NASA – Inara Pey: Living in a Modemworld

Space Sunday: major Artemis updates and a rollback

Posted on March 1, 2026 by Inara Pey

Yes, there’s been a lot in this column about Project Artemis and the US-led programme to return humans to the Moon, and while it might make Space Sunday sound a bit like a scratched record (Artemis..,Artemis…Artemis…), there is good reason for this: there’s a lot of news about the entire programme, from the anticipated launch of Artemis 2 and its crew on a trip around the Moon and back, to the focus of the main part of this article: major changes to the Artemis programme as a whole; so bear with me!

NASA’s current Administrator, Jared Isaacman, continues to surprise and impress despite concerns over his non-NASA activities and involvement with favoured space contractors. In my previous Space Sunday article, I covered Isaacman’s direct and open approach to the problems endemic to the Boeing CST-100 Starliner programme, and to the core of NASA’s management responsible for managing it (with two of the most senior resigning in the aftermath).

Following the press conference on that matter – which included the reading out of a letter to all NASA staff- Isaacman was present at a February 27th, 2026 Project Artemis update which carried its own surprises whilst signalling a change in direction for the programme – potentially putting it on a far better footing that had previously been the case.

The update saw a number of significant announcements:

The much-criticised Space Launch System (SLS) is not to be cancelled as yet – something many outside NASA have called for, despite there being no currently-available launch vehicle that can match its capabilities (see: Space Sunday: of Artemis and Administrators).
However, SLS will be changing, with one significant element – the Exploration Upper Stage – now cancelled.
As a result of the Exploration Upper Stage cancellation, the Block 1B variant of SLS will no longer be part of the SLS enhancement programme, nor, potentially, will be the even more powerful Block 2 version.
NASA will attempt to raise the launch cadence for SLS from approximately once every 3 years to once every 10 months.
Artemis 3 is no longer a lunar landing mission, but will be an Earth-orbiting test flight involving at least Human Landing System vehicle.
The original Artemis 3 lunar landing mission is therefore redesignated Artemis 4, but the time frame remains a (optimistic) 2028.

SLS Changes

Much of the critique surrounding SLS has been on the matter of launch cost, which stands at some US $2.5 billion per vehicle. However, these costs are based on the overall development of SLS and Orion, and are not simply the physical cost of get a specific launch stack off the pad. This is something many of the louder voices raised against SLS – notably those from the SpaceX corner – tend to ignore when pointing to the “lower” cost of something like Starship, which is put at around US $100 million per launch. In this, it needs to be pointed out that this has yet to be proven, as Starship has yet to actually achieve orbit, and even then, launch costs for NASA could be as much as US 1.3 billion, when all of the required tanker launches and the launch of the (also unproven) orbital propellant station the Starship HLS will require just to get itself to the Moon.

That said, SLS is a costly launch mechanism; in 2023, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report stating SLS was “unsustainable” at current spending levels, and suggested that launch costs could increase over time to as much as US $4 billion as a result of the technical complexity of the system, plans to try to extend its capabilities and its low launch cadence.

Exploration Upper Stage and “Near Block 1” SLS Development

Dropping the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) from the SLS development curve should address some of these concerns over rising costs.

EUS was due to debut with the Block 1B development of SLS, providing it with a more powerful and capable upper stage than the current Interim Cryogenic Propulsion (ICPS) upper stage. As it is now cancelled, NASA is pivoting away from the Block 1B version of SLS in order to develop a “near Block 1” upgrade, which will use a new upper stage in place of both ICPS and EUS.

Just how much this will save is open to debate: some US $3 billion has already be spent in developing EUS, and there will obviously be costs involved in developing a commercially-based replacement for it and ICPS. But there are other another compelling reasons for replacing EUS with a unit more in line (if more powerful) than the ICPS: simplicity of overall design and design and continuity of experience.

The Block 1 SLS is now a known creature, foibles and issues all taken as read. It’s a vehicle NASA is continually gaining knowledge and understanding in operating. Block 1B, with the EUS, it’s extended core stage elements (extended interstage and the enlarged universal stage adaptor) is a different beats, liable to demonstrate different flight characteristics and dynamics as well as introducing new elements which could have their own teething problems. Sticking with an only slightly modified vehicle to supersede the current Block 1 vehicle, reduces many of these factors, allowing NASA to “standardise” the SLS design and continue to gain data, knowledge and understanding on / of its characteristics incrementally. This was pretty much how things were handled back in the Apollo era, and the approach has a lot going for it, a point acknowledged during the briefing.

After successful completion of the Artemis I flight test, the upcoming Artemis II flight test, and the new, more robust test approach to Artemis III, it is needlessly complicated to alter the configuration of the SLS and Orion stack to undertake subsequent Artemis missions. There is too much learning left on the table and too much development and production risk in front of us. Instead, we want to keep testing like we fly and have flown. We are looking back to the wisdom of the folks that designed Apollo. The entire sequence of Artemis flights needs to represent a step-by-step build-up of capability,

– NASA Associate Administrator Amit Kshatriya

Exactly who will provide the replacement for ICPS / EUS and what form it will take was now discussed at the briefing. However, it was made clear that all of NASA’s contractors and partners in Artemis were consulted through the driver to redirect the programme, and all have been supportive of the moves – even Boeing, who stand to lose the most with the EUS cancellation, whilst SpaceX and Blue Moon have both opted to “accelerate” the development of their HLS systems.

Perhaps two of the strongest potential contenders for producing a new upper stage for SLS are United Launch Alliance (ULA) and Blue Origin.

ULA already has the powerful cryogenic Centaur V upper stage. Centaur is a venerable launch vehicle stage with a lot of expertise behind it, with the Centaur 5 already forming the upper stage of ULA’s Vulcan-Centaur rocket. Blue Origin, meanwhile, has the upper stage of their New Glenn booster. Whilst a “new kid on the block”, the stage has already proven itself reliable on two high-profile flights for New Glenn, and will shortly be back in action for a third flight, thus experience is quickly being gained in its operation. Further, blue Origin are already looking to develop an enhanced version of the stage in line with their plans for an even more powerful variant of their New Glenn vehicle, thus there is potential here as well.

Neither Centaur V nor the New Glenn upper stage would be suitable for SLS straight off the shelf, but using them as either a basis for a new stage design or developing a variant off of an existing design (Blue Origin) could significantly reduce the costs and time involved in developing and testing a new SLS stage.

Launch Cadence

Another mitigating factor when it comes to reducing overall costs is the decision to try to launch SLS on a greater cadence than has thus far been seen. Isaacman would specifically like to see an SLS / Artemis launch once every 10 months, putting Artemis almost on a similar launch cadence as Apollo. Doing so will likely increase Artemis costs, but it also brings some very clear benefits:

Personnel expertise. Gaps measured in years between launches can result in personnel expertise loss as people become tired of waiting for the next launch and seek a career move elsewhere, taking their expertise with them. A faster launch cadence with clear mission objectives is more likely to keep more of that expertise in-house at NASA for longer.
It makes Artemis potentially more robust, presenting NASA with a chance to present a clear roadmap for achieving the goals of establishing a lunar base and maintaining a human presence there. Clear time frames and mission objectives also help Congress in allowing the money to flow into NASA to support the programme.

Of course, achieving such a cadence is no easy task; thus far, Artemis 1 and Artemis 2 (of which more below) have demonstrated that, like it or not, SLS and its ground support systems are extremely complex and subject to technical issues which can so easily upset launches.

Artemis 3 – No Longer Aiming for the Moon

The decision to “divert” Artemis 3 to an Earth orbital mission was perhaps the biggest surprise in the update – although “divert” is not entirely correct.

What is proposed is the insertion of an additional Artemis / SLS launch between what is currently Artemis 2 and what would have been Artemis 3, the first crewed lunar landing in the programme. That mission – presumably utilising the same crew – will now effectively become Artemis 4, with the new Earth-orbital mission taking the name Artemis 3.

An infographic outlining the revised Artemis missions (2 through 6), with the Artemis 2 crewed mission around the Moon and back (2026) at the top; the new Artemis 3 mission (2027) centre and the first three crewed lunar landing missions (Artemis 4 through 6). Credit NASA

The aims of the revised Artemis 3 mission – scheduled for a 2027 launch – so far comprise (additional mission goals may be added as the mission requirements are further assessed):

On-orbit rendezvous and docking with one or other (or possibly both) of the current Human Landing System vehicles in development: Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2, and the nascent SpaceX Starship-derived HLS.
Perform integrated checkout of life support, communications, and propulsion systems on both HLS vehicles and assess their suitability / practically for zero gravity operations.
Carry out comprehensive tests of the new extended extravehicular activity (xEVA) suits to be used both with Artemis as as a replacement for the current generation of US EVA suits on the International Space Station.

This is actually a smart step on NASA’s part, and harkens back to the Apollo era and specifically, the Apollo 9 mission.

Artemis 3 will focus on earth-orbit rendezvous with either Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2 HLS or the SpaceX Starship HLS (depending on which is available at the time) or both (if both prove to be ready for testing – which right now looks unlikely in the case of the SpaceX HLS). Credit: NASA

Under the original Artemis plan, no provision was made for any on-orbit human testing of the SpaceX HLS vehicle ahead of Artemis 3. Instead, SpaceX were obliged to send and uncrewed HLS lander to the Moon and conducted an automated landing (or possibly 2) – but there were no provisions for any crewed testing of the vehicle prior to Artemis 3.

