors, when four of eight values on the vehicle’s propellant flow system failed, releasing 1.8 tonnes of highly toxic  monomethylhydrazine propellant and causing a fireball that engulfed the test rig.

The July 2018 hot fire test of an RS-88 launch escape motor used on Boeing’s Starliner. During the test 4 of eight valves failed, resulting in the dumping 1.8 tonnes of highly toxic propellants which in turn caused a fire which engulfed the engine and test stand. Credit: Boeing / Aerojet.

Whilst blaming engine supplier Aerojet Rocketdyne for the hot fire test incident, Boeing simultaneously sought to keep the news of the incident quiet, and limited the circulation of information relating to it to a few senor programme managers at NASA, who agreed to also keep the incident out of the public eye as much as possible so as not to further delay the programme, which was already behind schedule.

Although it is near impossible to state with certainty that this event market the start of successive failures of management both within Boeing and NASA as to how Starliner and its various issues and problems were both handled and communicated between the two parties, it fits with a pattern seen throughout the last several years of Starliner’s troubles.

All of this has now been made clear in a comprehensive report released by the new NASA Administrator, Jared Issacman, in the wake of an in-depth investigation covering several months into the Starliner project. Released during a public press briefing, the 311-page report (partially redacted) goes into extensive depth relating to the three Starliner flights to orbit to date: the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test 1 (OFT 1, 2019) and its follow-up Orbital Flight Test 2 (OFT 2, 2022), and the first Crew Flight Test (CFT 1, 2024) which famously resulted in heady reports of the mission crew – Sunita Williams and Barry Wilmore being “stranded” in space as if they were utterly helpless when in fact they are working aboard the ISS.

The report goes to great length to outline the core technical issues with Starliner relating to the four “doghouse” thruster packs mounted equidistantly around the circumference of Starliner’s service module and containing multiple large and small thrusters designed to provide the vehicle with flight motion and manoeuvring capabilities, together with the software issues which proved to be the undoing of the original OFT 1 mission which ultimately left the vehicle unable to rendezvous with the ISS and attempt an automated docking.

The Boeing CST-100 Starliner – A = crew capsule with major additional elements (1-9) comprising in order: the nosecone; parachute system cover; side hatch for ground-based access / egress; capsule RCS unit (x25 in total); landing airbags; heat shield; forward docking system port; 3x main parachutes; 3x windows. B = Service module with major additional elements (10 through 16) comprising in order: power and water, etc., umbilical connector to capsule; thermal control radiators for removing excess heat; “Doghouse” unit (x4), containing multiple RCS and OMAC thrusters each; monomethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide propellant tanks; roll control RCS thruster (part of the Doghouse units); RS-88 launch escape engines; solar panels for electrical power. Credit: Boeing

But most startlingly, the report reclassifies the Crew Flight Test 1 as a Type A mishap. This is NASA’s most extreme rating for malfunctions aboard crew carrying vehicles; for example, both the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle losses were classified as Type A mishaps on account of the loss of all board both vehicles. Type A mishaps have several main criteria: Injuring or fatalities during flight; loss of a vehicle or its control; damage exceeding US $2 million.

At first glance, and given that a) Williams and Wilmore did manage to maintain control over their vehicle and make a successful docking with, and transfer to, the ISS; b) there were no injuries or fatalities; and c) US $2 million in damages is an exceedingly small amount in the scheme of things, reclassifying CFT 1 a Type A mishap might appear to be more a knee-jerk reaction than might be warranted. However, the events experienced during CFT 1 make it abundantly clear that designating it a Type A mishap should have occurred at the time  of the flight – or at least immediately afterwards as the situation was fully understood.

The key point here is the second criteria for specifying a Type A mishap: the loss of the vehicle or its control. During CFT 1’s approach to the ISS for rendezvous and docking, the vehicle suffered a critical failure of five thruster sets required for manoeuvring control ( in NASA parlance, the vehicle lost its required 6 degrees of freedom manoeuvring). Regardless of the fact that the crew regained the use of four of the thrusters units in short order and went on to complete a successful docking at the ISS, at the time the failure occurred, Starliner was effectively adrift, unable to correct its orientation or motion – or even safely back away from the ISS to avoid the risk of collision. In other words, loss of the vehicle’s control had occurred.

Nor, as it turns out, was this the only issue. During its re-entry and descent through the atmosphere, the Starliner capsule Calypso suffered a failure with one of its RCS thruster systems, resulting in a “zero fault tolerance” situation – meaning there was no back-up for the failed unit during what was a critical phase of the vehicle’s flight.