Conversely, Blue Moon Mark 2, with its longer lead time (not being required – in theory – until Artemis 5 under the previous plans, and now Artemis 6 under the revised approach) would have undergone Earth orbit crewed testing prior to being used for lunar operations.

As such, this new step offers a means by which both vehicles (assuming both are ready for a 2027 launch) can be properly tested in Earth orbit, where the risks to the crew are potentially reduced, simply because they can use Orion to make a fast return to Earth. Thus, both can be properly assessed, including any shortfalls they might exhibit in advance of any attempt at a lunar landing. This is something that is clearly much better for all concerned than otherwise sitting and crossing fingers, as would have been the case with the original Artemis 3 mission.

Other Changes

Additionally, the Artemis Update indicates further changes within NASA’s operating structure as a whole with a drive to rebuild core competences and to better oversee commercial contracts and be more hand-on with commercial partners (as indicated in the Starliner press briefing). Key to this will be the implementation of standard processes right across the space agency, not just covering Artemis, but all commercial partnership and space projects.

Further, the space agency will embark on a process of new and more extensive involvement with Congress to keep them appraised of progress with SLS and Artemis, and has already embarked on a restructured process of negotiating with commercial partners and engaging them in NASA’s decision-making processes.

Whilst nothing should be definitively drawn from it, it is somewhat interesting that the new SLS upper stage designed to replace both ICPS and EUS (seen in the centre, above, with Orion attached) has a marked similarity to the New Glenn upper stage, seen to the right Orion and powering the Blue Moon Lander Mark 2 to orbit.

In the meantime, the NASA announcement has received a largely positive reaction from observers and stakeholders, and the approach it advocates potentially helps put Project Artemis on a much more realistic footing to achieve its goals.

Artemis 2 SLS Rolled Back to the VAB

As I reported in my previous Space Sunday update, Artemis 2 suffered another setback in plans to get a crewed Orion space vehicle on a 10-11 day free return flight to the Moon (with a day spent in a high Earth orbit beforehand) off the ground in March.

The Crawler-Transporter edges the Artemis 2 SLS stack and mobile launch platform into one of the two massive high bays of the VAB at Kennedy Space Centre near the end of an 11+ hour journey back from the launch pad. Credit: NASA livestream

The issue this time resides within the helium pressurisation system within the rocket’s Interim cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), which is required to get Orion to orbit and plays a role in meeting all of the mission’s planned goals. As I noted at the time of writing that update, NASA felt there were two potential routs to resolving the issue: by leaving SLS on the pad at Kennedy Space Centre’s Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B). Or rolling the entire stack back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), where a more comprehensive examination of the issue could be performed.

It was decided the latter was the better choice of action, and so on February 25th, 2026, the Artemis 2 launch vehicle and its Mobile Launch Platform were slowly and gently rolled back to the VAB atop one of the famous Crawler-Transporters.

A view from inside the VAB as Artemis 2 arrives. Note the curved gantries either side of the upper parts of SLS. These can be extended outwards (as can other levels within the high bay) to encapsulate the rocket and provide ease of access to its vitals for engineers. Credit: Cameron (@nyoomtm)

The physical move of the rocket and its launch tower structure commenced at 14:38 UTC, and took over 11 hours to complete, the Crawler-Transporter inches the entire structure into one of the VAB’s massive high bays inch by inch with incredible precision given the overall size of the Crawler-Transporter and its payload. The night-time arrival also afforded some unique views of the entire stack edging up to and then entering the VAB.

Currently, the hope is to correct the helium pressure issue in time to get the rocket back to the pad so it can meet an April 1st through 6th (inclusive) launch window. However, more extensive rectifications to the helium system, if required, will be left for the next SLS vehicle which will carry the crew selected for the new Artemis 3 mission to orbit.

Space Sunday: Starliner and Artemis woes

Posted on February 22, 2026 by Inara Pey

*An uncrewed CST-100 Starliner vehicle approaching the International Space Station during the vehicle’s Orbital Flight Test 2 mission, May 2022. Credit: NASA*

Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner programme, designed to offer both NASA and commercial space companies with the means of delivering astronauts to low-Earth orbit space stations such as the International Space Station (ISS) and the Blue Origin / Sierra Space led consortium’s Orbital Reef station, has had a very chequered history with the number of issues far outweighing the number of successes.

On all three occasions the CST-100, comprising a capsule with a capacity for up to seven crew – although 4 plus a measure of cargo is liable to be the usual complement, together with a service module – has reached orbit, it has done so while encountering a series of issues / failures. Indeed, such is the nature of some of the problems, they actually led to delays in getting the second flight test off the ground. More significantly, some of the issues were potentially known about as far back as June 2018. It was then, during a hot fire test of one of the vehicle’s RS-88 launch abort motors, when four of eight values on the vehicle’s propellant flow system failed, releasing 1.8 tonnes of highly toxic monomethylhydrazine propellant and causing a fireball that engulfed the test rig.

The July 2018 hot fire test of an RS-88 launch escape motor used on Boeing’s Starliner. During the test 4 of eight valves failed, resulting in the dumping 1.8 tonnes of highly toxic propellants which in turn caused a fire which engulfed the engine and test stand. Credit: Boeing / Aerojet.

Whilst blaming engine supplier Aerojet Rocketdyne for the hot fire test incident, Boeing simultaneously sought to keep the news of the incident quiet, and limited the circulation of information relating to it to a few senor programme managers at NASA, who agreed to also keep the incident out of the public eye as much as possible so as not to further delay the programme, which was already behind schedule.

Although it is near impossible to state with certainty that this event market the start of successive failures of management both within Boeing and NASA as to how Starliner and its various issues and problems were both handled and communicated between the two parties, it fits with a pattern seen throughout the last several years of Starliner’s troubles.

All of this has now been made clear in a comprehensive report released by the new NASA Administrator, Jared Issacman, in the wake of an in-depth investigation covering several months into the Starliner project. Released during a public press briefing, the 311-page report (partially redacted) goes into extensive depth relating to the three Starliner flights to orbit to date: the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test 1 (OFT 1, 2019) and its follow-up Orbital Flight Test 2 (OFT 2, 2022), and the first Crew Flight Test (CFT 1, 2024) which famously resulted in heady reports of the mission crew – Sunita Williams and Barry Wilmore being “stranded” in space as if they were utterly helpless when in fact they are working aboard the ISS.

The report goes to great length to outline the core technical issues with Starliner relating to the four “doghouse” thruster packs mounted equidistantly around the circumference of Starliner’s service module and containing multiple large and small thrusters designed to provide the vehicle with flight motion and manoeuvring capabilities, together with the software issues which proved to be the undoing of the original OFT 1 mission which ultimately left the vehicle unable to rendezvous with the ISS and attempt an automated docking.

The Boeing CST-100 Starliner – A = crew capsule with major additional elements (1-9) comprising in order: the nosecone; parachute system cover; side hatch for ground-based access / egress; capsule RCS unit (x25 in total); landing airbags; heat shield; forward docking system port; 3x main parachutes; 3x windows. B = Service module with major additional elements (10 through 16) comprising in order: power and water, etc., umbilical connector to capsule; thermal control radiators for removing excess heat; “Doghouse” unit (x4), containing multiple RCS and OMAC thrusters each; monomethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide propellant tanks; roll control RCS thruster (part of the Doghouse units); RS-88 launch escape engines; solar panels for electrical power. Credit: Boeing

But most startlingly, the report reclassifies the Crew Flight Test 1 as a Type A mishap. This is NASA’s most extreme rating for malfunctions aboard crew carrying vehicles; for example, both the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle losses were classified as Type A mishaps on account of the loss of all board both vehicles. Type A mishaps have several main criteria: Injuring or fatalities during flight; loss of a vehicle or its control; damage exceeding US $2 million.

At first glance, and given that a) Williams and Wilmore did manage to maintain control over their vehicle and make a successful docking with, and transfer to, the ISS; b) there were no injuries or fatalities; and c) US $2 million in damages is an exceedingly small amount in the scheme of things, reclassifying CFT 1 a Type A mishap might appear to be more a knee-jerk reaction than might be warranted. However, the events experienced during CFT 1 make it abundantly clear that designating it a Type A mishap should have occurred at the time of the flight – or at least immediately afterwards as the situation was fully understood.

The key point here is the second criteria for specifying a Type A mishap: the loss of the vehicle or its control. During CFT 1’s approach to the ISS for rendezvous and docking, the vehicle suffered a critical failure of five thruster sets required for manoeuvring control ( in NASA parlance, the vehicle lost its required 6 degrees of freedom manoeuvring). Regardless of the fact that the crew regained the use of four of the thrusters units in short order and went on to complete a successful docking at the ISS, at the time the failure occurred, Starliner was effectively adrift, unable to correct its orientation or motion – or even safely back away from the ISS to avoid the risk of collision. In other words, loss of the vehicle’s control had occurred.

Nor, as it turns out, was this the only issue. During its re-entry and descent through the atmosphere, the Starliner capsule Calypso suffered a failure with one of its RCS thruster systems, resulting in a “zero fault tolerance” situation – meaning there was no back-up for the failed unit during what was a critical phase of the vehicle’s flight.