Boeing Starliner capsule Calypso sitting on its airbags at the at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, following its successful return to Earth at the end of the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test 1 in December 2019. Calypso was also the capsule used for the Crew Flight Test in 2024. Credit: Bill Ingalis

So why wasn’t CFT 1 designated a Type A mishap immediately after the fact? Here the report is uncompromising in its assessment: NASA managers overseeing the Starliner contract were more concerned with getting the vehicle certified for routine crew operations than with admitting it still has major flight qualification issues which should disbar it from routine use to launch crews. It is in this approach of directly pointing the finger and throwing back the covers on how NASA and its contract have been functioning within the Starliner contract that the report – despite the redactions within it – is uncompromisingly clear in apportioning blame.

In particular, the report highlights numerous issues with the way the contract – and by extension – all commercial partnership contracts are handled by NASA. Chief among these is that, whilst charged with overall oversight responsibilities for such programmes, NASA took an almost completely hands-off approach to Starliner, bowing to Boeing when it came to most critical decision making on the overall fitness  for purpose of the system. Challenges to internal decision making at Boeing were muted or non-existent, and when it was felt Boeing were obfuscating or failing to be properly transparent, NASA tended not to challenge, but simply started mistrusting their contractor, allowing further breakdowns in communications to occur.

For its part, Boeing felt it could compartmentalise issues into individual fault chains and fixes, rather than seeing and reporting them as they were, a series of interconnected chains of design issues, faults and upsets. As a result, issues were dealt with on a kind of patch-and-fix approach, rather than a systematic examination of chains of events and proper root cause analysis. In this, the report particularly highlights the fact that whilst Boeing has a robust Root Cause / Corrective Action (RCCA) process, all too often it was never fully deployed in dealing with issues, the priority being to find a fix for each issue in turn and move on in the belief things would be rectified once all the fixes had been identified and implemented.

A time lapse photograph of the Boeing CST-100 Starliner featuring the capsule Calypso, docked at the ISS in June 2024 during Crew Flight Test 1, which saw a further series of thruster issues for the vehicle, ultimately leading it to make an uncrewed return to Earth. Credit: NASA

The report goes into a number of recommendations as to how NASA must handle future commercial partnerships such as the Commercial Crew Programme (CCP) of which SpaceX and Boeing are both a part, and how it should exercise full and proper oversight and lose its hands-off attitude. Time will tell in how these changes will affect such contracts – not just with Boeing and CST-100, but also with the likes of SpaceX and the development of their lunar lander, a project where NASA has again been decidedly hands-off in it approach to the work, allowing SpaceX to continually miss deadlines, fail to produce vehicle elements in time for testing, and to seemingly pushed vehicle development to one side in favour of pursuing its own goals whilst still taking NASA financing to the tune of US $4.9 billion.

In respect of Starline itself, the root cause(s) of the thruster issues on the vehicle still has/have yet to be fully determined. However, Issacman has made it clear NASA will not be withdrawing from the contract with Boeing; instead he has committed NASA to refusing to flying any crew aboard Starliner until such time as Boeing can – with NASA’s assistance – demonstrate that the issues plaguing the vehicle have been fully understood and dealt with properly and fully.

Whether that can be done within the next 5 years of ISS operational life remains to be seen.

Artemis 2: WDR Success; Launch Again Delayed

The Artemis 2 Space Launch System (SLS) rocket successfully completed its pre-flight wet dress rehearsal (WDR) test on Thursday, February 19th, 2026, potentially clearing the path for a mission launch in early March – or at least, that was the hope.

As I’ve noted in recent Space Sunday updates, the WDR is a major test of all the ground systems associated with launching an SLS rocket, together with the on-board systems and all ground support personnel  to make sure all systems are ready for an actual launch and staff are up-to-speed with all procedures and possible causes for delays, etc. Such tests run through until just before engine ignition, and include fully fuelling the booster’s core stage with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

The WDR had previously revealed issues with the propellant loading system at the base of the mobile launch platform on which the rocket stands ahead of lift-off, with various leaks being noted the both the first Artemis 2 WDR and previously with the uncrewed Artemis 1 mission of 2022.

A ground level view of the Artemis 2 SLS sitting atop its mobile launch platform at LC-39B, Kennedy Space Centre, Florida. Credit: NASA/Ben Smegelsky

The original Artemis 2 WDR suffered issues with the liquid hydrogen feed into the rocket and with a filter designed to keep impurities out of the propellants. Both the problem valves and the filter were swapped-out ahead of the second WDR together with the replacement of a number of seals which showed minor signs or wear. Following the second WDR test, an initial review of the gathered data was performed, and the results gave NASA managers the confidence to officially name March 6th, 2026 as the target launch date for the mission, marking the opening of a 5-day launch window in March, with a further window available in April.

However, within 24 hours of the target launch date being announced, NASA was forced to issue a further mission postponement when another issue was discovered – this time a helium leak in the booster’s upper stage.

The new leak is entirely unrelated to those within the umbilical propellant system on the mobile launch platform and lies within the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) pressurisation system.

The latest issue with the Artemis 2 SLS lies within the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), aka the rocket’s upper stage, seen above, which will perform a number of tasks in the mission – including getting the Orion crew vehicle to orbit in the first place. The issues are entirely unrelated to those seen with the main propellant loading system at the base of the rocket. Image credit: United Launch Alliance.

The ICPS plays a critical role in both lifting the Orion vehicle to its initial orbit following separation from the booster’s core stage, and then moving it to a high altitude orbit prior to it and Orion entering a trans-lunar injection orbit, where – after the ICPS has separated from Orion, it will be used as a target for a series of planned rendezvous and simulated docking exercises to test Orion’s ability to carry out the precise manoeuvring required to dock with Moon-orbiting Moon landers and (eventually)with the Gateway station.

However, in order to function optimally, the ICPS requires a  “solid” – that is a specific rate of flow and pressure for the helium. Fluctuations in the flow – such as caused by a leak – cannot be tolerated. This means that in order to fly, Artemis 2 requires the issue to be properly addressed. This is something that might be done whilst leaving the vehicle on the pad; however, it might require the vehicle to be rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) to allow complete access to the ICPS. At the time of writing, engineers at NASA were still evaluating which option to take.

But one thing is clear – with just two weeks between the discovery of the issue and the opening of the March launch window, there is precious little time to fully investigate and rectify the issue. As such, NASA is now shifting its focus towards having the mission ready for lift-off in time to meet the April 2026 launch window.

Space Sunday: lunar ambitions: the real and the not-so-real

The core stage of China’s new Long March 10 (CZ-10A variant) booster uses a single motor to ease itself into the waters of the South China Sea to await recovery after a highly successful test flight. Credit: CCTV video footage

The current “race for the Moon” is turning into a hare-and-tortoise situation on several levels, including internationally. On the one hand, there is America’s (arguably over-complicated, thanks to NASA’s insistence on the use of cryogenic propulsion to get to / from the lunar surface) Artemis programme, which seems to race along in fits and bursts (and frequently slams itself into a wall of delay) and then there is China’s more conservative “latter-day Apollo” approach, which quietly plods along, racking up achievements and milestones whilst seeming to be technologically far behind US-led efforts.

As noted, China’s approach to reaching the Moon, is something of a harkening back to the days of Apollo in that it uses a relatively small-scale crewed vehicle for getting between Earth and the Moon, and a similarly small-scale lander. However, size isn’t everything, and both crew vehicle and lander (the latter of which has a cargo variant) would be more than capable in allowing China to establish a modest human presence on the Moon, just as their Tiangong space station, whilst barely 1/4 the size of the International Space Station, has allowed them to do the same in Earth orbit. It is also important to recognise it as part of an integrated, step-by-step lunar programme officially called the Chinese Lunar Exploration Programme (CLEP) and familiarly referenced as the Chang’e Project after the Chinese Goddess of the Moon, which has allowed China to develop both a greater understanding of operations on the Moon and in understanding the Moon itself.

The Chang’e project commenced over 20 years ago, and recorded its first successes in 2007 and 2010 with its Phase 1 orbital robotic missions. This was followed by the Phase II lander / rover missions (Chang’e 3 and Chang’e 4) in 2013 and 2018 respectively, and then the Phase III sample return mission of Chang’e 5 (2020).

Currently, the programme is in its fourth phase, an extensive study of the South Polar Region of the Moon in preparation for human landings, nominally targeting 2030. This phase of the programme has already seen the highly successful Chang’e 6 mission, the first to retrieve surface samples from the Moon’s far side, as well as deploying a rover there. 2026 will see Chang’e 7 launched, a high concept resource seeking mission comprising an orbiter, lander and “lunar flyer”, all geared to locate resources which can be utilised by future missions.

China’s Chang’e 6 mission, launched in May 2024, was the first Chinese mission to the far side of the Moon, and the first mission to ever return samples gathered from the lunar far side and return them to Earth (June 2024). In this image, Chang’e 6 is seen from the Jinchan mini-rover, which piggybacked a ride to the Moon with the lander. Credit: CNSA.