So why wasn’t CFT 1 designated a Type A mishap immediately after the fact? Here the report is uncompromising in its assessment: NASA managers overseeing the Starliner contract were more concerned with getting the vehicle certified for routine crew operations than with admitting it still has major flight qualification issues which should disbar it from routine use to launch crews. It is in this approach of directly pointing the finger and throwing back the covers on how NASA and its contract have been functioning within the Starliner contract that the report – despite the redactions within it – is uncompromisingly clear in apportioning blame.

In particular, the report highlights numerous issues with the way the contract – and by extension – all commercial partnership contracts are handled by NASA. Chief among these is that, whilst charged with overall oversight responsibilities for such programmes, NASA took an almost completely hands-off approach to Starliner, bowing to Boeing when it came to most critical decision making on the overall fitness for purpose of the system. Challenges to internal decision making at Boeing were muted or non-existent, and when it was felt Boeing were obfuscating or failing to be properly transparent, NASA tended not to challenge, but simply started mistrusting their contractor, allowing further breakdowns in communications to occur.

For its part, Boeing felt it could compartmentalise issues into individual fault chains and fixes, rather than seeing and reporting them as they were, a series of interconnected chains of design issues, faults and upsets. As a result, issues were dealt with on a kind of patch-and-fix approach, rather than a systematic examination of chains of events and proper root cause analysis. In this, the report particularly highlights the fact that whilst Boeing has a robust Root Cause / Corrective Action (RCCA) process, all too often it was never fully deployed in dealing with issues, the priority being to find a fix for each issue in turn and move on in the belief things would be rectified once all the fixes had been identified and implemented.

*A time lapse photograph of the Boeing CST-100 Starliner featuring the capsule* Calypso, docked at the ISS in June 2024 during Crew Flight Test 1, which saw a further series of thruster issues for the vehicle, ultimately leading it to make an uncrewed return to Earth. Credit: NASA

The report goes into a number of recommendations as to how NASA must handle future commercial partnerships such as the Commercial Crew Programme (CCP) of which SpaceX and Boeing are both a part, and how it should exercise full and proper oversight and lose its hands-off attitude. Time will tell in how these changes will affect such contracts – not just with Boeing and CST-100, but also with the likes of SpaceX and the development of their lunar lander, a project where NASA has again been decidedly hands-off in it approach to the work, allowing SpaceX to continually miss deadlines, fail to produce vehicle elements in time for testing, and to seemingly pushed vehicle development to one side in favour of pursuing its own goals whilst still taking NASA financing to the tune of US $4.9 billion.

In respect of Starline itself, the root cause(s) of the thruster issues on the vehicle still has/have yet to be fully determined. However, Issacman has made it clear NASA will not be withdrawing from the contract with Boeing; instead he has committed NASA to refusing to flying any crew aboard Starliner until such time as Boeing can – with NASA’s assistance – demonstrate that the issues plaguing the vehicle have been fully understood and dealt with properly and fully.

Whether that can be done within the next 5 years of ISS operational life remains to be seen.

Artemis 2: WDR Success; Launch Again Delayed

The Artemis 2 Space Launch System (SLS) rocket successfully completed its pre-flight wet dress rehearsal (WDR) test on Thursday, February 19th, 2026, potentially clearing the path for a mission launch in early March – or at least, that was the hope.

As I’ve noted in recent Space Sunday updates, the WDR is a major test of all the ground systems associated with launching an SLS rocket, together with the on-board systems and all ground support personnel to make sure all systems are ready for an actual launch and staff are up-to-speed with all procedures and possible causes for delays, etc. Such tests run through until just before engine ignition, and include fully fuelling the booster’s core stage with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

The WDR had previously revealed issues with the propellant loading system at the base of the mobile launch platform on which the rocket stands ahead of lift-off, with various leaks being noted the both the first Artemis 2 WDR and previously with the uncrewed Artemis 1 mission of 2022.

*A ground level view of the Artemis 2 SLS sitting atop its mobile launch platform at LC-39B, Kennedy Space Centre, Florida. Credit: NASA/Ben Smegelsky*

The original Artemis 2 WDR suffered issues with the liquid hydrogen feed into the rocket and with a filter designed to keep impurities out of the propellants. Both the problem valves and the filter were swapped-out ahead of the second WDR together with the replacement of a number of seals which showed minor signs or wear. Following the second WDR test, an initial review of the gathered data was performed, and the results gave NASA managers the confidence to officially name March 6th, 2026 as the target launch date for the mission, marking the opening of a 5-day launch window in March, with a further window available in April.

However, within 24 hours of the target launch date being announced, NASA was forced to issue a further mission postponement when another issue was discovered – this time a helium leak in the booster’s upper stage.

The new leak is entirely unrelated to those within the umbilical propellant system on the mobile launch platform and lies within the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) pressurisation system.

The latest issue with the Artemis 2 SLS lies within the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), aka the rocket’s upper stage, seen above, which will perform a number of tasks in the mission – including getting the Orion crew vehicle to orbit in the first place. The issues are entirely unrelated to those seen with the main propellant loading system at the base of the rocket. Image credit: United Launch Alliance.

The ICPS plays a critical role in both lifting the Orion vehicle to its initial orbit following separation from the booster’s core stage, and then moving it to a high altitude orbit prior to it and Orion entering a trans-lunar injection orbit, where – after the ICPS has separated from Orion, it will be used as a target for a series of planned rendezvous and simulated docking exercises to test Orion’s ability to carry out the precise manoeuvring required to dock with Moon-orbiting Moon landers and (eventually)with the Gateway station.

However, in order to function optimally, the ICPS requires a “solid” – that is a specific rate of flow and pressure for the helium. Fluctuations in the flow – such as caused by a leak – cannot be tolerated. This means that in order to fly, Artemis 2 requires the issue to be properly addressed. This is something that might be done whilst leaving the vehicle on the pad; however, it might require the vehicle to be rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) to allow complete access to the ICPS. At the time of writing, engineers at NASA were still evaluating which option to take.

But one thing is clear – with just two weeks between the discovery of the issue and the opening of the March launch window, there is precious little time to fully investigate and rectify the issue. As such, NASA is now shifting its focus towards having the mission ready for lift-off in time to meet the April 2026 launch window.

Space Sunday: lunar ambitions: the real and the not-so-real

Posted on February 15, 2026 by Inara Pey

The core stage of China’s new Long March 10 (CZ-10A variant) booster uses a single motor to ease itself into the waters of the South China Sea to await recovery after a highly successful test flight. Credit: CCTV video footage

The current “race for the Moon” is turning into a hare-and-tortoise situation on several levels, including internationally. On the one hand, there is America’s (arguably over-complicated, thanks to NASA’s insistence on the use of cryogenic propulsion to get to / from the lunar surface) Artemis programme, which seems to race along in fits and bursts (and frequently slams itself into a wall of delay) and then there is China’s more conservative “latter-day Apollo” approach, which quietly plods along, racking up achievements and milestones whilst seeming to be technologically far behind US-led efforts.

As noted, China’s approach to reaching the Moon, is something of a harkening back to the days of Apollo in that it uses a relatively small-scale crewed vehicle for getting between Earth and the Moon, and a similarly small-scale lander. However, size isn’t everything, and both crew vehicle and lander (the latter of which has a cargo variant) would be more than capable in allowing China to establish a modest human presence on the Moon, just as their Tiangong space station, whilst barely 1/4 the size of the International Space Station, has allowed them to do the same in Earth orbit. It is also important to recognise it as part of an integrated, step-by-step lunar programme officially called the Chinese Lunar Exploration Programme (CLEP) and familiarly referenced as the Chang’e Project after the Chinese Goddess of the Moon, which has allowed China to develop both a greater understanding of operations on the Moon and in understanding the Moon itself.

The Chang’e project commenced over 20 years ago, and recorded its first successes in 2007 and 2010 with its Phase 1 orbital robotic missions. This was followed by the Phase II lander / rover missions (Chang’e 3 and Chang’e 4) in 2013 and 2018 respectively, and then the Phase III sample return mission of Chang’e 5 (2020).

Currently, the programme is in its fourth phase, an extensive study of the South Polar Region of the Moon in preparation for human landings, nominally targeting 2030. This phase of the programme has already seen the highly successful Chang’e 6 mission, the first to retrieve surface samples from the Moon’s far side, as well as deploying a rover there. 2026 will see Chang’e 7 launched, a high concept resource seeking mission comprising an orbiter, lander and “lunar flyer”, all geared to locate resources which can be utilised by future missions.

China’s Chang’e 6 mission, launched in May 2024, was the first Chinese mission to the far side of the Moon, and the first mission to ever return samples gathered from the lunar far side and return them to Earth (June 2024). In this image, Chang’e 6 is seen from the Jinchan mini-rover, which piggybacked a ride to the Moon with the lander. Credit: CNSA.

In 2028, the last of the Phase IV mission will launch. Chang’e 8 is intended to be a combination of in-situ resource utilisation (ISRU) test bed, demonstrating how local materials (water ice, regolith) can be used to produce structures on the Moon via advanced 3D printing, and to establish a small ecosystem experiment in advance of human landings.