In 2028, the last of the Phase IV mission will launch. Chang’e 8 is intended to be a combination of in-situ resource utilisation (ISRU) test bed, demonstrating how local materials (water ice, regolith) can be used to produce structures on the Moon via advanced 3D printing, and to establish a small ecosystem experiment in advance of human landings.

This approach means that from a standing start, China has replicated much of NASA’s work of the 1960s that helped pave the way for Apollo, but in much greater depth. It’s not unfair to say that by retuning such a focused series of mission phases – notably Phase IV – China potentially will develop a greater spread of knowledge concerning the Moon’s South Polar Region than NASA.

At the same time, China has been developing the hardware required for the human side of the Chang’e Project. This primarily takes the form of their Mengzhou (“Dream Vessel”) reusable crewed vehicle, the Lanyue (“Embracing the Moon”) 2-stage lunar  lander / ascent vehicle and the Long March 10 semi-reusable heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) offering a very similar capability to Blue Origin’s New Glenn vehicle.

Mengzhou is being developed in two variants: a low Earth orbit (LEO) variant, designed to ferry crews to / from the Tiangong space station. The second is being developed expressly for lunar missions, offering an increased mission endurance capability. The first uncrewed orbital test-flight for the 14-tonne LEO version of Mengzhou is due to take place in 2026, the system having been going through progressive flight tests throughout the 2010 and early 2020s. If successful, it will pave the way for the vehicle to start operating on crewed flights to Tiangong alongside the current Shenzhou craft, which it will eventually replace.

Launch of the CZ-10A and Mengzhou test vehicles, February 11th, 2026. Credit: CCTV

On February 11th, 2026, a test article of the 21-tonne Mengzhou lunar vehicle completed a significant test atop the core reusable stage Long March 10 (Chinese designation CZ-10A) booster. This was a combined mission to test both the Mengzhou launch abort system (LAS) whilst under the rocket’s maximum dynamical pressure flight-regime, and also the booster’s ability to complete an ascent to its nominal stage separation altitude of 105 km, and then make a controlled descent and splashdown close to its recovery ship.

Following a successful launch, the combined vehicle climbed up to the period of “Max Q”, around 1 minute into a flight and wherein the maximum dynamic forces are being applied to the entire stack. The Mengzhou LAS successfully triggered, boosting the vehicle away from the Long March core stage at high speed. The Mengzhou capsule then separated from the LAS performed a splashdown downrange.

The Mengzhou LAS powers away from the CZ-10A corse stage, carrying the Mengzhou capsule with it, as would be required should a critical malfunction occur with the Long March 10 rocket. Credit: CCTV
The Long March 10 core stage then continued a powered ascent profile, performing engine shutdown at 105 km before simulating an upper stage separation followed by a post-separation manoeuvre. This saw the stage enter “glide” phase, using its aerodynamic fins to maintain its orientation.

During this “glide” phase (actually a controlled descent, the stage orienting itself to fall engines-first), the booster carried out an automated pre-cooling of its engines in readiness for re-use and raise the pressure within the propellant tanks to settle their contents in readiness for engine re-use.

Cameras on the booster capture the deployment of the SpaceX-like grid fins on the upper end of the stage, which help it to maintain the correct orientation during its descent back to Earth. Credit: CCTV

Roughly one minute before splashdown, several of the engines successfully re-lit in a braking manoeuvre to bleed off much of the stage’s velocity. These were quickly reduced to just 3 motors and then a single motor as the stage came to a near-hover before that motor shutdown allowed it to settle smoothly and vertically in the water just 200 metres abeam of its recovery ship.

As an aside, it is interesting to contrast reporting on this flight with media coverage of SpaceX Starship “integrated flight tests”. In the case of the latter, almost every flight has been reported as some kind of spectacular success, despite most of the flights blowing up, barely meeting their assigned goals, or simply re-treading ground already covered. By contrast, the Mengzhou / CZ-10A core stage test flight has largely been defined as a “small step” in China’s progress, with some emphasising the flight “not reaching orbit” – which it was never intended to do.

In reality, the entire flight was a complete success. Not only did it demonstrate the Mengzhou vehicle’s LAS fully capable of lifting the command module and crew clear of an ascending CZ-10A should the latter suffer a malfunction during the most dynamically active phase of it flight, it also further demonstrated the capsule’s parachute descent system and its ability to make a recoverable splashdown (Mengzhou is capable of both water and land-based touchdowns, being able to be equipped with either a floatation device or airbags prior to launch).

Another still from the video of the test flight, showing the booster entering the see and its proximity to the recovery vessel, just visible on the right of the image. Future tests will see the recovery vessel attempt to “catch” a returning booster directly using a “tether” system. Credit: CCTV

Further, the test demonstrated the CZ-10A core stage’s ability to undertake a return to Earth and splashdown (again, the booster is designed to both land on a recovery ship a-la Falcon 9 and New Glenn, or make a splashdown close enough to the recovery ship so it can then be recovered – direct returns to the recovery vessel will be a part of future tests). Finally, such was the accuracy of the guidance systems, the rocket splashed down just 200 metres from the recovery ship, as planned.

That said, it is true that all the core components of the crewed phase of the Chang’e project still have a way to go before China can send a crew to the Moon. But like the tortoise, their one-step-at-a-time / keep-it-simple approach could yet see them become the first nation to do so since 1972.

Why SpaceX is most likely “Shifting from Mars to the Moon”

Thirteen months ago, in an attempt to bolster his failing “Mars colony plan” (a totally unrealistic fever dream of sending a “Battlestar Galactica” scale feet of 1,000 Starship vehicles carrying 1 million people to Mars to establish a colony there), the SpaceX CEO declared “the Moon is a distraction” and Mars was the focus for his company.

Well, he’s had 13 months to forget all that, as on the weekend of February 7th and  8th, 2026, the self-styled man who “knows more about manufacturing than anyone else alive on Earth” and yet cannot deliver on a single one of his manufacturing promises, declared that the Moon is now the focus of SpaceX’s endeavours, all as a part of a grand plan to “expand human consciousness and support his equally questionable idea of operating a 1-million strong constellation of Starlink satellites as a string of “data centres in space”. For good measure he mixes in terms such as “climbing the Kardashev scale” )the latter seems to be a particular reference point for so-called space entrepreneurs of late).

However, the real reason is liable to be far more mundane: the SpaceX CEO is again trying to justify the US $1.2 trillion valuation he and his fellow broad members arbitrarily awarded the company in January, and to justify such a figure in the face of an upcoming IPO whilst also possibly trying to further dazzle investors with shiny promises about orbital data centres and moon bases at a time when SpaceX has just “inherited”xAI and its cash burn-through of around US $1 billion a month.

The promise of a fully operational “Moon Base Alpha” (yes, once again we have a sci-fi trope to add gloss to an idea) in “10 years” will, undoubtedly go the same way as the more than a decade old claim that Tesla vehicles will be capable of full self driving “next year”; the statement that SpaceX would have Starship operational by 2022, and that Starship would fly around the Moon in 2023 and to Mars in 2024, err, 2026, err, 2028. That is to say, most likely never.

Martian Organics Cannot be Entirely Explained by Non-organic Processes

One of the major mysteries of Mars is the question of methane. It was first detected in more than faint trace amounts by the European Space Agency’s Mars Express mission in 2004. A decade later, NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) rover Curiosity,  detected methane spikes and  organic molecules whilst exploring the floor of Gale Crater. Then in 2019, the rover a massive spike as it explored “Teal Ridge”, a formation of bedrock and deposits on “Mount Sharp” (Aeolis Mons).

Alongside of this is the vexing discovery of organic elements on Mars. These and the methane seem to point a finger towards the idea that the planet may have once harboured life. However, as even proponents of this idea point out, both organics and methane can result from purely inorganic interactions. The tick is – how to determine which might be the case.

An artist’s rendering of Curiosity at work in Gale Crater. Credit: NASA

In March 2025, Curiosity detected small amounts of decane, undecane, and dodecane in a rock sample, which constituted the largest organic compounds found on Mars to date. These offered the potential to determine which option might be more likely to cause their existence – organics or inorganic chemical reactions. All three are hydrocarbons could be fragments of fatty acids, also known as carboxylic acid.

On Earth, carboxylic acid (aka fatty acids) is a natural by-product of life. Such acid can be found in animal tissues, nuts and seeds. In the case of animal tissues, carboxylic acid is predominantly formed by the breakdown of carbohydrates by the liver and found within adipose tissue, and the mammary glands. however, they can also be created by inorganic reactions – such as lightning striking chemically rich soils (or regolith), hydrothermal interactions and photochemical reactions between ultraviolet radiation and hydrocarbon-rich mixtures.

In order to try to determine whether the fatty acids discovered by Curiosity preserved in ancient mudstone are the result of organic processes or inorganic. Whilst limited with working only with data from the rover’s Sample Analysis at Mars (SAM) spectrometer, the team sought to recreate the likely conditions on Mars some 80 million years ago – this being the amount of time the rock containing the acids would likely have been exposed to the surface atmosphere – and then work back from there to try to determine which would survive the longest: carboxylic acid produced by organic or inorganic means.