This approach means that from a standing start, China has replicated much of NASA’s work of the 1960s that helped pave the way for Apollo, but in much greater depth. It’s not unfair to say that by retuning such a focused series of mission phases – notably Phase IV – China potentially will develop a greater spread of knowledge concerning the Moon’s South Polar Region than NASA.

At the same time, China has been developing the hardware required for the human side of the Chang’e Project. This primarily takes the form of their Mengzhou (“Dream Vessel”) reusable crewed vehicle, the Lanyue (“Embracing the Moon”) 2-stage lunar lander / ascent vehicle and the Long March 10 semi-reusable heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) offering a very similar capability to Blue Origin’s New Glenn vehicle.

Mengzhou is being developed in two variants: a low Earth orbit (LEO) variant, designed to ferry crews to / from the Tiangong space station. The second is being developed expressly for lunar missions, offering an increased mission endurance capability. The first uncrewed orbital test-flight for the 14-tonne LEO version of Mengzhou is due to take place in 2026, the system having been going through progressive flight tests throughout the 2010 and early 2020s. If successful, it will pave the way for the vehicle to start operating on crewed flights to Tiangong alongside the current Shenzhou craft, which it will eventually replace.

*Launch of the CZ-10A and Mengzhou test vehicles, February 11th, 2026. Credit: CCTV*

On February 11th, 2026, a test article of the 21-tonne Mengzhou lunar vehicle completed a significant test atop the core reusable stage Long March 10 (Chinese designation CZ-10A) booster. This was a combined mission to test both the Mengzhou launch abort system (LAS) whilst under the rocket’s maximum dynamical pressure flight-regime, and also the booster’s ability to complete an ascent to its nominal stage separation altitude of 105 km, and then make a controlled descent and splashdown close to its recovery ship.

Following a successful launch, the combined vehicle climbed up to the period of “Max Q”, around 1 minute into a flight and wherein the maximum dynamic forces are being applied to the entire stack. The Mengzhou LAS successfully triggered, boosting the vehicle away from the Long March core stage at high speed. The Mengzhou capsule then separated from the LAS performed a splashdown downrange.

*The Mengzhou LAS powers away from the CZ-10A corse stage, carrying the Mengzhou capsule with it, as would be required should a critical malfunction occur with the Long March 10 rocket. Credit: CCTV*

The Long March 10 core stage then continued a powered ascent profile, performing engine shutdown at 105 km before simulating an upper stage separation followed by a post-separation manoeuvre. This saw the stage enter “glide” phase, using its aerodynamic fins to maintain its orientation.

During this “glide” phase (actually a controlled descent, the stage orienting itself to fall engines-first), the booster carried out an automated pre-cooling of its engines in readiness for re-use and raise the pressure within the propellant tanks to settle their contents in readiness for engine re-use.

Cameras on the booster capture the deployment of the SpaceX-like grid fins on the upper end of the stage, which help it to maintain the correct orientation during its descent back to Earth. Credit: CCTV

Roughly one minute before splashdown, several of the engines successfully re-lit in a braking manoeuvre to bleed off much of the stage’s velocity. These were quickly reduced to just 3 motors and then a single motor as the stage came to a near-hover before that motor shutdown allowed it to settle smoothly and vertically in the water just 200 metres abeam of its recovery ship.

As an aside, it is interesting to contrast reporting on this flight with media coverage of SpaceX Starship “integrated flight tests”. In the case of the latter, almost every flight has been reported as some kind of spectacular success, despite most of the flights blowing up, barely meeting their assigned goals, or simply re-treading ground already covered. By contrast, the Mengzhou / CZ-10A core stage test flight has largely been defined as a “small step” in China’s progress, with some emphasising the flight “not reaching orbit” – which it was never intended to do.

In reality, the entire flight was a complete success. Not only did it demonstrate the Mengzhou vehicle’s LAS fully capable of lifting the command module and crew clear of an ascending CZ-10A should the latter suffer a malfunction during the most dynamically active phase of it flight, it also further demonstrated the capsule’s parachute descent system and its ability to make a recoverable splashdown (Mengzhou is capable of both water and land-based touchdowns, being able to be equipped with either a floatation device or airbags prior to launch).

Another still from the video of the test flight, showing the booster entering the see and its proximity to the recovery vessel, just visible on the right of the image. Future tests will see the recovery vessel attempt to “catch” a returning booster directly using a “tether” system. Credit: CCTV

Further, the test demonstrated the CZ-10A core stage’s ability to undertake a return to Earth and splashdown (again, the booster is designed to both land on a recovery ship a-la Falcon 9 and New Glenn, or make a splashdown close enough to the recovery ship so it can then be recovered – direct returns to the recovery vessel will be a part of future tests). Finally, such was the accuracy of the guidance systems, the rocket splashed down just 200 metres from the recovery ship, as planned.

That said, it is true that all the core components of the crewed phase of the Chang’e project still have a way to go before China can send a crew to the Moon. But like the tortoise, their one-step-at-a-time / keep-it-simple approach could yet see them become the first nation to do so since 1972.

Why SpaceX is most likely “Shifting from Mars to the Moon”

Thirteen months ago, in an attempt to bolster his failing “Mars colony plan” (a totally unrealistic fever dream of sending a “Battlestar Galactica” scale feet of 1,000 Starship vehicles carrying 1 million people to Mars to establish a colony there), the SpaceX CEO declared “the Moon is a distraction” and Mars was the focus for his company.

Well, he’s had 13 months to forget all that, as on the weekend of February 7th and 8th, 2026, the self-styled man who “knows more about manufacturing than anyone else alive on Earth” and yet cannot deliver on a single one of his manufacturing promises, declared that the Moon is now the focus of SpaceX’s endeavours, all as a part of a grand plan to “expand human consciousness and support his equally questionable idea of operating a 1-million strong constellation of Starlink satellites as a string of “data centres in space”. For good measure he mixes in terms such as “climbing the Kardashev scale” )the latter seems to be a particular reference point for so-called space entrepreneurs of late).

However, the real reason is liable to be far more mundane: the SpaceX CEO is again trying to justify the US $1.2 trillion valuation he and his fellow broad members arbitrarily awarded the company in January, and to justify such a figure in the face of an upcoming IPO whilst also possibly trying to further dazzle investors with shiny promises about orbital data centres and moon bases at a time when SpaceX has just “inherited”xAI and its cash burn-through of around US $1 billion a month.

The promise of a fully operational “Moon Base Alpha” (yes, once again we have a sci-fi trope to add gloss to an idea) in “10 years” will, undoubtedly go the same way as the more than a decade old claim that Tesla vehicles will be capable of full self driving “next year”; the statement that SpaceX would have Starship operational by 2022, and that Starship would fly around the Moon in 2023 and to Mars in 2024, err, 2026, err, 2028. That is to say, most likely never.

Martian Organics Cannot be Entirely Explained by Non-organic Processes

One of the major mysteries of Mars is the question of methane. It was first detected in more than faint trace amounts by the European Space Agency’s Mars Express mission in 2004. A decade later, NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) rover Curiosity, detected methane spikes and organic molecules whilst exploring the floor of Gale Crater. Then in 2019, the rover a massive spike as it explored “Teal Ridge”, a formation of bedrock and deposits on “Mount Sharp” (Aeolis Mons).

Alongside of this is the vexing discovery of organic elements on Mars. These and the methane seem to point a finger towards the idea that the planet may have once harboured life. However, as even proponents of this idea point out, both organics and methane can result from purely inorganic interactions. The tick is – how to determine which might be the case.

*An artist’s rendering of* Curiosity *at work in Gale Crater. Credit: NASA*

In March 2025, Curiosity detected small amounts of decane, undecane, and dodecane in a rock sample, which constituted the largest organic compounds found on Mars to date. These offered the potential to determine which option might be more likely to cause their existence – organics or inorganic chemical reactions. All three are hydrocarbons could be fragments of fatty acids, also known as carboxylic acid.

On Earth, carboxylic acid (aka fatty acids) is a natural by-product of life. Such acid can be found in animal tissues, nuts and seeds. In the case of animal tissues, carboxylic acid is predominantly formed by the breakdown of carbohydrates by the liver and found within adipose tissue, and the mammary glands. however, they can also be created by inorganic reactions – such as lightning striking chemically rich soils (or regolith), hydrothermal interactions and photochemical reactions between ultraviolet radiation and hydrocarbon-rich mixtures.

In order to try to determine whether the fatty acids discovered by Curiosity preserved in ancient mudstone are the result of organic processes or inorganic. Whilst limited with working only with data from the rover’s Sample Analysis at Mars (SAM) spectrometer, the team sought to recreate the likely conditions on Mars some 80 million years ago – this being the amount of time the rock containing the acids would likely have been exposed to the surface atmosphere – and then work back from there to try to determine which would survive the longest: carboxylic acid produced by organic or inorganic means.

What they found was that organic mechanisms appear to leave far more in the way of organic remnants – such as decane, undecane, and dodecane – than the typical non-biological processes involved in forming carboxylic acid could produce. The team suggest that this might be because any organics responsible for the fatty acids might have been assisted by periodic impacts by carbonaceous meteorites, known to be sources of fatty acids formed in space.