What they found was that organic mechanisms appear to leave far more in the way of organic remnants – such as decane, undecane, and dodecane – than the typical non-biological processes involved in forming carboxylic acid could produce. The team suggest that this might be because any organics responsible for the fatty acids might have been assisted by periodic impacts by carbonaceous meteorites, known to be sources of fatty acids formed in space.

A graphic shows the long-chain organic molecules decane, undecane, and dodecane, the largest organic molecules discovered on Mars to date. Credit: NASA/Dan Gallagher

However the team also urge caution: whilst their finding might move the needle further towards the idea that Mars once harboured life, they also clearly note that there is a need for greater study; Mars is a complex world, rich in complex interactions. As such, more and detailed study is required – preferably first-hand, through the obtaining of samples from Mars itself. Currently, and rather ironically, whilst NASA had planned to make samples from the Mars 2020 rover Perseverance available for return to Earth, these do not contain samples of a similar nature to those found by Curiosity.

More particularly, at the time Perseverance had launched to Mars with sample retrieval in mind, no-one had actually sorted out how such a retrieval might be achieved. As such, a series of highly complicated, overly expensive proposals were put forward, involving both US and European co-operation. Each of these were knocked down on the basis of complexity and escalating price – up to US $11 billion – or close to half of NASA’s overall budget – for such a mission was just too big an ask. Thus, despite more cost-effective proposals such has Rocket Lab’s (still complex) three-launch mission slated to cost a “mere” US $4 billion, the entire idea of a sample return mission has been cancelled as a result of NASA’s budget being tightened.

Space Sunday: hotel on the Moon by 2032? Probably not

A rendering of the GRU Space “version 2” hotel. A possibility, a pipedream or something else? Credit: GRU Space

The commercial space sector is in its infancy, and it is very easy to get caught up in the hype and promises that start-ups in the sector bring with them. At times, this is made worse by publications and media outlets swallowing every statement made by the CEO of SpaceX hook, line and sinker, without applying a modicum if critical thinking (yes, I’m looking at you, Ars  Technica, Space.com, Everyday Astronaut and Marcus House), encouraging publications to act more like PR mouthpieces than offering professional reportage.

Take, for example, Galactic Resource Utilisation (GRU) Space, and their claim that in by 2032, they will be operating the world’s first hotel on the Moon and will follow it up with a larger version before offering the same on Mars; framing the moves as the first necessary steps towards humanity becoming a galactic civilisation.

Exactly how serious this company – comprising two founders and a “consultant” – might be in its aims is unclear. But from the company name (GRU – to close to Felonius Gru, the man who planned to steal the Moon in 2010’s Despicable Me to be coincidence , and likely intended as a “har, har” joke) through to some of their wider claims, it’s hard to see this as little more than (at best) naïve thinking.

Certainly, the company’s website and “whitepaper” give rise to a wealth of questions, in terms of the reality of the idea of a hotel on the Moon, through the claims GRU Space make concerning it, to the claims made by the company’s founder. Given this, it’s hard to know where to start in analysing GRU Space and their entire “plan”; both the website and “whitepaper” are fill with gross over-simplifications and logical fallacies whilst at the same time simply skipping over key aspects and costs required of such an undertaking. Take for, example, the company’s 6-point “master plan”, the first 3 steps of which read:

1.       Build a hotel on the Moon. GRU solves off-world habitation.
2.       Build America’s first Moon base (road, mass drivers, warehouses, physical infrastructure on the Moon).
3.       Repeat on Mars.

Who’d have though establishing facilities on the Moon and Mars would be so “simple”. and that’s ignoring the arse-about face progression of steps 1 and 2 – build your hotel then build the infrastructure to support it? Is that not akin to building a housing estate and then providing the necessary road, power, water, sewage, etc., infrastructure?). I’m also going to ignore step 3 entirely, as it involves everything else I’ll cover in this article – with each one being of far greater magnitude.

Steps 4 through 6 of the “plan” are hardly better, drawing as they do on terms such as the Overton Window, and Kardashev Scale and mixing them with further logical fallacies in order to make a (very poor) case for investment whilst offering objectively misguided / misunderstood parallels together with dichotomies of thinking which further underscore the inherent naivety throughout the “whitepaper”.

GRU Space claims the first step in their endeavour will be a test module. Credit GRU Space

In terms of misguided parallels, the “whitepaper” draws on space tourism and tourism on Mount Everest as demonstrations of the potential for a hotel on the Moon to have mass appeal. In terms of the former, the company points to the rise of space tourism in the last 5 years, presenting a graph suggesting tourism far outweighs astronaut flight into space. However, the data presented ignores the fact that almost 50% of said tourists have participated in sub-orbital flights to the edge of space; a very different proposition to flying to orbit – or the Moon to the point where it has absolutely no bearing on the latter.