*A graphic shows the long-chain organic molecules decane, undecane, and dodecane, the largest organic molecules discovered on Mars to date. Credit: NASA/Dan Gallagher*

However the team also urge caution: whilst their finding might move the needle further towards the idea that Mars once harboured life, they also clearly note that there is a need for greater study; Mars is a complex world, rich in complex interactions. As such, more and detailed study is required – preferably first-hand, through the obtaining of samples from Mars itself. Currently, and rather ironically, whilst NASA had planned to make samples from the Mars 2020 rover Perseverance available for return to Earth, these do not contain samples of a similar nature to those found by Curiosity.

More particularly, at the time Perseverance had launched to Mars with sample retrieval in mind, no-one had actually sorted out how such a retrieval might be achieved. As such, a series of highly complicated, overly expensive proposals were put forward, involving both US and European co-operation. Each of these were knocked down on the basis of complexity and escalating price – up to US $11 billion – or close to half of NASA’s overall budget – for such a mission was just too big an ask. Thus, despite more cost-effective proposals such has Rocket Lab’s (still complex) three-launch mission slated to cost a “mere” US $4 billion, the entire idea of a sample return mission has been cancelled as a result of NASA’s budget being tightened.

Space Sunday: space debris and atmospheric damage + some updates

Posted on February 1, 2026 by Inara Pey

A European Space Agency Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) burns-up in the upper atmosphere following its departure from the International Space Station (ISS). Debris from this type of re-entry burn-up is now of growing concern due it its potential impact on the atmosphere and climate change. Credit: ESA

I’ve written about the issues of space debris on numerous occasions in these pages (for example, see: Space Sunday: debris and the Kessler syndrome; more Artemis or Space Sunday: Debris, Artemis delays, SpaceX Plans). Most of these pieces have highlighted the growing crowded nature of space immediately beyond our planet’s main atmosphere, the increasing risk of vehicle-to-vehicle collisions and the potential for a Kessler syndrome event.

However, there is another aspect of the increasing frequency of space launches and the number of satellites and debris re-entering the atmosphere: pollution and an increase in global warming. This is something I covered in brief back in October 2024, and it is becoming a matter of growing concern.

Currently, there are 14,300 active satellites orbiting Earth (January 2026), compared to just 871 20 years ago. Some 64.3% of these satellites belong to one company: SpaceX, in the form of Starlink satellites. Launches of these commenced in 2019, with each satellite intended to operate between 5 and 7 years. However, because of their relative cheapness, combined with advances in technology and the need for greater capabilities means than since August 2025, SpaceX has been “divesting” itself of initial generations of their Starlink satellites within their anticipated lifespan at a rate to match the continued use of newer satellites, freeing up orbital “slots” for the newer satellites.

As a result, SpaceX is now responsible for over 40% of satellite re-entries into the atmosphere, equating to a net of over half a tonne of pollutants – notably much of it aluminium oxide and carbonates – being dumped into the upper atmosphere a day, all of which contributes to the greenhouse effect within the upper atmosphere.

These particulates drift down into the stratosphere where monitoring is showing they are having some disturbing interactions with everything from the ozone layer through to weather patterns.

We’re really changing the composition of the stratosphere into a state that we’ve never seen before, much of it negative. We really don’t understand many of the impacts that can result from this. The rush to space risks disrupting the global climate system and further depleting the ozone layer, which shields all living things from DNA-destroying ultraviolet radiation.

– John Dykema, applied physicist at the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard

In a degree of fairness to SpaceX – who will continue to dominate the issue of re-entry pollutants if their request to deploy a further 15,000 Starlink units is approved – they are not the only contributor. One Web, Amazon, Blue Origin and China via their Qianfan constellation, all stand to add to the problem – if on something of a smaller scale (Amazon and Blue Origin, for example, only plan to operate a total of 8,400 satellites, total). Further, NASA itself is a contributor: the solid rocket boosters used by the space shuttle and now the Space Launch System have been and are major depositors of aluminium and aluminium oxides in the upper atmosphere.

Nor does it end there. The vehicles used to launch these satellites are a contributing factor, whether semi-reusable or expendable. They add exhaust gases – often heavy in carbonates – into the atmosphere, as well as continuing to the dispersion of pollutants in the upper reaches of the atmosphere as upper stages re-enter and burn up.

Carbonates and things like aluminium oxides are of particular concern because of their known impact on both greenhouse gas trapping and in the destruction of the ozone layer. A further factor here is that research suggests that interactions between aluminium oxide and solar radiation in the upper atmosphere can result in the production of chlorine in a highly reactive form, potentially further increasing ozone loss in the atmosphere.

We’re not only putting thermal energy into the Earth’s climate system, but we’re putting it in new places. We don’t really understand the implications of changing stratospheric circulation. It could cause storm tracks to move. Maybe it could shift climate zones, or possibly be a new source of droughts and floods. Chlorine is one of the key actors in the ozone hole. If you add a new surface that converts existing chlorine into reactive and free radical forms, that will also promote ozone loss. Not yet enough to create a new ozone hole, but it can slow the recovery that began after the 1987 Montreal Protocol phased out chlorofluorocarbons.

– John Dykema, applied physicist at the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard

There is something of a complex balance in all of this. We need the capabilities an orbital infrastructure can provide – communications, monitoring, Earth and weather observation, etc., – but we also need to be aware of the potential for debilitating the natural protections we need from our atmosphere together with the potential for pollutants to further accelerate human-driven climate change beyond the ability of the planet to correct.

This is further complicated by the inevitable friction between commercial / corporate need – and much of modern space development is squarely in the corporate domain, where income and revenue are the dominant forces – and governmental oversight / policy making and enforcement. As such, how and when policy makers might act is also subject to some complexity, although many in the scientific community are becoming increasingly of the opinion that action is required sooner rather than later, and preferably on a united front.

Changes to stratospheric circulation may ultimately prove more consequential than the additional ozone loss, because the outcomes are so uncertain and potentially far-reaching. For the moment, many questions are not really amenable to straightforward, linear analysis. The ozone loss is significant, and we’re putting so much stuff up there that it could grow in ways that are not proportional to what has thus far been seen. The question is whether policymakers will act on those concerns before the invisible wake of our spacefaring ambitions becomes impossible to ignore.

– John Dykema, applied physicist at the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard

Brief Updates

Artemis 2 Launch targets February 8th As Earliest Opportunity

NASA has announced a new earliest launch target date for Artemis 2: Sunday, February 8th, 2026, some two days later than the initial earliest launch date target.

The decision to push the target date back was taken after the planned wet dress rehearsal (WDR) for the launch – which sees all aspects of a vehicle launch tested right up to the point of engine ignition – was postponed due to extremely cold weather moving in over the Kennedy Space Centre which could have impacted accurate data gathering on the 49-hour test, which had been slated to commence on January 29th, 2026.

*The Artemis 2 Space Launch System rocket on the pad at Launch Complex 39B at Kennedy Space Centre, January 31st, 2026. Credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky.*

The WDR was instead reset for the period of February 1st through 3rd, 2026, with the countdown clock to the start of testing resuming at 01:13 UTC on February 1st. It will run through to the opening of a simulated launch window for 02:00 UTC on February 2nd. This latter part of the test will see the propellant loading system – which exhibited issues during preparations for the 2022 Artemis 1 launch – put through its paces to confirm it is ready for an actual launch.

As a thorough testing of all ground and vehicle systems, and a full rehearsal for all teams involved in a launch, the WDR is the last major step in clearing the SLS and Artemis 2 for it mission around the Moon. It will officially terminate as the simulated launch window opens, some 10 seconds before engine ignition – but data gathering will continue through until February 3rd as the rocket is de-tanked of propellants and made safe. Then will come a data analysis and test review.

The actual crew of Artemis 2 are not participating in the test, but will be observing / monitoring elements of the WDR as it progresses. NASA has a livestream of the pad as the WDR progresses, and a separate stream will be opened during the propellant loading phases of the test.

The Artemis 2 crew: Canadian Space Agency astronaut Jeremy Hansen, and NASA astronauts Victor Glover (vehicle pilot), Reid Wiseman (mission Commander) and Christine Koch. Credit: NASA

The push back to February 8th, means that NASA effectively has a 3-day opportunity through until February 11th (inclusive) in which to launch the mission before the current window closes. After that, the mission will have to wait for the March launch window to open.

NASA / SpaceX Crew 12 Looks to February 11th Launch

As NASA primarily focuses on Artemis 2, a second crewed launch is being lined up on the taxiway (so to speak) ready to follow the SLS into space – or possibly launch ahead of it.

NASA and SpaceX have confirmed they are looking at February 11th, 2026 as a potential launch date for the Crew 12 mission to the International Space Station (ISS). The mission will lift-off from Kennedy Space Centre’s launch Complex 39A (LC-39A), just a few kilometres away from the SLS at LC-39B, carrying NASA astronauts Jessica Meir and Jack Hathaway, together with ESA astronaut Sophie Adenot, and Roscosmos cosmonaut Andrey Fedyaev aboard the SpaceX Crew Dragon Freedom.

The Expedition 74/75 / SpaceX Crew 12 personnel, l to r: Roscosmos cosmonaut Andrei Fedyaev, NASA astronauts Jack Hathaway (vehicle pilot) and Jessica Meir (crew commander), and ESA astronaut Sophie Adenot. Image credit: SpaceX.

Officially classified as NASA Crew Expedition 74/75, the four will bring the ISS back up to it nominal crew numbers following the medical evacuation which saw the Crew 11 astronauts make an early return to Earth, as I’ve covered in recent Space Sunday articles.

The preparations for Crew 12’s launch means that in the coming days there will be two rockets on the pads at Kennedy’s Launch Complex 39, each proceeding along its own route to launch. As to which goes first, this depends primarily on how the Artemis 2 / SLS launch preparations go. If it leaves the pad between February 8th and February 10th as planned, then there is nothing hindering Crew 12 lifting-off atop their Falcon 9 booster. However, any push-back to February 11th would likely see Crew 12 delayed until February 12th at the earliest. Conversely, if Artemis 2 is delayed until the March launch opportunity, this immediately clears the way for Crew 12 to proceed towards a February 11th lift-off, with both February 12th and 13th also available.

Habitability of Europa Takes Another Blow

In my previous Space Sunday article, I covered recent studies relating to the potential for Jupiter’s icy moon Europa to harbour life (see: Space Sunday: examining Europa and “The Eye of Sauron”). The studies in question were mixed: one contending that conditions on Europa might lean towards life being present within its deep water ocean, the other being more sceptical about the sea floor conditions required to support life (e.g. the presence of hydrothermal vents).

Now a further study has been published, and it also suggests the chances of life existing in Europa’s ocean are at best thin.

One of the core issues with Europa has been knowing just how thick its ice shell actually is. Some have suggested it could be as little as 2 kilometres thick, whilst others have stated it could be as deep as 30km.

Understanding the thickness of the moon’s ice crust is crucial, as it helps define whether or not processes seen to be at work on the Moon are sufficient enough to have an impact on what might be happening within any liquid water oceans under the ice.

If the ice crust is thin – say a handful of kilometres or less – then activities like subduction within the ice sheets have a good chance of carrying minerals and nutrients created by the interaction between brines in Europa’s surface ice down into the ocean below, where they might help support life processes. similarly, transport mechanisms within the ice could carry oxygen generated as a result of surface interactions down through the ice and into the waters below. If the ice is too thick, then there is a good chance such processes grind to a halt long before they break through the ice crust into the waters below, thus starving them of nutrients, chemicals and gases.

An analysis of data gathered by NASA’s Juno mission as it loops its way around Jupiter and making periodic fly-bys of Europa now suggests that the primary ice crust of Europa is potentially some 28-29 kilometres thick. That’s not good news for the moon’s potential habitability because, as noted it would severely hamper any movement of minerals and nutrients down through the moon’s ice and into the waters below. However, the researchers do note that this doesn’t mean such elements could not reach the waters below, but rather they would take a lot longer to do so, but rather their ability to support any life processes within Europa’s waters would be greatly diminished.

An unknown complication here is he state of the ice towards the bottom of the crust. Is it solid all the way through, or does it become more slush-like as it nears the water boundary layer, warmed by the heat of Europa’s mantle as it radiates outward through the ocean? If it is more slush-like, even if only for around 5 kilometres, this might aid transport mechanisms carrying nutrients, minerals, chemicals and oxygen down into the ocean. Conversely, if the ice is solid and there is a further 3-5 km thick layer of icy slush forming the boundary between it and liquid water, then it will act as a further impediment to these transport mechanisms being able to transfer material to the liquid water ocean.

As a result of this study, and the two noted in my previous Space Sunday article, eyes are now definitely turning towards NASA’s Europa Clipper, due to arrive in orbit around Jupiter in 2030, and ESA’s Juice mission, due to arrive in 2031, in the hope that they will be able to provide more detailed answers to conditions on and under Europa’s ice.

Space Sunday: Crew 11 comes home; Artemis 2 rolls out

Posted on January 18, 2026 by Inara Pey

The Crew-11 astronauts deboarding their NASA flight to Ellington Field, Houston on January 16th, 2026. Left to right: NASA astronauts Mike Fincke and Zena Cardman; Japan’s Kimya Yui and cosmonaut Oleg Platonov. Credit: NASA/Robert Markowitz

NASA’s ISS Expedition 73/74 crew, flying as SpaceX Crew 11, have made a safe and successful return to Earth following their medical evacuation from the space station.

As I reported in my previous Space Sunday piece, the decision to evacuate the entire 4-person crew, comprising NASA astronauts Zena Maria Cardman and Edward Michael “Mike” Fincke, together with Kimiya Yui of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and Russian cosmonaut Oleg Platonov, was made after one of the four suffered an unspecified medical issue. Details as to who has experienced the issue and what form it takes still have not been revealed – although when initially discussing bringing the crew back to Earth roughly a month ahead of their planned end-of-mission return, the agency did make it clear the matter was not the result of an injury.

NASA also made clear the move to bring the crew home was in no way an emergency evacuation – had it been so, there were options available to return the crew a lot sooner. Instead, the evacuation was planned so that the affected crew member could have their situation properly diagnosed on Earth, whilst allowing time for the combined crew on the ISS to wrap-up as much as possible with outstanding work related to their joint time on the station and to allow Fincke, as the current station commander, to hand-over to cosmonauts Sergey Kud-Sverchkov, who together with Sergey Mikayev and US astronaut Christopher Williams will continue aboard the station, where they will at some point in the next month be joined by the Crew 12 team from NASA.

*Crew Dragon* Endeavour, with her docking hatch open, backs gently away from the ISS, January 14th, 2026. Credit: NASA

The crew began prepping for their departure in the evening (UTC) of Wednesday, January 14th, when after a round of goodbyes to the three remaining on the ISS and then changing into the SpaceX pressure suits, the four Crew 11 personnel boarded Crew Dragon Endeavour, prior to the hatches between the spacecraft and station being closed-out and final checks run on the vehicle’s status in readiness for departure.

Following this, all four of the crew ran through a series of leak checks on their suits to ensure all connections with the Dragon’s life support systems were working, and Cardman – acting as the Crew 11 Mission commander and the experienced Fincke as the Crew 11 vehicle pilot – completed all pre-flight and power checks.

*Captured via a high altitude observation aircraft, Endeavour passed into the denser atmosphere surrounded by a plasma cone of super-heated molecules and trailing a fiery tail behind her. Credit: NASA*

Undocking occurred at 22:20 UTC, slightly later than planned, Fincke guiding the spacecraft smoothly and safely away from the station until Endeavour moved through the nominal 400-metre diameter and carefully monitored “keep out sphere” surrounding the ISS. This “sphere” represents the closest any vehicle can come to the ISS whilst operating entirely independently from the station – vehicles can only move closer whilst engaged in actual docking manoeuvres.

Crossing the sphere’s outer boundary some 20 minutes later, Endeavour entered the “approach / departure ellipsoid” – a zone extending away from the ISS denoting, as the name suggests, the area of space along which vehicles can approach / depart the station and make a safe manoeuvres away should anything happen during an initial docking approach.

By 22:52 UCT, some 30 minutes after initial undocking, Endeavour transitioned away from the ISS and into its own orbit around the Earth, intended to carry to a position where it could commence it re-entry manoeuvres and make a targeted splashdown off the coast of California. The main 13.5-minute de-orbit burn was initiated at 07:53 UTC on January 15th, as Endeavour passed over the Indian Ocean and Indonesia. From here, it passed over the Pacific reaching re-entry interface with the denser atmosphere at 08:31 UTC. At this point communications were lost – as expected – for around 7 minutes as the vehicle lay surrounded by super-heated plasma generated by the friction of its passage against the denser atmosphere, prior to being re-gained at 08:37 UTC.

*A pre-dawn infrared photograph taken from the deck of the recovery vessel MV Shannon, shows* Endeavour *still glowing from the heat generated by her passage through the atmosphere as she awaits recovery, January 15th, 2026. Credit: SpaceX*

Splashdown came at 08:40 UTC, closing-out a 167-day flight for the four crew. Recovery operations then commenced as a SpaceX team arrived at the capsule via launches and set about preparing it to be lifted aboard the recovery ship, which also slowly approached the capsule stern-first. By 09:14 UTC, Endeavour had been hoisted out of the Pacific and onto a special cradle on the stern of the MV Shannon, allowing personnel on the ship to commence the work in fully safing the capsule and getting the hatch open to allow the crew to egress.

On opening the hatch, a photograph of the four crew was taken, revealing them all to be in a happy mood, the smiles and laughter continuing as they were each helped out of Endeavour with none of them giving any clues as to who might have suffered the medical condition. Gurneys were used to transfer all four to the medical facilities on the Shannon, but this should not be taken to signify anything: crews returning from nigh-on 6-months in space are generally treated with caution until their autonomous systems – such as sense of balance – etc, adjust back to working in a gravity environment.

*Visors up and thumbs up, the four crew (Platonov, Fincke, Cardman and Yui) aboard Endeavour as the capsule hatch is opened following recovery onto the MV Shannon. Credit: SpaceX*

Following their initial check-out, all four members of Crew 11 were flown from the Shannon to shore-based medical facilities for further examinations. The ship, meanwhile, headed back to the port of Long Beach with Endeavour. Following their initial check-outs in California, the four crew were then flown to Johnson Space Centre, Texas on Friday, January 16th for further checks and re-acclimatisation to living in a gravity environment. No further information on the cause of the evacuation or who had been affected by the medical concern had, at the time of writing, been given – and NASA has suggested no details will be given, per a statment issued following the crew’s arrival at Johnson Space Centre.