Turning to Mount Everest, while it is true that tourism has made up the lion’s share of ascent to the summit of Mount Everest, since the 1990s, less than 8,000 individuals have made the trip to summit of the mountain. Both sub-orbital flights to the edge of space and to the summit of Mount Everest aren’t cheap: the latter comes in at between US $50,000 and US $120,000 for a trip with “good” to “excellent” logistical support; whilst sub-orbital flights cost somewhere in the range of US $225,000-US $400,000. None of these price points are exactly accessible to a mass market. And they don’t come anyway close to the costs GRU Space is projecting. costs presented no sound financial foundation other than vague predications from the likes of the SpaceX CEO (and we all know how accurate those tend to be) .

By their own guessimates, GRU Space are planning to offer 5-night stays at their “Moon hotel” for an initial US $$27,083,335.00 per person, which they claim will fall to just under US $1 million. However you cut it, the first is several orders of magnitude greater than the cost of an 8-minute flight to the edge of space, and enough to make even the very wealthy baulk. The second, meanwhile operates on a false assumption, something I’ll come to in a moment. As such, it is hard to see GRU Space leverage the kind of real money they will need to make their plans a reality.

The GRU Space “version 1” hotel supposedly for 4 guests, an inflatable structure surrounded by shaped regolith. Credit: GRU Space

In terms of cost to customers, the “whitepaper” glosses over / ignores a lot. First, the suggestion they will be using either the Starship HLS or Blue Origin Blue Moon Mark 2 lunar landers – both of which, it is not unfair to say, will have other priorities (assuming the SpaceX HLS actually reaches a point where it can enter service), making their use in a parallel commercial venture somewhat questionable. More to the point: these vehicles will require periodic refuelling to remain operational – at an unknown cost the “whitepaper” fails to mention. More than that, both vehicles require refuelling in order to reach the Moon; no mention of this fact in made in the GRU Space document or who will pay for it.

Given that SpaceX estimate on-orbit refuelling of a Moon-bound Starship will be on the order of US $180 million – that’s a big chunk of missing data – US $45 million per seat in the case of tourists heading for the “version 1” hotel (designed to house  guests), if the cost is to be passed on, which is not mentioned either; neither is how the cost per flight be met if GRU Space is to somehow “absorb” it. There are also other issues around the use of Starship (e.g. whether or not the HLS version will ever be used for anything beyond two Artemis missions and then junked; whether the “standard” version of Starship will ever be rated to launch humans – eve the HLS version will not be rated for crew launches from Earth and so on). however, I’ll do you a favour a pass on waffling on about them.

Of course, Starship is not the only player in town. There’s Blue Origin, a company far more likely at this point in time to deliver humans to the surface of the Moon than SpaceX. But even they require on-orbit and lunar refuelling options, again increasing the overall cost per guest at a GRU Space hotel.

Similarly, the idea that there will be some kind of “10 fold” decrease” in the cost of launching humans into space, making flights to the 12-person “version 2” of the hotel so much cheaper, actually stand up to scrutiny. Whilst Starship has the potential to reduce the cost of launching inanimate payloads to orbit, this is only if it can operate at scale – multiple launches per day. Frankly, the commercial market as a whole is a long way from requiring that kind of general launch cadence, making the idea questionable.

More to the point, whilst SpaceX has reduced the cost per kilo of launching payloads to orbit on Falcon 9, the cost to do the same with humans – $225 million per 4-person launch – has not shifted downwards at all since 2019, despite the 5-fold increase in the Crew Dragon fleet.. This is because launching humans requires a lot of specialised ground and vehicle systems; thus SpaceX look to reductions in servicing and turning around Falcon 9 booster as a means to offset the overheads involved in servicing and refurbishing individual Crew Dragon craft, not as a means to reduce costs to users. There is absolutely no reason to suspect this would not also be the case with and future human rated version of Starship, were it to appear.

Nor does the failure to accurately present costs end there. no mention is made as to:

  • The cost of what would likely be single-use spacesuits for the hotel guests (which could be anywhere from US $10 million to US $228 million, depending on the suit type and manufacturer).
  • The cost of developing and deploying suitable life support systems and their back-up for each hotel; the implementation of suitable power generation and storage capabilities and the parallel need for thermal regulation systems.
  • The costs involved in ensuring adequate on-sit medical facilities.
  • The cost (or number) of staff for each version of the hotel (or in providing them with accommodation, life support, food, etc.).