The four crew members of NASA’s / SpaceX Crew-11 mission have arrived at the agency’s Johnson Space Centre in Houston, where they will continue standard postflight reconditioning and evaluations. All crew members remain stable. To protect the crew’s medical privacy, no specific details regarding the condition or individual will be shared.

– NASA statement following the arrival of the Crew 11 members at JSC, Texas.

Artemis 2 on the Pad

The massive stack of the second flight-ready Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and its Orion MPCV payload, destined to carry four astronauts to cislunar space and back to Earth, rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at NASA’s Kennedy Space Centre atop its mobile launch platform, to make its way gently to Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B).

The rocket – comparable in size to the legendary Saturn V – and its launch platform slowly inched out of High Bay 3 at the VAB at 12:07 UTC, carried by one of NASA’s venerable Crawler Transporters at the start of the 6.4 kilometre journey.

Artemis emerges: Sitting atop it mobile Launch Platform and on the back of a Crawler Transporter, the Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle containing Integrity, departs High Bay 3 of the Vehicle Assembly Building, Kennedy Space Centre, on the firs leg of the Artemis 2 flight to cislunar space and back. Credit: AP/John Raoux

The drive to the launch pad took almost 12 hours to complete, the average speed less than 1.6 km/h throughout. Standing 98 metres in height, SLS is powered by a combination of 4 RS-25 motors originally developed for the space shuttle, together with two solid rocket boosters (SRBs) based on those also used for the shuttle – although these boosters, with their tremendous thrust, will only be available to the rocket during the first couple of minutes of its ascent to orbit, helping to push it through the denser atmosphere before being jettisoned, their fuel expended.

The next major milestone for the launch vehicle is a full wet dress rehearsal on February 2nd, 2026. This involves a full countdown and fuelling of the rocket’s two main stages with 987 tonnes of liquid propellants, with the rehearsal terminating just before engine ignition. The wet dress rehearsal is a final opportunity to ensure all systems and launch / flight personnel handling the launch are ready to go.

Artemis 2 on its way to Launch Complex 39B at Kennedy Space Centre, January 17th,2026. Note the large boxy grey structure on the left of the base of the rocket. The is the combined propellants feed and power transfer mechanism, which proved problematic with leaks during preparations for Artemis 1 in 2022. Credit: AP/John Raoux

It was the wet dress rehearsal that caused numerous problems for NASA with Artemis 1, the uncrewed flight of an Orion vehicle around the Moon in 2022, with repeated leaks occurring in the cryogenic propellant feed connections on the launch platform. These issues, together with a range of other niggles and the arrival of rather inclement weather, forced Artemis 1 to have to return to the VAB three times before it was finally able to launch.

Since then, changes have been made in several key areas – including the propellant feed mechanisms. The hope is therefore that the wet dress rehearsal for Artemis 2 will proceed smoothly as the final pre-flight test, and the green light will be given for a crewed launch attempt, possibly just days after the rehearsal. However, Artemis 2 will not be standing idle on the pad until February 2nd; between now and then there will be a whole series of tests and reviews, all intended to confirm the vehicle’s readiness for flight and ground controllers readiness to manage it.

The crew of Artemis 2 – Canadian astronaut Jeremy Hansen, and NASA astronauts Christina Koch, Victor Glover and Reid Wiseman, prepare to address the media as Artemis 2 crawls by on its way to the launch pad. Credit: NASA

Assuming everything does go smoothly, NASA is currently looking at Friday, February 6th, 2026 as the earliest date on which Artemis 2 could launch, with pretty much daily windows thereafter available through until February 11th, with further windows available in March and April.

As I’ve recently written, Artemis 2 will be an extended flight out to cislunar space over a period of 10 days, during which the 4-person crew of NASA astronauts Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover and Christina Koch and Canadian Space Agency astronaut Jeremy Hansen will thoroughly check-out the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and its fitness as a lunar crew transport vehicle.

These tests will initially be carried out in Earth orbit over a 24-hour period following launch, during which the Orion vehicle – called Integrity – will lift both the apogee and perigee of its orbit before performing an engine burn to place itself into a trans-lunar injection flight and a free return course out to cislunar space, around the Moon and then back to Earth. The transit time between Earth and cislunar space will be some 4 days (as will be the return transit time). This is slightly longer than Apollo generally took to get to the Moon, but this (again) is because Artemis 2 is not heading directly for a close orbit of the Moon, but rather out to the vicinity of space that will eventually be occupied by Gateway Station, where crews will transfer from their Orion vehicle to their lunar lander from Artemis 4 onwards. Thus, this flight sees Integrity fly a similar profile the majority of Artemis crewed missions will experience.

As I’ve also previously noted, this flight will use a free return trajectory, one which simply sends the craft around the Moon and then back on a course for Earth without the need to re-use the vehicle’s primary propulsion. Most importantly of all, it will test a new atmospheric re-entry profile intended to reduced the amount of damage done to the Orion’s vital heat shield as it comes back through Earth’ atmosphere ahead of splashdown.

Space Sunday: an evacuation and astronaut health

Posted on January 12, 2026 by Inara Pey

*The International Space Station as it appeared from a Crew Dragon vehicle in 2021. Credit: NASA / SpaceX*

For the first time in the history of the International Space Station (ISS), NASA is curtailing an entire crew rotation in order to bring an astronaut with an undisclosed medical condition back to Earth in order for them to receive full and proper treatment.

Exactly what the medical issue is has not been disclosed, although NASA has confirmed it is not injury related and the move is being made out of an abundance of care rather then the crew member suffering any immediate threat to their life. Nor has the name of the affected astronaut been made public as yet. What is known is the affected individual is one of the four people making up the Crew 11 (NASA ISS Expedition 73/74) mission, who arrived aboard the ISS in August 2025, and who were due to return to Earth later in February 2026 following a hand-over to the upcoming Crew 12 mission.

Crew 11 comprises veteran NASA astronaut Michael “Mike” Fincke, who took over the role of ISS commander after arriving there in August 2025, NASA astronaut Zena Maria Cardman, making her first trip into space and who is serving as the station’s Flight Engineer, together with Kimiya Yui of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on his second mission to the ISS, and Russian cosmonaut Oleg Platonov, on his first flight to orbit.

For Cardman this is the second time in succession her debut space flight his been the focus of changes; originally, she was to have flown as part of the Crew 9 mission in 2024, but was removed from that flight alongside astronaut Stephanie Wilson so their positions could be used to return Barry Wilmore and Sunita Wilson to Earth, following the issues with their Boeing Starliner which caused NASA to elect not to use that vehicle to bring them back to Earth.

News of the medical issue first broke on January 7th, when NASA announced the first EVA “spacewalk” of 2026 had been cancelled. This was to have been the first of 4 EVAs carried out by Crew 11 and the upcoming Crew 12 missions to install the last pair of iROSA solar arrays on the ISS as part of a years-long operation to boost the station’s power generation capabilities.

When originally launched, the ISS was furnished with eight pairs of massive 1-tonne solar arrays, each measuring 35 metres in length and 12 metres in width and originally capable of generating some 31 kW of electricity per pair. Called Solar Array Wings (SAWs) by NASA, these massive arrays have slowly become less and less efficient in generating electricity for the station, both as a result of their increasing age and because they are fairly fragile, and some have suffered certain amounts of damage over the decades.

*A close-up view of damage done to the 4B SAW of the ISS in 2007, following a move and redeployment of the array during STS-120. Credit: NASA*

Initially developed for NASA deep space missions, ROSA – Roll-Out Solar Arrays – are much more compact, much lighter and more robust than the SWs, as well as being far more efficient. The version used on the ISS – iROSA – for example, masses just 325 kg per array, with each array being half the size of the SAW units and able to generate up to 2/3rd the original SAW output. Since 2022, pairs of these iROSA units have been added to the ISS to supplement the SAW units, both stabilising and boosting the station’s power generation capabilities significantly.

As the medical issue was first announced at the time the EVA crew – Fincke and Cardman – would have been going through personal and equipment check-outs in advance of the actual EVA preparation and execution period planned for January 8th, initial speculation was that one of them had suffered some form of medical issue severe enough to curtail the planned activity. However, speculation as to who the affected crew member might be shifted to JAXA astronaut Kimiya Yui after a press briefing on January 8th revealed that he had requested a private consultation with medical experts on Earth around the same time as the EVA pre-prep work.

Whoever the individual affected is, the result is the same: as they require evacuation to Earth as a matter of safety and well-being, then all four members of Crew 11 must return early from the ISS, so that no-one ends up (dare I use the term beloved of the media?) “stranded” on the ISS “without a ride home”.

A 2021 enhanced image of the International Space Station showing how it would appear with six iROSA solar arrays deployed over three pairs of the the station’s existing primary arrays. At the time, it was only planned to deploy six of the 8 iROSA units to the ISS, the decision to add the final two being made in 2024. Credit: NASA

Currently, the plan is to return Crew 11 to Earth on the 14th / 15th January, with Crew dragon Endeavour departing the ISS at around 22:00 UTC on the 14th, with splashdown off the coast of California planned for around 08:40 UTC on the 15th. Following recovery, the entire crew will likely be flown to shore-based medical facilities.