Perhaps the most glaring example of the naivety present in the “whitepaper” is the claim that GRU Space can recoup all of the outlay involved in establishing the 4-person hotel  – liable to realistically be in excess of at least US $1 billion – by flying just 12 guests to the hotel in the first year.

The only way this potentially comes into the vicinity of being a realistic figure is if the costs of all the essentials mentioned above – power, life support, etc – are ignored, and you look at the claim sideways and in a mirror. With one eye closed and the other squinting, whilst simultaneously reciting Hamlet’s soliloquy in full.

Another rendering of GRU’s “version 2” hotel. Credit: GRU Space

In terms of logical fallacies with the “whitepaper”, these are literally manifold-  places an many as 5 in single statements. I’m not going to list all of them here. But to provide a further example: the whitepaper infers that because NASA requires in-situ resource utilisation (ISRU) for the Artemis Moon base, GRU Space is the only logical choice for providing those capabilities because they are “unique”. In reality, there are multiple companies and universities involved in ISRU technology development, all of whom are far better established than a two-man start-up.

There is much more within the “whitepaper” that can, and should be challenged – and which should have been challenged by space media outlets rather than them simply regurgitating the PR without thought or research but no. Like the equally questionable Voyager Station proposal claiming a company will have a spinning space station (to give it artificial gravity) accepting up to 280 guests (at $1.2 million a pop) operating from 2027 – the PR is presented as reportage that has a Field of Dreams inevitability, with not a single question about where the “tens of billions” required to build the station will come from (indeed, as of writing, Above Space has raised exactly … US $4.8 million over 4 years, and much of the dedicated space media which helped hype the idea seem to have quietly brushed it to one side.

As such, I admit to a certain curiosity as to where GRU Space will be in the hype cycle a year from now. As it is, it would appear that two companies originally cited as “backers” for the project have requested their names be removed from the company’s website: Anduril Space and … SpaceX.  If nothing else, having a company run by the king of over-promising and under-delivering ask for its name to be removed from your  website can’t really be a good sign.

Artemis 2 Update

The Artemis 2 Orion vehicle within its payload fairings and Launch Abort System at the top of the Space Launch System rocket on LC-39B, Kennedy Space Centre during the wet dress rehearsal. Credit: NASA

As per my previous Space Sunday article, Sunday, February 8th, 2026 was targeted as the launch date for the launch of the crewed Artemis 2 mission around the Moon and back.

At that time of that article, NASA was running the mission’s massive Space Launch System rocket through a wet dress rehearsal  (WDR) – a final pre-launch test designed to ensure all ground systems  – including those responsible for loading the vehicle’s core tanks with propellants were all operating correctly and to uncover any niggles in processing, etc. that could be ironed-out before an actual launch.

During the preparations for Artemis 1 in 2022, a similar WDR caused NASA much embarrassment and rolling of the mission’s launch vehicle back and forth between the launch pad and the Vehicle Assembly Building at Kennedy Space Centre (exacerbated by bad weather) due to a series of issues relating to the feeds providing propellants and vital gases to the rocket, including the liquid hydrogen propellant feed located on the mobile launch platform at the base of the rocket.

These issues resulted in significant changes and updates to the umbilical system in the years following Artemis 1, and the Artemis 2 WDR was the first opportunity to test them in sequence. These updates name some at NASA take a bullish attitude towards the WDR and the updates made to the launch systems.

However, as propellant loading progressed, sensors within the umbilical propellant feed system reported a helium leak similar to that seen with Artemis 1, possibly as a result of the neighbouring hydrogen umbilical super cooling the seals on the helium feed, causing them to contract and allow helium to escape. The countdown was paused to allow the helium seals to warm up and reset.

This appeared to work, and the countdown reached  T -5:15. at this point the Ground Launch Sequencer – a system designed to monitor all aspects of the vehicle’s preparations ad make sure everything proceeds in the correct sequence – intervened and shut down the test when it registered multiple sensors reporting a sudden and sustained spike in hydrogen leaking from the umbilical system – much as happened with the Artemis 1 WDR.

As a result, the the February launch opportunities were closed out, and operations moved to the early March launch opportunity to allow the problems with the hydrogen feed to be investigated. This means Artemis 2 will not launch until March 7th, earliest, and will likely be preceded by a further WDR. The leaks and delay are liable to cause further negative feedback towards SLS / Orion – and cause NASA a certain degree of embarrassment.

Artemis 2 on the pad at Kennedy Space Centre. Credit: Craig Bailey. Florida Today

In the meantime, the delay clears Crew 12 for a February 11th launch to the ISS.