As a result of this, the ISS is likely to undergo a period when it is under-staffed, with just three people aboard to run things: US astronaut Christopher Williams, on his first rotation at the ISS, together with cosmonauts Sergey Kud-Sverchkov, who is on his second stint on the ISS and will take over as station commander as from January 12th, and Sergey Mikayev, another ISS rookie. Whilst this is not the first time a reduced crew has operated the station (the last was during the COVID pandemic), the early return of Crew 11 does raise some complications for the immediate future of ISS operations.

The first of these is that without the Crew 11 personnel, the first two EVAs required to prepare the external power systems etc, for the installation of the new iROSA units (which would have been carried out by Crew 12 following their arrival on the ISS in February). Nor can the members of Crew 12 or the other personnel on the ISS simply “slot into” the work Cardman and Fincke were to have performed: each EVA requires specialised training and techniques – and none of Crew 12 nor those remaining on the station have received said training. Thus, the iROSA deploy is liable to be subjected to some delay.

Nor is it clear as to when Crew 12 will be in a position to launch to the ISS and take some of the pressure off of Williams, Kud-Sverchkov and Mikayev. Usually, NASA prefers to launch an outgoing crew several days ahead of a departing crew, so as to allow a formal hand-over one to the next. With Crew 11 now set to return early,it is unlikely such a hand-over will be possible, and as a result, additional time will be required by Crew 12 to get fully up-to-speed with the overall status of the ISS and the revised work schedule for their rotation.

A major determining favour in this could be that of Artemis 2. Under the current launch schedule, the SLS rocket for that mission is set to roll-out to Launch Complex 39B at Kennedy Space Centre on January 17th. Once there, the vehicle will undergo the last remaining tests required to clear it for a planned February 6th, mission lift-off.

Like Artemis 1 in 2022 (see here), Artemis 2 is due to make the drive from the Vehicle Assembly Building at NASA’s Kennedy Space Centre to Launch Complex 39B mounted on its Mobile Launch Platform atop NASA’s huge Crawler Transporter. The multi-hour roll-out is currently targeting January 17th, 2026. Credit: NASA

Given this, and while ISS and Artemis missions are essentially separate entities with no real cross-over, NASA is likely to be very cautious about having any parallel launch preparations going on at the “neighbouring” Launch Complex 39A, where SpaceX operate all of their crewed launches, simply because both facilities have a degree of overlap in the use of launch support services – notably radar and tracking capabilities which could bring preparations for both launches into a degree of conflict, particularly if one or the other experiences delays whilst on the pad.

So unless SpaceX is able to demonstrate it is able to accelerate Crew 12 launch preparations to a point where an attempt can be made before the Artemis 2 roll-out and launch and without interfering with the final ground tests Artemis 2 must complete to meet its planned launch date, it is entirely possible Crew 12 will have to wait until around its originally target launch date of February 15th in order to get off the ground. And that’s assuming issues with Artemis 2 don’t push its launch back during a time when Crew 12 could otherwise have been on its pad and otherwise ready to go. As a result, the entire situation remains in something of a state of flux, and this story will continue to develop over the coming week.

Astronaut Health and Welfare

All of the above has forced a degree of focus on the questions of astronaut health and welfare, both on the ISS and in terms of missions to the Moon and Mars. The ISS has the overall advantage in this regard, as it is obviously the closest to Earth, and is the best equipped off-Earth facility when it comes to astronaut health – albeit one that is necessarily limited when it comes to more serious conditions or significant injuries. In particular, the ISS has extensive first-aid and medical facilities, including the likes of an ultrasound scanner, defibrillators and other specialised equipment, with many crew members receiving paramedic levels of medical training, backed by the ability to be able to call on Earthside expertise rapidly and with minimal delay in real-time communications and, in a worse-case scenario, have stricken crew returned to Earth in relatively short order.

While much of this can be replicated in missions to the Moon and Mars, there limitations. Getting back from the Moon is not exactly “immediate”, particularly with regards to the way Artemis using cislunar space rather than a direct Earth-Moon-Earth approach, and Mars is obviously even less so. Further, two-way communications are more limited.; there is always at least a 2.6 second delay in two-way Earth-Moon / cislunar space communications, for example. While this might not sound a lot, it could be the difference between saving and losing a life.

For Mars missions the situation is even worse, given delays are always at least 4 minutes for two-way communications, and can be as much as 24 minutes. Whilst the latter clearly means that practical real-time medical advice and support cannot realistically be offered during medical emergencies, it also means that crews on such mission face the additional psychological strain of being unable to communicate in real-time with family and loved ones, leaving all such contact to pre-recorded messages.

In terms of general health, there are a wide range of issues to be considered. The most obvious is that of physical fitness in micro-gravity conditions: as is only too well-known, long-term exposure to micro-gravity can result in a range of muscular and cardiovascular issues. While these can be addressed through discipline and exercise (around 2.5 hours a day), it’s still a major commitment to do so day in and day out for between 6 and 8 months journey time between Earth and Mars. But whilst such issues are the most referenced of those associated with living and working in microgravity, they they are not the only issues. There are many physiological and psychological matters we have yet to fully understand and address as best we can.

One example of this takes the form of the so-called 2015-16 One-Year Mission (although its duration was technically 11 months). In it, identical twins and astronauts Scott and Mark Kelly where the focus of an in-depth study of physical and psychological impacts of long duration space flight. This saw Scott Kelly spent the time on the ISS, whilst Mark remained on Earth as a control subject. Doing so allowed ten different teams of medical, health and psychology experts to monitor changes in Scott Kelly’s overall health, physiology and psychology using Mark as a baseline reference. Hus, they were able to analyse in detail a wide range of elements and their associated changes in Scott, including body mass changes / redistribution, eye and bone deformation, immune system responses, molecular and psychological changes, alterations in cognitive capabilities and more. The results were in many ways both surprising and unexpected.

*Astronauts and identical twins Mark and Scott Kelly after the One-Year Mission (2015/16). Credit: NASA*

Whilst Scott Kelly remained in overtly good physical health, he did undergo changes to his cognitive abilities, his DNA and immune system and changes to his body’s gene regulation processes. He also experienced changes to his retinas and eyesight, as well as to his carotids and gut microbiome. Whilst none of these changes were significantly debilitating (and did correct themselves over a period of time following his return to Earth), they were not entirely without outward impact on him, and pointed the way to the potential for serious psychological and other issues being a problem within especially isolated, long-duration missions where direct contact with others outside of the immediate crew is next to impossible in real time.

Nor is this all. As I recently related to friend and fellow space enthusiast Hugh Toussant, there are significant health implications linked to deep space radiation exposure which have only really come to light in the last 6 years and which require much more in the way of study. Some of these issues are, as an example, related to Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs), the so-called “background radiation of the Big Bang”, and a subject which has been somewhat overlooked due to a preoccupant with addressing the impact of solar radiation effects such has coronal mass ejections (CMEs) which can admittedly be utterly devastating to an unprotected crew in very short order.

Whilst GCRs perhaps don’t have the immediate threat of something like a CME, they are also potentially much more of a risk over time and harder to address, simply because of the amount of energy they contain. In particular, a 2018/19 study demonstrated that GCR collisions with the human body can result in the reactivation of various strains of Herpes viruses which are otherwise generally dormant. These include the relative mild (but sill unpleasant varicella-zoster virus (VZV), which can cause issues such as glandular fever, all the way through to the highly contagious Epstein–Barr virus (EBV). The latter is particularly nasty, as it is very tightly linked to malignant diseases such as cancers (both lymphoproliferative – Burkitt lymphoma, hemophagocytic lymphohistiocytosis, and Hodgkin’s lymphoma – and non-lymphoid malignancies such as gastric cancer and nasopharyngeal carcinoma).

What was particularly unsettling about this study was that not only did it show that viruses like EBV could be re-activated by exposure to GCRs – but that it had happened to astronauts aboard the ISS, which operates within the relative shelter of Earth’s magnetic field and the protection it offers by diverting GCRs away towards the polar regions and thus out of the path of the ISS as it orbits the Earth. In particular a check back across the medical histories of 112 astronauts who flew on the ISS and shuttle missions revealed that between 61% and 96% of them had demonstrated shedding one or more re-activated Herpes viruses, including both EBV and VZV.

Exactly how much risk of such viral reactivation might occur on something like a mission to Mars – which largely takes place outside of any protection afforded by Earth’s magnetic field – is utterly unclear. However, given the potential for something like EBZ to give rise to a host of long-term malignant illnesses, it is clear that the apparent link between GCRs and the reactivation and shedding of such viruses needs to be more fully understood in order to enable proper mitigation techniques to be developed well before anyone starts mucking about with trying to send people to Mars. All of which is a long way of saying that while we have learned a lot about living and working in space, we very much have much more to understand.

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Artemis 2 SLS Rolled Back to the VAB

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Why SpaceX is most likely “Shifting from Mars to the Moon”

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Brief Updates

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Artemis 2 on the Pad

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Astronaut Health and Welfare

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